Suchergebnisse

In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fiscal forecasting system, useful for real-time monitoring of government's borrowing requirement in Spain, a country that has been at the center of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures to meet public deficit targets. The system is made of a suite of models, with different levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; general government vs sub-sectors) suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fiscal data published nowadays by Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental for ex-ante detection of risks to official projections, and thus can help in reducing the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary deviations. On the basis of our results, we discuss how official monitoring bodies could expand, on the one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of risks of (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets.

En este trabajo presentamos una herramienta para el seguimiento en tiempo real de la ejecución presupuestaria de las Administraciones Públicas en España. La herramienta incorpora un conjunto amplio de modelos estadísticos, con diferentes niveles de agregación entre partidas presupuestarias y subsectores de las Administraciones Públicas, que permiten procesar de manera efi ciente la sustancial información mensual y trimestral publicada actualmente por las autoridades estadísticas en España. La principal utilidad de la herramienta es complementar el análisis habitualmente realizado para detectar de manera anticipada posibles riesgos de desviación con respecto a los objetivos fi scales ofi ciales ; In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fiscal forecasting system of use for the real-time monitoring of the Spanish government's borrowing requirement. Spain has been at the centre of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures in meeting public defi cit targets. The system comprises a suite of models, with different levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down ; general government vs sub-sectors), which are suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fi scal data currently published by the Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental in the ex-ante detection of risks to offi cial projections, and can thus help reduce the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary slippage. On the basis of our results, we discuss how offi cial monitoring bodies could expand, on one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of risks to (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets

This paper discusses about the election of regional heads to the regional government budget allocation. This study discusses the regional budget in the period before local election and during the local election. Comparison is done by comparing the average expenditure comparison before and during the local election period by using paired sample t-test. The sample in this study in Indonesia carried out the post-conflict local election in 2017. The results of this study showed that basically before the post-conflict local election and at the post-conflict local election. There was a decrease in the allocation of grant spending during the post-conflict local election compared to the previous year. Besides that, there was no difference in the allocation of social assistance expenditure. This can improve the renewal and regulatory system in Indonesia, thus indicating that budget politicization is not proven.

AbstractMining royalties provide a volatile source of revenue for state governments in Australia. We explore the effects of changes in royalty revenue received by a state government on current‐year budget decisions about expenditure, tax revenue and the budget surplus. The literature postulates different models for how lower‐level government budget decisions respond to a revenue windfall from a higher level of government. Empirical evidence on these models over 1998–2019 provides strong evidence that over a half of a royalty windfall becomes a change in budget expenditure. Estimates of changes to tax revenues and the surplus are not definitive nor robust.

The paper states the pressing need for a more analytical approach to the allocation of Central Government budgets and to budget forecasts for local areas. In many cases Central Government is unable to deal with individual projects of expenditure or investment and a strict optimisation at this micro level is impracticable. In these circumstances allocation must be based on broad and more aggregative indices, current and predicted. The paper offers a number of distinctions and certain allocation methods are discussed with simple illustrations. It is argued that methods have to approximate to micro optimisation at one extreme and macro economic optimisation at the other. The paper calls for further analysis on the interrelationships between methods.

From an international perspective, a relationship between public sector transparency and better economic and social outcomes is something that is increasingly acknowledged. In terms of lack of transparency in budget reports both bureaucratic model and fiscal illusion theory have been argued as explanations. To assess transparency in budget practices we analyse to what extent a sample of 41 countries are meeting OECD requirements according to its Best Practices for Budget Transparency document (OBP). We find an average OBP fulfilment of 56.4 per cent. Transparency is negatively correlated with corruption and positively correlated with economic development. Countries receiving external financial and technical support meet fewer OBP recommendations than countries not receiving it. Considering the political framework, both progressive and conservative governments reach similar transparency levels. OECD members do not significantly fulfil more OBP suggestions than non‐members. In respect of 4 variables: transparency, corruption, democracy and development, four clusters of countries arise: top‐performing, low transparency‐developed, low transparency‐developing and worst‐performing.

Table of Contents -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction and Overview -- Part I: From Economic Stabilization to Budget Stabilization: Theory and Tools -- 2. From Economic Stabilization to Budget Stabilization -- 3. Subnational Government Tools for Budget Stabilization -- Part II: Boom-Year Savings and Effects in Bust Years -- 4. Patterns of State Savings with BSF and GFS -- 5. State Saving Behavior - Effects of BSF in Interaction with BBR -- 6. Effects of Boom-year Savings across Three Types of State Expenditures -- 7. Effects of Boom-year Savings on Bust-year Budgetary Actions -- Part III: Implications for Budgeting and Financial Management -- 8. Budgeting for Fiscal Stability over the Economic Cycle -- 9. Boom-Year Savings and Budgetary Forecasting -- 10. Debt as Counter-cyclical Fiscal Tool -- 11. A Framework for Fiscal Policy Coordination and Economic Stability -- 12. Prospects for Budget Stabilization by Subnational Governments -- References -- Notes -- General Appendixes -- Index