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Judges often give statutes strained interpretations. What makes an interpretation strained? What, if anything, justifies a strained interpretation? Is there always a point past which an interpretation would be too strained, or are there some interpretations which judges are entitled to adopt, whatever a statute says? I claim to answer all of these questions. Using the formula about conditional probability known as Bayes' theorem, I offer a precise definition of a strained interpretation, and identify two reasons for strained interpretations. I claim that the case for strained interpretations is often stronger than is realised, and illustrate that claim with a novel defence of the House of Lords' decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission. Finally, I suggest that even if a legislature is sovereign, there may be meanings which a legislature is unable to enact into law. Thus, there may be limits on even a sovereign legislature's powers.

I approach the identification of the principles of legal interpretation through a discussion of an important but largely forgotten strand in our legal heritage: the idea (and at some points in English law, the rule) that the interpretation of legislation is to be done by the lawmaker. The idea that authentic interpretation is interpretation by the lawmaker united the Roman emperors Constantine and Justinian with Bracton, Aquinas, King James I of England, Hobbes, and Bentham. Already in the early 17th century, a new modern approach was emerging in England. The modern approach separates the interpretive power from the legislative power, and allocates the interpretive power to an independent court. I argue that there are some cogent, general considerations in favour of the modern approach. But it is worth identifying the elements of good sense that made it seem that the interpretive power ought to be reserved for the lawmaker. And it is worth identifying the drawbacks in the modern approach; I argue that they are highly relevant to the complex question of how judges ought to interpret legislation.

Abstract: The computer language (computer code) on the basis of which smart contracts are written is different from the natural (Human) language. Computer language is a 'dry' language, whereas natural language is 'wet'. In other words, it means that computer language is deterministic (just one meaning and one result are conceivable), when natural language is open to more and potential different meanings. Natural language requires therefore in itself interpretation, at least more than computer language. Computer language in theory doesn't require and possibly doesn't leave room for interpretation. If this assumption is accurate, what are the consequences of it (on the intention of the parties, on contract drafting, on courts' intervention…)? Building on that assumption, this article explores, from a comparative perspective, the impact of the blockchain-based smart contract technology, especially regarding contract drafting techniques. Contract drafting style in common law (long contracts, based on a 'if …, then ….' approach, quite similar to the coding approach) is in part based on the idea of preventing courts' interpretation and intervention. In civil law countries instead, contracts are generally shorter, for several reasons but partly because drafters tend to rely on more general legal concepts, external to the contract, and know that courts will play an important role, through interpretation, in disclosing the 'true meaning' of a contract. Coding contracts and relying on computer-code language can hence have a significant impact on the civil law approach and bring the two legal systems closer as far as contract drafting and contract interpretation are concerned.

The current discourse of heritage interpretation, based on Tilden's
book Interpreting Our Heritage (1957), centres on ideas of education,
materiality of heritage, expert knowledge and conservation. As such,
it shares in the key characteristics of the Authorised Heritage Discourse
(Smith 2006) and is subject to the same challenges that stem
from definitions of heritage as immaterial, as a process and as a key
factor in creating futures. The inadequateness of the Interpretive
Authorised Heritage Discourse to respond to these challenges has
become more apparent due to the size and speed of recent migrations.
In response, I propose a new paradigm of heritage interpretation
that is based on Mouffe's (2013) concept of agonistics. Agonistic
interpretation seeks to make visible the representations, meanings
and emotions that underpin heritage, and to provide an infrastructure
that visitors to heritage sites and museums may use to continue
to build their identities and futures.

It is still assumed in scholarship that 'contra legem' characterizes the Court of Justice of the European Union case law on conforming interpretation. This article argues, through a new reading of the relevant CJEU jurisprudence, that the case law on conforming interpretation has been taking a new direction away from 'contra legem'. A critique of the new jurisprudence is then proposed through pointing to two unrenounceable virtues of the 'contra legem' requirement – towards making scholarship aware of the urgent need to take seriously, and critically face, the new jurisprudence.

Constitutional interpretation is an issue which has come under considerable scrutiny in the USA, in the light of such happenings as the nomination of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, and the Iran-Contra affair. This book is intended as an overview of the debate on constitutional interpretation, and employs historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, ethical and structural methods of criticism. It also tries to show how constitutional issues are addressed by different people, such as the President, Members of Congress and students of political science. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1053/thumbnail.jpg

Der Konsument ist tot, es leben die Konsumenten. Dieser Beitrag schlägt ein Modell der Unternehmens- und Markenkommunikation vor, welches die unterschiedlichen Typen und Interpretationsformen der Konsumenten anerkennt. Die klassischen Modelle der Markentechnik, der Markenpersönlichkeit und der Markensysteme werden zunächst kritisch geprüft und dann in einem neuen Modell der Bedeutungszuschreibung zusammengeführt, welches aus dem Pragmatismus heraus entwickelt wird. Dieser Beitrag und das Modell der Bedeutungszuschreibung sollen dazu beitragen, behavioristische und anthropologische Fehlschlüsse zu erkennen und in der Unternehmens- und Markenkommunikation zu vermeiden. Er schlägt zudem vor, die Interaktionsdynamik zwischen Korporationen und Konsumenten stärker zu beachten, um die Formen der Interpretation konstruierter Objekte besser zu verstehen.

The purpose of this project is to provide a fresh and in-depth analysis of legal jurisprudence through the use of two of the most important legal theorists of our time, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. This project focuses on how Dworkin's position in his famous paper "Hard Cases", helps us understand an important Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California. Cohen will be the main focus of my project. The project will discuss the case and the possible ways of deciding the case. Then the project explains both Dworkin's and Hart's positions. Finally, the project will analyze how Dworkin's position, helps solve the case and problem of legal jurisprudence exemplified by Cohen. This project is one that I have spent both Fall 2019 and Spring 2020 researching and analyzing. I have always had a curiosity to understand what law is. In the Fall of 2019 I completed an independent study that allowed me to spend time reading Dworkin and working through the different ways to interpret legal statutes. The impact that Dworkin made on me was that there seems to be principles that help guide how judges interpret the law, but these principles are very rarely ever written down. This pushed me to go further and to research the history of why philosophers started to discuss legal interpretivist. The significance of this topic is that it is specific to my area of study. I am a philosophy major who intends to go to law school. In order to successful undertake such a task, I need to understand the reasons that guide judicial decision makers in interpreting laws in particular ways. I believe the position Dworkin espouses allows legal scholars to go deeper to understand what exactly goes into a judicial decision. By revealing how underlying normative principles of our legal system guide legal decisions.