Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.

We estimate the dynamic effects of government spending shocks, using time-varying volatility in US data modeled through a Markov switching process. We find that the average government spending multiplier is significantly and persistently above one, driven by a crowding-in of private consumption and non-residential investment. We rationalize the results empirically through a contemporaneously countercyclical response of government spending and an efficient weighting of observations inversely to their error variance. We then show that the multiplier is significantly smaller when volatility is high, consistent with theories predicting reduced effectiveness of fiscal interventions in uncertain times.

Scholars have known for some time that attitudes toward federal spending on welfare are shaped by racial antipathies. Are attitudes toward spending on nonwelfare social programs similarly grounded? This article explores the dimensionality of spending attitudes and the extent to which they are rooted in stereotypical beliefs about blacks. Analysis of data from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 National Election Studies demonstrates that whites' attitudes toward welfare spending and social spending are structured in two-dimensional terms and that stereotypical beliefs about the work ethic of blacks systematically constrain their welfare attitudes and do not affect attitudes toward other social programs.