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AbstractAchieving the Paris Agreement's global temperature goal of keeping warming well below 2 °C and ideally 1.5 °C requires limiting fossil fuel production. In the United Nations climate change negotiations, this need is only beginning to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, as some countries have already adopted supply-side climate policies, initial cooperative activities have started, and calls grow for a fossil fuel treaty, questions arise about the prospects and possible effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply. Combining qualitative insights on possible participants in a supply-side coalition with a quantitative analysis based on integrated assessment general equilibrium modelling, this article addresses these questions. Through k-means clustering based on fossil reserves per capita, fossil fuel rents and existing supply-side policies, we first identify which (groups of) countries are most likely to lead the formation of an international supply-side coalition, and which (groups of) countries are likely to follow. Drawing on these insights, we develop several scenarios for the evolution of international supply-side coalitions and compare these to a business-as-usual scenario. By doing so, we demonstrate the global and regional environmental, trade and macroeconomic effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply and combining fossil supply restrictions with carbon pricing to meet the Paris goals. Our findings underscore the importance of pursuing supply-side and ambitious demand-side climate policies in parallel, and identify the scope and coverage, size of the coalition, and incentives for participation as key design elements for an international supply-side coalition.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, IF IT IS TO BE A REALITY IN ASIA, HAS TO COME BY CONSCIOUS POLITICAL DECISIONS AND ACTIONS, AFFIRMING THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS OVER ECONOMICS. SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN ONE OF THE TWO OR THREE CRUCIAL HURDLES FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA, IT IS NECESSARY TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

AbstractSustained high growth in many developing countries ('the rise of the rest') combined with long‐standing World Trade Organization (WTO) working practices hamper the ability of the WTO to perform its routine functions and paralyze efforts to adapt to new circumstances. For want of an alternative, preferential trade agreements have taken up some of the slack in addressing differences in domestic regulation of product safety, environmental and social conditions, but these are exclusionary and inefficient from a global perspective. In this article, we argue that a new type of agreement based on open plurilateral cooperation offers better prospects for groups of countries to explore and develop their potential common interests on regulatory matters, while safeguarding core aspects of their national regulatory sovereignty and increasing the possibility of regenerating the WTO from within.

Many of the policies that affect international supply chains and associated trade flows are regulatory in nature. Governments generally do not pursue domestic regulation or design trade agreements with a view to support the "trade as production" model by reducing regulatory differences that have the effect of impeding trade. This paper proposes several mechanisms to help make policy more supportive of regulatory cooperation initiatives that are aimed at reducing excess costs that negatively affect supply chain trade and investments, and that can be incorporated into trade agreements. While the analysis and suggestions are general, specific context and examples are provided by recent trade agreements and regulatory cooperation initiatives involving Canada, the EU and the US.

How do countries' actions on the international stage affect their reputations? We propose that, particularly when evaluating countries about whom individuals may have few prior beliefs, international agreements may hold particular sway in establishing countries' reputations. Specifically, if a relatively unknown country joins an organization with a country that has a good reputation, individuals will judge that original state to be less risky; if the better-known countries are generally perceived to have a bad reputation, the less-known state will also look more risky. This article presents evidence from a survey experiment in which individuals are asked about the weight of various factors in their perceptions of countries' reputations. Subjects would randomly receive a prompt about a country's domestic policy reform or its ties to other countries via economic or cultural agreements. The results show that states' international ties play a role in assessments about country reputations. We also examine possible mechanisms underlying this finding. Lower risk associated with agreements with good countries is largely a function of anticipated economic benefits. However, the higher risk associated with agreements with bad countries seems to be more a function of anticipated political closeness between countries.(International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

We discuss the significance of environmental cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific region through addressing the growing concern on pollutionhaven formation; standards harmonisation as a trade prerequisite; and the undue reliance on the environmental Kuznets curve. Such an agreement must be supported by the sustainability principle and should capitalise on the favourable empirical response time to international treaties. With these we then examine the negotiation of an Asia‐Pacific Agreement on Environmental Cooperation separate from the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation. Such separation desirability is explained with the help of the Bhagwati principle of harmonisation and free trade, a real options analysis, and the accountability principle.

The study of international political economy is distinguished not only by its substantive focus but also by its continuing attention to cooperative, or at least rule-guided, arrangements. These cooperative arrangements are defined variously: as an open world economy by Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, and as strong international regimes by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. But in either case, the problems of cooperation and order are not approached simply as tactical alliances or as limiting cases of international anarchy. Instead, close attention is paid to the possibilities for rule making and institution building, however fragile and circumscribed they may be. By this view, the absence of a Hobbesian "common power to keep them all in awe" does not preclude the establishment of some effective joint controls over the international environment. Elaborating on this perspective, Brian Barry argues that "international affairs are not a pure anarchy in which nobody has any reason for expecting reciprocal relations to hold up. In economic matters, particularly, there is a good deal of room for stable expectations."