Suchergebnisse

Collection of three papers: * Immigration: the Australian Way. Keynote Address to the National Conference of the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia, Brisbane, 20 November, 1998. Higher levels of immigration will increasingly be recognised as good politics and as in the national interest. * Malthus and Australia: the Malthus Sermon. Keynote address to the National Academies' Forum Malthus and his legacy. National Library of Australia Canberra, 17 September 1998. The problems of population and poverty are those of institutions and distribution, not of resources and technology. * A global Sydney needs migration. Background paper prepared for the Asia-Pacific Cities Summit Brisbane, 28 February-3 March 1999. Sydney is primary port of entry for new arrivals to Australia. It also has significant expansion costs and environmental constraints. For this reason, NSW Premier Carr, alone among State leaders, has supported low immigration for Australia. Mr Carr is mistaken.

This paper analyses the impact of a change in Australia's immigration policy, introduced in the mid-1990s, on migrants' probability of becoming entrepreneurs. The policy change consists of stricter entry requirements and restrictions to welfare entitlements. The results indicate that those who entered under more stringent conditions - the second cohort - have a higher probability to become self-employed, than those in the first cohort. We also find significant time and region effects. Contrary to some existing evidence, time spent in Australia positively affects the probability to become self-employed. We discuss the intuitions for the results and their policy implications.

What are the ethical implications of global poverty for immigration policy? This article finds substantial evidence that migration is effective at reducing poverty. There is every indication that the adoption of a fairly open immigration policy by rich countries, coupled with selective use of immigration restrictions in cases of deleterious brain drain, could be of significant assistance to people living in poor countries. Empirically there is nothing wrong with using immigration policy to address poverty. The reason we have to reject such an approach is not empirical but normative. People have human rights to stay in their home country and to migrate elsewhere. Counter poverty measures that require people to move or to stay are likely to violate these rights. Everyone should be free to migrate but no one should be forced to migrate. Using immigration policy to address global poverty, in place of alternatives, fails on both these counts.

European countries have been erecting thick walls aimed at preventing unwelcome guests from entering. The institutional, legal and even physical barriers are have the intention of stopping flows of political and economic migrants who try to make their way to the imaginary dreamland of a welfare state. All these regulations carry the label of 'New Policy', and the continent itself has been called 'Fortress Europe'. At the same time states of the European Union are consolidating their powers in creating a common unified immigration policy. This paper analyses both: the 'new policy' and the process of unification of the immigration regulations in the EU. It goes back in time showing the emergence of immigration policy regimes. Moreover, it tries to bring to light the barely existent 'tackling of root causes'.

The history of immigration policy is marked by the wrongful and discriminatory exclusion of certain groups of people. In this article, I argue that descendants of those who were wrongfully excluded have a pro tanto right to immigrate to the state in question as reparation. I begin by identifying the two main approaches theorists generally take to establish a claim for reparation: the inheritance approach and the counterfactual approach. In the first section, I argue that the inheritance approach does not offer a promising argument for reparations for descendants of those who were wrongfully excluded. In the second section, I argue that the counterfactual approach, by contrast, does. In the third section, I respond to the objection that this prima facie claim for reparation can be undermined by current circumstances. In the fourth section, I show why this reparation should be offered in the form of immigration rights.