Suchergebnisse

Auf Grundlage eines Modells implizierter Kontrakte wird nach Erklärungen dafür gesucht, warum Firmen in den USA bei rückläufiger Auftragslage eher Arbeitskräfte entlassen, statt ein work-sharing (etwa in Form von Kurzarbeit) einzuführen. Als Hauptursache identifizieren die Autoren die institutionelle Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung in den meisten US-Staaten und folgern, daß die Einführung einer Unterstützung analog dem Kurzarbeitergeld das work-sharing begünstigen könnte. (IAB)

This book offers a unique comprehensive, technically in-depth, and up-to-date treatment of modeling economic agreements by applying recent results of advanced algebras, representation theory, theory of categories, and transmutation theory. The importance of a new concept of agreements, as introduced here, is derived from a general impossibility of making a complete contract for any nontrivial economic transaction. The proposed extensions provide foundations rich enough to follow complexity of economic property rights, including entrepreneurial agreements, clubs and transfers through the restructuring processes. The book is relevant for academics with theoretical interest in economics, applied mathematics, mathematical economics, operational research and advance management of tangible and intangible assets. It provides full details and line-by-line proofs of all basic relations needed for research in modeling issues of economic property rights theory and economic agreements

This concise landmark in law and jurisprudence offers the first coherent, liberal account of contract law. The Choice Theory of Contracts answers the field's most pressing questions: what is the 'freedom' in 'freedom of contract'? What core values animate contract law and how do those values interrelate? How must the state act when it shapes contract law? Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller - two of the world's leading private law theorists - show exactly why and how freedom matters to contract law. They start with the most appealing tenets of modern liberalism and end with their implications for contract law. This readable, engaging book gives contract scholars, teachers, and students a powerful normative vocabulary for understanding canonical cases, refining key doctrines, and solving long-standing puzzles in the law

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.