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On 1 October, 2012, the Georgian people made an important historical choice in favor of the Georgian Dream political opposition coalition headed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. This event will undoubtedly go down in the country's annals as the first time the opposition was brought to power not by revolution, but by election. And despite a certain opinion prevailing in society that a revolution might be possible, political tradition in post-Soviet Georgia took an extremely unexpected turn. The thing is that elections of any scope in Georgia have long failed to be a mechanism for bringing about a democratic change in power, acting instead as a pretext for carrying out coups or revolutions. Since the Soviet Union collapsed and Georgia acquired its independence, essentially no power change in the country has occurred by means of an election. An exception was the first multiparty parliamentary election held on 28 October, 1990; at that time, the ruling Communist party conceded its position to a national political force in the form of the Round Table-Free Georgia opposition bloc headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. It is also worth noting that victory over the communists was sustained while the Constitution of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and other Soviet laws were still in effect. Another salient point is that despite the impressive victory of the opposition bloc and the antagonism existing between the national government (which struggled for Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union) and the communists, the latter also acquired deputy mandates; they were even able to create an opposition faction. Fourteen political parties participated in the election of 28 October, 1990, held according to the mixed system. Two hundred and fifty members of parliament (125 under the proportional and 125 under the majority system) were elected for a five-year term. Furthermore, only two political parties-Round Table-Free Georgia (81 deputies plus 43 majority deputies) and the Communist Party of Georgia (44 deputies plus 17 majority deputies)-were able to overcome the 4% election barrier. However, at that time six parties were represented in the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, four of which managed to acquire deputy mandates under the majority system. After Zviad Gamsakhurdia's government was overthrown, all the subsequent elections ended with the victory of the ruling party: first, of the Union of Citizens of Georgia party headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, and after 2003 the United National Movement party headed by Mikheil Saakashvili. This party came to power in November 2003 with the help of the Rose Revolution, after which it was able to win another two parliamentary elections. On 1 October, 2012, the era of the United National Movement party came to an end.

The political and legislative communities long ignored the problem of civil integration of national minorities for the simple reason that the nation had had no time to overcome so-called ethno-national thinking. Its apologists regard minorities as part of an ethno-nation with a statehood of its own, or as an ethno-nation living in a state where it forms a numerically small group with no statehood at all. In this way, statehood and an ethno-national community were considered identical to the extent that the terms could hardly be separated. The doctrine was equally accepted by the titular and non-titular ethnoses. Its extreme manifestation took the form of ethno-egotism and a "feverish ethnic consciousness;" and general civic principles were pushed aside for the sake of egotistical group interests. The most extreme interpretations of ethno-nationalism result in regimes that tend, on the one hand, toward latent or even obvious ethnic purges. On the other, such manifestations urge national minorities to demand re-division of territories and force them to shift their loyalty from the country they live in to their historical homeland. The non-dominating ethnoses tend to suspect the state of favoring the dominant group at the expense of the rest. On the other hand, the dominant ethnic group suspects the ethnic minorities of ethnic egotism, etc. Ethnic nationalism has already caused segmentation of Georgian society, which constitutes a mêlée of ethnic communities that are diverse but unable to find unity. This created a paradox: part of the Georgian educational infrastructure serves the minorities; there are minorities-oriented media that manage to keep afloat; and there is freedom of communication with the historical homeland. This never led, and could not lead, to integration, instead it deepened disintegration. Under Soviet power, however, this did not bother anyone. The empire's Center struck a balance between the population majority and the minorities. It preached proletarian internationalism, an ideology that bestowed the role of a unifying and consolidating force on the Russian nation. The nomenklatura mechanism helped to maintain a balance in state administration and relations among the Soviet nations. The balancing factors disappeared along with the Soviet Union to allow ethnocratic trends to promptly move to the fore. Under President Gamsakhurdia, the institutions of statehood were destroyed to please ethnocracy, while state interests deteriorated into narrow sub-ethnic interests. The idea of civic awareness died along with the status of Soviet citizen, while the political vocabulary acquired new tags: "masters," who belonged to the titular nation, and "guests," which implied the national minorities.

The United National Movement declared the development of small and medium businesses as one of its main aims and promised to remove the taxation issue, the main irritant, from the agenda. Under Eduard Shevardnadze tax evasion was easy: businessmen and bureaucrats established unofficial relations regarded at the top as a natural development pattern of capitalism and primary accumulation. Businessmen were free to break the law, while bureaucrats seized the moment to grow rich by using their official positions to raise their personal prosperity. Even though the country's leaders alleviated state economic pressure on business, they increased their political and bureaucratic pressure by the same token, making the business community a hostage of the state and its bureaucracy. The latter was not only growing rich on bribes, it wanted large chunks of the businesses as well. Corrupt politicians and top bureaucrats protected the lawbreakers. In other words, while economic coercion was alleviated, pressure from the country's political leaders and corrupt bureaucrats was doubled. Businessmen were naturally displeased: they wanted to wriggle out of the double pressure. At one time, Eduard Shevardnadze used this to tighten his control over the business community and strengthen the social base of his power. After coming to power through a coup that toppled the regime of legitimately elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, he badly needed all the support he could master. The deposed president's allies stood opposed to him, while most of the population badly hit by the economic devastation and sliding standard of living posed a serious threat to his political system. To strengthen the regime's economic and social basis, President Shevardnadze assembled a business community out of his friends and political allies and enlisted new allies from among the businessmen connected with his regime. This explains how the National Bank of Georgia squandered credits and damaged the state's interests: advised by highly placed and influential people, its chairman was issuing credits in hard currency to be repaid in depreciated Georgian coupons. Huge capital formed in this way. Being aware that sooner or later he would be called to account, the chairman kept a list of all those who recommended the credit seekers. He shot himself under dubious circumstances during the interrogations. Naturally enough, society refused to accept the official version as true. The members of the top crust were not the only ones to exploit the permissiveness of Shevardnadze's regime: ordinary people who lost their jobs when the Soviet Union fell apart found themselves at the very bottom. Some became petty merchants, others took to smuggling; still others tried to set up small and medium businesses by violating the laws. Permissiveness relieved the state's pressure and let them live.

This article describes the mechanisms of formation of political elites that led to their ascension to the highest tier of the power hierarchy in post-Soviet Georgia. In work, in the process of theoretical analysis, drawing on empirical material, thematically describes the mechanisms of formation and recruitment of elites in example 4 of the ruling political elites, mobilized, and consolidated around, Z. Gamsakhurdia, Е. Shevardnadze, М. Saakashvili and nicknamed the "informal leader" of Georgia B. Ivanishvili. These ruling political elites differed from each other in terms of ideological and value orientations defining different paths of a hierarchical ascent to the highest stages of power structures of the modern independent Georgia. This article uses two-level form of analysis. In the first case, attention is paid to theoretical aspects of mechanisms of change of government, such as elections and saturated with elements of the coup, a revolution. In the second case, the focus has shifted to the synthesis of theoretical components and the study of empirical and factual issues of this material. The paper also contains an analysis of the factors that contributed to the formation of counter-elite in opposition to the ruling political elite. Also describes the patterns of political behavior that are counter-elite used to gain power. In the process of climbing the political forces irreconcilable opposition to the highest level of the political hierarchy, they often went beyond the permissible scope of legal and constitutional norms, achieving their political goals revolution and "revolution." In turn, the ruling political elite tried using the levers of power through authoritarian methods and illegal mechanisms of the state machine, in order to preserve themselves as the ruling political elite within the transformed political system ; В данной статье рассмотрены механизмы формирования политических элит, обусловившие восшествие их на высшую ступень властной иерархии в постсоветской Грузии. В труде, в процессе теоретического анализа, проведённого с опорой на эмпирические материалы, тематически описаны механизмы формирования и рекрутирования элит, на примере 4-х правящих политических элит, мобилизованных и консолидированных вокруг З. Гамсахурдия, Э. Шеварнадзе, М. Саакашвили и прозванного «неформальным правителем» Грузии Б. Иванишвили. Эти правящие политические элиты отличались друг от друга с точки зрения идеологических и ценностных ориентиров, определявшая разные пути иерархического восхождения на высшие ступени властных структур современной независимой Грузии. В работе использована двухуровневая форма анализа. В первом случае внимание уделяется теоретическим аспектам механизмов смены власти, таких как выборы и, насыщенная элементами переворота, революция. Во втором случае акцент перенесён на обобщение теоретических компонентов и изучение эмпирико-фактологических вопросов данного материала. В работе также содержится анализ факторов, способствовавших становлению контр-элиты в противовес правящей политической элиты. Также описаны те модели политического поведения, которые контр-элита использовала для захвата власти. В процессе восхождения политических сил непримиримой оппозиции на высшую ступень политической иерархии, они зачастую выходили за допустимые рамки правовых и конституционных норм, добиваясь своих политических целей переворотом и «революцией». В свою очередь, правящая политическая элита всячески старалась, используя властные рычаги с помощью авторитарных методов и незаконных механизмов государственной машины, дабы сохранить за собою статус правящей политической элиты внутри трансформируемой политической системы

Northwestern Transcaucasia is one of the post-Soviet areas most affected by regional cleavages and ethno-political conflicts. Following the fall of the Russian Empire, Georgia tried to build its own statehood, while in Abkhazia and South Ossetia there was a confrontation between Kartvelian communities oriented towards Tbilisi and the Abkhazian and Ossetian ones facing Moscow and Ciscaucasia. With the Sovietization of Transcaucasia in 1921 and the creation of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR), South Ossetia was converted to an Autonomous Oblast within the GSSR, while Abkhazia became a proper SSR (albeit with an ambiguous Union Treaty with the GSSR) but, in 1931, it was downgraded to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the GSSR. For at least a decade after their Sovietization, Abkhazia and South Ossetia could benefit from a certain cultural and linguistic autonomy, but from the second half of the 1930s they were affected by a growing policy of Georgianization and, in the Abkhazian case, also by a massive Kartvelian immigration. After Stalin's death and Beria's execution in 1953, Abkhazians and South Ossetians experienced a new phase of broadening their cultural and linguistic rights. The following decades were characterized by the deepening of the contraposition and mutual stimulation dynamics between Abkhazian and Ossetian national identities and the Georgian one. In the second half of the 1980s, radical nationalism progressively imposed its hegemony over Georgian society and, in 1990, the GSSR parliament assumed the objective of the country's independence. Consequently, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian legislative assemblies proclaimed their own sovereign republics. Then, in January 1991 Georgia attacked South Ossetia, resulting in the outbreak of military conflict in the region, during which both Tbilisi and Tskhinval declared their independence. In 1992, following the coup against the nationalist Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze's return as Georgian leader, a ceasefire agreement between Tbilisi and Tskhinval was reached in June with Russian mediation, consolidating South Ossetian control over most of the region. Soon, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was involved in the ceasefire monitoring process, but failed to foster concrete steps towards a negotiated solution to the Ossetian-Georgian political conflict. Contextually, inter-ethnic tensions grew in Abkhazia and, in August 1992, Georgia militarily attacked the region, initially conquering a large part of it but subsequently suffering the progressive counter-offensive of the Abkhazians, who in September 1993 re-established their control over Sukhum and large part of the region. Meanwhile, in August 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had been established to monitor the conflict in Abkhazia. Following the Abkhazian military victory, a complex phase of Abkhazian-Georgian talks began, under the aegis of the United Nations and with the participation of the Russian Federation and the CSCE. Then, in May 1994, a ceasefire and separation of forces agreement was reached, with the establishment of a security zone on which a CIS peacekeeping contingent was deployed, and UNOMIG was expanded. Once the military dimension of the conflict was frozen, the parties were engaged in complex talks to reach a negotiated political solution, under the auspices of the UN and with an active role of Russia. However, the positions were no longer reconcilable: on the one hand, Tbilisi intended to establish its sovereignty over Abkhazia within the framework of a federalist compromise, on the other hand, Sukhum was willing to accept at most a confederal and symbolic solution. Therefore, in 1999, the parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia formally declared state independence, greatly reducing the prospects for a negotiated solution to the political conflict with Georgia.

The article studies the process of political transformation of Georgia since the declaration of its independence. The author`s hypothesis is that Georgia's political transformation should lead to the democratization of its political regime, which in this study is seen as a process of departure from the former Soviet practices of the political system. That is, political transformation is a multidimensional process of gradual departure from socialism. The author analyses a number of factors of the political regime change, from the first democratic government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which began the process of political transformation of Georgia, the coming to power of Eduard Shevardnadze, and his resignation in a result of mass protests called "colour revolution", leading to the election victory of Mikheil Saakashvili, whose political force, the United National Movement, was replaced by the Georgian Dream. Also, the study examines the features of the political regime in Georgia, examines the process of establishment and development of power relations, and identifies the main trends and links that directly influenced the process of development of the political system since 1991. The aim of the study is to identify the main reasons that hindered the process of democratization of Georgia, contributing to the understanding of the patterns of democratic development of the country's political system. The main methods used are empirical, problemchronological, and case study method. The author concludes that Georgia's political transformation can be characterized by a combination of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. The country's transformation process has not been simple and homogeneous, and the on-going process of democratization in Georgia is the result of the collapse of the Soviet system, which can now be described as an incomplete transition to a consolidated democracy. However, given Georgia's aspirations to become a member of NATO and the European Union, resolving the problem of secessionist regions on the path to building a democratic state is extremely important. ; У статті досліджується процес політичної трансформації Грузії з моменту проголошення її незалежності. Гіпотеза полягає у тому, що політична трансформація Грузії має привести до демократизації її політичного режиму, що розглядається як процес відходу від колишніх радянських практик функціонування політичної системи. Тож, політична трансформація є багатовимірним процесом поступового відходу від соціалізму. Авторка аналізує ряд чинників зміни політичних режимів, від першого демократичного уряду на чолі із Звіадом Гамсахурдією, з якого було розпочато процес політичної трансформації Грузії, приходом до влади Едуарда Шеварднадзе, і його усуненням в результаті масових протестів, які називають «кольоровою революцією» й які привели до перемоги на виборах Міхеіла Саакашвілі, політичну силу якого «Єдиний національний рух» було замінено «Грузинською мрією». Також, у досліджені вивчаються особливості політичного режиму Грузії, розглядається процес встановлення та розвитку владних відносин, визначено основні тенденції та зв'язки, які безпосередньо впливали на процес становлення політичної системи після здобуття незалежності у 1991 році. Метою дослідження є виявлення основних причин, які перешкоджали процесу демократизації Грузії, що сприяє розумінню закономірностей демократичного розвитку політичної системи країни. Основними методами є емпіричний, проблемно-хронологічний, й метод кейс-стаді. У результаті дослідження було зроблено висновок, що політичній трансформації Грузії притаманне поєднання авторитарних та демократичних тенденцій. Трансформаційний процес країни не був простим й однорідним, й започаткований процес демократизації у Грузії є результатом розпаду радянської системи, який наразі можна охарактеризувати як незавершений перехід до консолідованої демократії. Проте, враховуючи прагнення Грузії стати членом НАТО та Європейського Союзу, вирішення проблеми сецесіоністських регіонів на шляху розбудови демократичної держави є найважливішим.

The article studies the process of political transformation of Georgia since the declaration of its independence. The author`s hypothesis is that Georgia's political transformation should lead to the democratization of its political regime, which in this study is seen as a process of departure from the former Soviet practices of the political system. That is, political transformation is a multidimensional process of gradual departure from socialism. The author analyses a number of factors of the political regime change, from the first democratic government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which began the process of political transformation of Georgia, the coming to power of Eduard Shevardnadze, and his resignation in a result of mass protests called "colour revolution", leading to the election victory of Mikheil Saakashvili, whose political force, the United National Movement, was replaced by the Georgian Dream. Also, the study examines the features of the political regime in Georgia, examines the process of establishment and development of power relations, and identifies the main trends and links that directly influenced the process of development of the political system since 1991. The aim of the study is to identify the main reasons that hindered the process of democratization of Georgia, contributing to the understanding of the patterns of democratic development of the country's political system. The main methods used are empirical, problemchronological, and case study method. The author concludes that Georgia's political transformation can be characterized by a combination of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. The country's transformation process has not been simple and homogeneous, and the on-going process of democratization in Georgia is the result of the collapse of the Soviet system, which can now be described as an incomplete transition to a consolidated democracy. However, given Georgia's aspirations to become a member of NATO and the European Union, resolving the problem of secessionist regions on the path to building a democratic state is extremely important. ; У статті досліджується процес політичної трансформації Грузії з моменту проголошення її незалежності. Гіпотеза полягає у тому, що політична трансформація Грузії має привести до демократизації її політичного режиму, що розглядається як процес відходу від колишніх радянських практик функціонування політичної системи. Тож, політична трансформація є багатовимірним процесом поступового відходу від соціалізму. Авторка аналізує ряд чинників зміни політичних режимів, від першого демократичного уряду на чолі із Звіадом Гамсахурдією, з якого було розпочато процес політичної трансформації Грузії, приходом до влади Едуарда Шеварднадзе, і його усуненням в результаті масових протестів, які називають «кольоровою революцією» й які привели до перемоги на виборах Міхеіла Саакашвілі, політичну силу якого «Єдиний національний рух» було замінено «Грузинською мрією». Також, у досліджені вивчаються особливості політичного режиму Грузії, розглядається процес встановлення та розвитку владних відносин, визначено основні тенденції та зв'язки, які безпосередньо впливали на процес становлення політичної системи після здобуття незалежності у 1991 році. Метою дослідження є виявлення основних причин, які перешкоджали процесу демократизації Грузії, що сприяє розумінню закономірностей демократичного розвитку політичної системи країни. Основними методами є емпіричний, проблемно-хронологічний, й метод кейс-стаді. У результаті дослідження було зроблено висновок, що політичній трансформації Грузії притаманне поєднання авторитарних та демократичних тенденцій. Трансформаційний процес країни не був простим й однорідним, й започаткований процес демократизації у Грузії є результатом розпаду радянської системи, який наразі можна охарактеризувати як незавершений перехід до консолідованої демократії. Проте, враховуючи прагнення Грузії стати членом НАТО та Європейського Союзу, вирішення проблеми сецесіоністських регіонів на шляху розбудови демократичної держави є найважливішим.

Migration has become one of the most current themes in the reality of Georgian society since the destruction of the Soviet Union. However, this process dates backs to the twentieth century in the history of Georgian migration. Wars, chaos and turmoil, geopolitical location, and social and political conflicts constantly triggered the population to migrate either within the country or abroad. The most recent history of Georgian migration can be divided into several waves or phases: 1. Before the 1950s (Soviet Union regime), when the population was forced to leave their living place by brutal political repressions; 2. In the period of the 1950s to the 1990s, when Georgians migrated within the territory of the Soviet Union Republic; 3. The mass migration of the 1990s, which was caused by social crisis, economic hardship, political turmoil, military conflicts (including inter-ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and South Ossetia (1988–1992) and the civil war of 1993, against the democratically elected Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia; 4. The later migration outflow from Georgia was mainly recorded in 2000, when a huge wave of migrants went to Russia but, as the visa regime had been restricted, Georgian citizens had to choose another destination. This time migrants headed to European countries and the USA. It has to be mentioned that since 2002, the emigration process has become more and more diverse as the motivation of migrants varied as well as the places of destination. Unfortunately, the data that reflects the precise picture of migration in Georgia does not exist. Even the official data cannot be acknowledged as accurate information about the migrants or migration because of the absence of a precise mechanism that collects reliable statistical information. It depicts data based on various sources and methodologies that should be taken into consideration when highlighting the number of migrants. ; International Black Sea University, Georgia ; Eka Beraia – PhD, Assistant Professor atthe Faculty of American Studies, International Black Sea University (Tbilisi); member of the team of scholars at the Georgian Geostrategic Euro-Atlantic Integration Institute (GEAI); Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Caucasus International University (Georgia). ; beraia_eka@yahoo.com ; 117 ; 129 ; 1 ; Antelava L, Status of a woman and Style of family life-Gender problems in Georgia, Tbilisi 2002. ; Article 3 of the UN Protocol (2017, November): to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention. html. ; Assessment of U.S. activities to combat traffi cking in persons (2003, August) U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/wetf/us_assessment.pdf. ; Badurashvili I., Illegal Migrants from Georgia: Labor Market Experiences and Remittance Behavior, Georgian Centre of Population Research 2012, http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East2012-RR-39.pdf. ; Badurashvili I., Determinants and Consequences of Irregular Migration in a Society under Transition: The Case of Georgia, (in:) Population Association of America Annual Meeting. 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Waterson (eds.), Gender in Georgia: Feminist Perspectives on Culture, Nation and History in the South Caucasus, New York 2018. ; Lutz H., Life in the Twilight Zone: Migration, Transnationality, and Gender in the Private Household, "Journal of Contemporary European Studies", 2004 vol. 12, no. 1. ; Shioshvili T., American Ethnicity, Tbilisi 2016. ; UNICEF, UNHCHR, OSCE/ODIHR, Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe, https://www.osce.org/odihr/18540?download=true. ; US Department of State Trafficking in Persons report, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/. ; Yale-Loehr, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?, Cornell University Law School 2005, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1860&context=facpub. ; 26

2009/2010 ; L'ordine stabilito a Yalta e' crollato insieme al Muro di Berlino. Con la fine della guerra fredda l'Urss e' scomparsa, lasciando al suo posto la Russia, ridemensionata al punto da classificarsi nel 2004 in termini PIL a parita' di potere d' aquisto al decimo posto mondiale dopo il Brasile. Le sue spese militari in dollari erano pari a 1/23 di quelle del Pentagono (dati di SIPRI). La fine del Bipolarismo ha inaugurato una nuova configurazione: quella Unipolare, con i soli Stati Uniti definiti come "iperpotenza". Il mondo e' profondamente mutato, e gli equilibri dell'epoca bipolare sono diventati un ricordo del passato. L' indipendenza delle cinque repubbliche centro-asiatiche (Kazakistan, Kirghisistan, Tagikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) e delle tre caucasiche (Armenia, Azerbaigian, Georgia) al seguito della dissoluzione dell'Unione Sovietica, ha comportato un completo sconvolgimento dello spazio geopolitico. E' impossibile non rilevare la straordinaria posizione geopolitica di questi stati. Essi sorgono, infatti, al centro della massa euroasiatica, nel cuore di quella "Terra Centrale" che Halford Mackinder considerava la "chiave" del dominio mondiale, all'incrocio di civiltà millenarie, lungo quella che fu la "Via della seta" e, finalmente, in prossimità del Medio Oriente. I dirigenti di Mosca hanno tardato a valutare in tutta la loro portata i cambiamenti geopolitici del dopo guerra fredda, e in particolare la determinazione di Washington ad approfittare dell'indebolimento dell'influenza russa per rafforzare le sue posizioni strategiche dal Caucaso all'Asia Centrale.La perdita dell'influenza di Mosca e' iniziata con la Perestrojka, mentre si rafforzavano i movimenti nazionalistici. La nascita di stati indipendenti ha fatto cessare qualsiasi forma di controllo diretto, mentre i blocchi legati ai conflitti acceleravano il crollo dei legami economici. La determinazione della Georgia a sganciarsi al più presto dall'influenza russa e' anche il risultato della strumentalizzazione da parte di Mosca dei conflitti locali che, fin dai primi anni '90 sono continuati (Abkasia, Ossezia del Sud). Mosca non appariva come una risorsa per la risoluzione di questi conflitti; al contrario, ha tentato di utilizzarli per i propri fini. E' stato, questo, uno dei principali argomenti avanzati dagli americani nel 1997, al momento della creazione del Guam (Georgia, Ucraina, Azerbaijan, Moldavia). Gli Stati Uniti sono incontestabilmente i maggiori protagonisti della ricomposizione dello spazio post-sovietico, con tutta una gamma di interventi: sia trattati bilaterali di cooperazione economica e militare, sia trattati multilaterali, quali il sostegno dato alla creazione di Guam (Georgia, Ucraina, Azerbaijan, Moldavia). Gli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001 forniscono agli Stati Uniti l'occasione per piazzare le proprie pedine nell'ambito 'antiterrorismo" nel cuore dell'area euroasiatica, al fine di garantire la sicurezza degli accessi alle ricchezze petrolifere del Mar Caspio, (in piena collaborazione militare in particolare nel Uzbekistan, Kirgistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan). In Georgia, strategicamente importante per Washington, sono sorte numerose ONG locali, finanziate e sostenute dalle ONG estere e da organismi internazionali. I finanziamenti vanno a programmi di ogni genere, ma sempre con l'imposizione di un modello unico. La strategia di Washington, finalizzata al duraturo indebolimento della Russia nell'ambito del suo spazio tradizionale, viene completata dalle rivoluzioni politiche: in Georgia alla fine dell 2003, in Ucraina alla fine dell 2004. Da allora la percezione delle minacce per la Russia si e' evoluta sino al punto in cui il potere militare degli USA e della NATO e stato definito come la principale minaccia militare, come affermato da Putin nei suoi discorsi (con la sua affermazione la minaccia missilistica farebbe tornare USA e Russia ai tempi della guerra fredda). Come sappiamo la Sicurezza Energetica e' priorita assoluta, punto cardine dello sviluppo dello Stato. La dipendenza energetica influenza direttamente la capacita' di uno Stato di esercitare il suo potere nel campo della sicurezza. Gli Stati importatori sono particolarmente vulnerabili di fronte alla minaccia di una loro interruzione. Il Petrolio e' protagonista di molte crisi internazionali, ha provocato guerre e alleanze internazionali. La decisione sul trasporto del greggio sui mercati internazionali non solo e' una priorita' assoluta, ma riveste una piu' profonda valenza geopolitica. Molteplici segnali indicano chiaramente la volontà e la determinazione del Cremlino a perseguire un disegno neo-imperiale nelle aree ex-sovietiche dell' "estero vicino". L'essenziale per Putin - Medvedev è mantenere il controllo dell'hard core, ovvero l'unità e centralizzazione dello Stato, la coerenza geo-politica. Oggi ciò che conta per Mosca è rafforzarsi, durare. La scelta unipolare induce le Potenze di rango inferiore ad allearsi tra di esse per contrabilanciare l'egemonia dell'Iperpotenza. La politica di pressione energetica non è una novità: questa, gia' ideata negli anni '90, e'stata perfezionata nell'era Putin, il cui piu' ambizioso sogno e' quello di controllare l'intero sistema di distribuzione regionale del gas in Europa, secondo il principio seguente: chi controlla le pipeline, controlla l'acquirente/buyer – ed, in qualche misura, il Paese produttore di gas. Così, prima tappa del progetto di Vladimir Vladimirovich è l'Europa, dove Mosca ha stabilito stretti e collaudati legami con alcuni governi (Germania, in primis, il gasdotto sottomarino baltico tra Russia e Germania. gasdotto sottomarino posato nel Mar Baltico che permetterà a Gazprom di portare il gas russo in Germania e nel resto dell'Europa nord-occidentale, forse persino in Gran Bretagna.) e compagnie energetiche per organizzare una grande rete di sicurezza e business. La "Sicurezza energetica" è oggi il servizio più importante che Mosca vuole vendere all'Europa. Tuttavia esiste un ostacolo, la cosiddetta "Nuova Europa" di Rumsfeld: tutta la "Nuova frontiera orientale" della UE e della NATO, dai Paesi Baltici a Polonia, Ucraina, Georgia, è percepita da Mosca come ostile: NATO dell'Est. L'incubo per Mosca e anche il "corridoio" Caspio - Azerbajan – Georgia - Mar Nero – Odessa (Ukraina) (già esiste l'oleodotto Odessa – Brody con possibile estensione fino a Danzica, Mar Baltico) per portare il gas centroasiatico direttamente alla "Nuova Europa", bypassando la Russia; in prospettiva fino al terminale di Danzica (Mar Baltico, Polonia), dove è possibile liquefare e mandare il gas via mare agli USA; oppure da Brody avviarlo alla commercializzazione regionale via Ucraina e Polonia. Mosca ha percezione della minaccia: già da tempo compagnie occidentali che operano nel Caspio azero e kazako hanno costruito postazioni sulla costa del Mar Nero per favorire i futuri flussi di idrocarburi centro-asiatici verso occidente. Inoltre l'ingresso nella UE di Romania e Bulgaria ha reso attuali i progetti di "corridoi" per portare il gas azero e turkmeno in Europa via Caspio – Caucaso – Turchia – Europa sud-orientale (per esempio il progetto Nabucco), escludendo Mosca. Infine è operativo l'oleodotto BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan), che per ora trasporta solo petrolio azero fino alle coste del Mediterraneo orientale, bypassando i Dardanelli e la Russia. In un non lontano domani si potrebbe realizzare una pipeline sottomarina caspica, in grado di portare anche il greggio kazako di Tengiz, Karatchaganak, Kashagan, sottraendolo alla servitù delle pipeline russe. Di conseguenza per l'intero East-West Energy Corridor ci sono alcune preoccupazioni. I conflitti nel Caucaso: tra Armenia e Azerbaijan rigurdante di Nagorno Karabach e in Georgia (Abkazia e Ossetia del Sud) . A partire dal crollo dell'URSS, la Georgia raggiunta l' indipendenza, ha dovuto lottare per proteggere la propria integrità territoriale. A causa dei conflitti con le repubbliche separatiste di Abkhazie e Ossezia del Sud, protrattisi fra il 1990 e il 1993, con particolare violenza nel 1992-1993, Tbilisi aveva perduto de facto la sovranità su due territori anche prima della drammatica svolta del 2008, con il conflitto russo-georgiano e il riconoscimento da parte russa dell'indipendenza delle due regioni. Questa guerra possiamo definirla come lo scontro di interessi Russo-Americani. Inoltre , l'evoluzione in senso filo-atlantista della politica georgiana, soprattutto dopo il 2003, e stata la base del grave inasprimento dei rapporti con la Russia, di cui la Georgia dipende in gran parte per l'approvvigionamento energetico. La questione del conflitto russo-georgiano, il problema della sicurezza energetica, quello dell'allargamento della Nato alla Georgia e i conflitti hanno rappresentato i motivi d'interesse principali per l'Unione Europea e per l'Occidente in genere.Tutti i dossier appaiono, al momento molto delicati a causa dell'importanza dei rapporti fra Europa e Russia. Mosca si è fermamente opposta all'integrazione euro-atlantica della Georgia e ai progetti euro-americani di nuovi gasdotti che dall'area del Caspio utilizzerebbe il corridoio transcaucasico e la Turchia per eludere il territorio russo. Cedere alla richieste russe a lasciare Armenia, Azerbaijan e Georgia nell'orbita russa non è un'opzione per l'Europa. Le nazioni piu influenti dell'UE hanno interesse a favorire un alto grado d'integrazione regionale nel Caucaso meridionale e a fare del Caucaso meridionale una zona di trasmissione virtuosa (politica ed economica) fra l'area euro-atlantica, quella nord euroasiatica dominata da Mosca e quella medio-orientale. Per ottenere tale risultato , gli europei dovrebbero favorire la pacificazione completa del conflitto russo-georgiano e di quello azero-armeno per il Nagorno Karabakh, coinvolgere Turchia, Russia e Stati Uniti in negoziati multi-laterali. Senza tale evoluzione si rischiano anni di alta instabilita in un area sempre piu importante per l'Europa e per le relazioni Internazionali. La classe politica Georgiana cerca di far entrare il paese nella NATO e nell'UE dal 1991. E' vero che la pace e la prosperità sono di cruciale importanza per la stabilita della regione, e per i grandi progetti di East-West Corridor e dell' Europa in generale. Perciò i paesi dell' Europa guardano con grande attenzione tutto ciò che succede e succederà in questo Paese, affidabilita dei sistemi e dei regimi. Nell'aprile del 1991 la Georgia proclama l' indipendenza, è stata il secondo Stato dell' URSS a chiudere con il regime comunista. La vittoria elettorale della coalizione nazionalista Gamsakhurdia avvenuta il 27 maggio del 1991 ha introdotto il sistema elettorale diretto. Gamsakhurdia viene eletto primo Presidente della Georgia dopo il crollo dell'URSS. Le conseguenze dell' eredità post sovietica (fallimento nel rilanciare l'economia, inesperienza nella gestione dello Stato) hanno causato un colpo di Stato militare nel 1992, ed il forte nazionalismo ha provocato l'aggravamento della situazione in Abkasia e Osetia del Sud. Nel tentativo di normalizzare la situazione interna del Paese, nel marzo 1992 venne richiamato Eduard Shevardnadze, affinche si assumesse la responsabilita' di ricoprire la carica provvisoria di Presidente del Consiglio di Stato, grazie ad una delega del consiglio Militare, in attesa dello svolgimento delle nuove elezioni. Nel 1992 diventa Presidente del Parlamento. Nell' agosto del 1995 il Parlamento approva una nuova Costituzione, e Shevardnadze viene eletto secondo Presidente della Georgia. Nel 2002 il suo governo entra in crisi politico-economica. l'ex -Ministro della Giustizia dello stesso Shevardnadze , leader dell Oposizione Mikehil Saakashvili (fortemente filo Americano) ha guidato il popolo contro i brogli delle elezioni, contro il Presidente Shevardnadze, costringendolo alle dimissioni. "Rivoluzione di velluto" o "Rivoluzione delle Rose" cosi è stata chiamata la protesta esplosa. Il 4 gennaio del 2004 Saakashvili e' stato eletto terzo presidente della Georgia. Dopo 3 anni, il suo governo entra in crisi e costringe Saakashvili ad anticipare le elezioni presidenziali al 5 gennaio 2008, e quelle parlamentari nella primavera del 2008. Dopo essere stato eletto con un secondo mandato nel 2008, Shaakashvili e' stato fortemente contestato dall'opposizione e da parte della popolazione Georgiana per i brogli elettorali. Il governo Saakashvili e' entrato in grave crisi, soprattutto dopo la guerra russo-georgiana riguardante all'Ossezia del sud dell' agosto 2008. Nella tesi si pongono varie domande: ci si chiede se le continue turbolenze in Georgia siano conseguenza degli scontri di interessi Geopolitici delle Potenze Esterne oppure l'esito degli scarsi rendimenti politici dei Governi della Georgia. Ci si chiede anche se in questo scenario internazionale, la Georgia potrebbe superare le nuove sfide Geopolitiche. Cosa accadde dopo la caduta dell muro di Berlino in un Paese con una popolazione di circa 4 millioni di abitanti, che si estende per 69.700 km2 , e cosi' strategico per Washington e Mosca? Quali sono le paure e le aspirazione della popolazione? Qual e' il mondo visto da Tbilisi? Quali sono le prospettive e gli scenari futuri? ; XXII Ciclo