Suchergebnisse

THE AUTHOR BRIEFLY SUMMARIZES THE HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS OF NEW BRUNSWICK'S LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

Chapter I (p. 3-32): The Congress of the United States, by Bernard C. Steiner ; Mode of access: Internet.

We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness & exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, & other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition & selective retirement, but to learning-by-doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of "positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility & power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success & on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, & seniority rule. Tables, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

Strengthening the budgetary powers of legislatures through nonpartisan budget offices adds to the capacity-building repertoire of development donors. Budget offices are supposed to provide legislatures with information and analysis independent from the executive. The United States Agency for International Development believes that strengthening the legislature's power of the purse improves governance. We highlight USAID-funded legislative strengthening projects implemented in Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Afghanistan to show how these budget offices function. There is a significant potential for these units to assist members of parliament in understanding the budget process, the broad fiscal challenges facing government, and expenditure control and budgetary trade-offs that affect present and future spending. These cases demonstrate the challenges of creating and sustaining a parliamentary budget office. Finally, in an effort to make budget offices effective and sustainable, we outline several key steps that we believe are important both for donors and the legislative bodies. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract not available. Adapted from the source document.

We review debates concerning the evolution and impact of parliamentary obstruction in the U.S, Senate, focusing on path dependency versus remote majoritarian perspectives. We consider the viability of circum-venting supermajority requirements for rules changes by using rulings from the chair to establish precedents. Because the viability of this approach depends, at least in part, on the anticipated reaction of the public, we conduct a preliminary analysis of public opinion data from the 1940s through the 1960s and from the showdown over the obstruction of judicial nominees in 2005. We contend that the balance of the evidence favors the position that senators have generally supported the maintenance of the filibuster and have been able to make procedural adjustments when obstruction threatened a committed majority's top priorities, although we offer some important refinements required in comparing the historical operation of obstruction to its impact in today's Senate. Adapted from the source document.

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

In this reply, I will focus on the implications of Montero and Vidal-Puga's finding, acknowledging that their result is correct. Thus, what follows should not be interpreted as a defense of the Proposition 2 of Morelli 1999, but as a clarification of the impact of this correction for the demand bargaining research agenda as a whole.

During the legislative process, many documents are prepared by Congress and its committees. Governmental and non-governmental entities track and record congressional activities, and many more entities chronicle and analyze the development of public policy. The wide availability of such information can be overwhelming to those involved in legislative research. The purpose of this book is to assist Members and congressional staff in identifying and accessing key resources used during legislative research

Legislative-judicial interaction can be understood in terms of bill success in state legislatures. This study examines whether the anticipated actions of the courts to interpret, expand, or retract legislative meaning discourages or prevents policy making by legislatures. Specifically, the effect of ideologically extreme state supreme courts on the likelihood of ideological bill enactments is tested. The findings indicate that state legislatures are significantly less likely to pass legislation when state supreme courts are ideological. Furthermore, the party and power of the governor and committee sponsorship of bills are significant, and conservative bills are less likely to pass than liberal ones. Thus, there is evidence that judiciaries exercise preemptive suppressive powers upon legislation. Adapted from the source document.

A comprehensive study which looks at the politics of legislative debates in 33 liberal democracies in Europe, North America and Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. This book offers an account of the rules and practices determining floor access, with a particular focus on gender, seniority, and legislative party positions.