Depicting the Philippines as a prescientific society, this paper discusses how the environment plays a significant role in shaping the culture of research and scientific productivity. Such conducive environment includes having an adequate think space, a supportive and engaging critical mass, and most importantly, an efficient incentives system. The paper cites several examples of research institutions in the Philippines which highlighted the importance of collaborative efforts, research networks, strong leadership, and generous rewards in attaining success in their endeavor. It also mentions detriments to productivity such as implicit publication costs, the politics of fairness of equality, and the bias for quantity over quality.
Ziel dieser Studie war es, den Einfluss verschiedener Anreizsysteme auf die Bereitschaft zur Teilnahme an der passiven mobilen Datenerfassung unter deutschen Smartphone-Besitzern experimentell zu messen. Die Daten stammen aus einer Webumfrage unter deutschen Smartphone-Nutzern ab 18 Jahren, die aus einem deutschen, nicht wahrscheinlichen Online-Panel rekrutiert wurden. Im Dezember 2017 beantworteten 1.214 Teilnehmer einen Fragebogen zu den Themen Smartphone-Nutzung und -Fähigkeiten, Datenschutz und Sicherheit, allgemeine Einstellungen gegenüber der Umfrageforschung und Forschungseinrichtungen. Darüber hinaus enthielt der Fragebogen ein Experiment zur Bereitschaft, an der mobilen Datenerhebung unter verschiedenen Anreizbedingungen teilzunehmen.
Themen: Besitz von Smartphone, Handy, Desktop- oder Laptop-Computer, Tablet-Computer und/oder E-Book-Reader; Art des Smartphones; Bereitschaft zur Teilnahme an der mobilen Datenerfassung unter verschiedenen Anreizbedingungen; Wahrscheinlichkeit des Herunterladens der App zur Teilnahme an dieser Forschungsstudie; Befragter möchte lieber an der Studie teilnehmen, wenn er 100 Euro erhalten könnte; Gesamtbetrag, den der Befragte für die Teilnahme an der Studie verdienen müsste (offene Antwort); Grund, warum der Befragte nicht an der Forschungsstudie teilnehmen würde; Bereitschaft zur Teilnahme an der Studie für einen Anreiz von insgesamt 60 Euro; Bereitschaft zur Aktivierung verschiedener Funktionen beim Herunterladen der App (Interaktionshistorie, Smartphone-Nutzung, Merkmale des sozialen Netzwerks, Netzqualitäts- und Standortinformationen, Aktivitätsdaten); vorherige Einladung zum Herunterladen der Forschungs-App; Herunterladen der Forschungs-App; Häufigkeit der Nutzung des Smartphones; Smartphone-Aktivitäten (Browsen, E-Mails, Fotografieren, Anzeigen/Post-Social-Media-Inhalte, Einkaufen, Online-Banking, Installieren von Apps, Verwenden von GPS-fähigen Apps, Verbinden über Bluethooth, Spielen, Streaming von Musik/Videos); Selbsteinschätzung der Kompetenz im Umgang mit dem Smartphone; Einstellung zu Umfragen und Teilnahme an Forschungsstudien (persönliches Interesse, Zeitverlust, Verkaufsgespräch, interessante Erfahrung, nützlich); Vertrauen in Institutionen zum Datenschutz (Marktforschungsunternehmen, Universitätsforscher, Regierungsbehörden wie das Statistische Bundesamt, Mobilfunkanbieter, App-Unternehmen, Kreditkartenunternehmen, Online-Händler und Social-Media-Plattformen); allgemeine Datenschutzbedenken; Gefühl der Datenschutzverletzung durch Banken und Kreditkartenunternehmen, Steuerbehörden, Regierungsbehörden, Marktforschung, soziale Netzwerke, Apps und Internetbrowser; Bedenken zur Datensicherheit bei Smartphone-Aktivitäten für Forschungszwecke (Online-Umfrage, Umfrage-Apps, Forschungs-Apps, SMS-Umfrage, Kamera, Aktivitätsdaten, GPS-Ortung, Bluetooth).
Abstract:The design of incentive systems is a central issue in the economics of organization. This paper argues that very often the ideal incentive systems to use within firms will involve low-powered incentives. Five particular circumstances leading to weak incentives being optimal are examined.
As compensation and benefits professionals consider incentive packages, they should note an emerging market trend among employees—the desire to be able to redeem rewards both online and off. Ongoing research by American Express Incentive Services, L.L.C., has demonstrated that employees want the ability to select personally relevant rewards. The latest research examined the "choice" preference at the next level. When asked where they would be most likely to redeem a reward gift card, more than one third of incentive users said they would want to use the card in stores and online. Stored-value reward cards not only let recipients reward themselves how and when they want but also can play an essential role in creating good employee relations in a sluggish economy. Recent AEIS research suggests that personally meaningful incentives can help downsizing companies stem the resignation temptation that often follows layoffs.
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions. With moral hazard, optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation. This is true even if performance measures are subjective, in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance.
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 127-138
The paper traces the evolution of incentive policy in Cuba since 1959. It details the complexities and difficulties in elaborating national wage scales and applying bonus schemes consistent with the goals of Cuba's planned economy. The experience with recent incentives policies under the System of Economic Management and Planning as well as new forms of work organization is presented and analyzed
We present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions - or what we call motivational effort - in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the intensity of motivation and bears the motivational costs. Second, another agent of the firm chooses the motivational actions and incurs the associated costs. In the latter case, the firm must not only incentivize the worker to work hard, but also the motivator to motivate the worker. We characterize and discuss the conditions under which monetary incentives and motivational effort are substitutes or complements, and show that motivational effort may exceed the efficient level.
This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal‐agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.
The People's Republic of China's twelfth five-year plan, which provides the overarching guidelines for its domestic policies from 2011- 2015, was officially adopted on March 14 of this year. Notably, the average rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been lowered from eight percent to seven percent, signifying that economic development will not be pursued at the expense of other priorities. The plan suggests China's attempt at a long-overdue transition from an overly export-dependent economic development model mainly based on low-cost manufacturing, to one driven by domestic consumption and services. Adapted from the source document.
