Suchergebnisse

This paper aims to clarify how the legislative procedure works in the European Union (hereinafter, EU), both in the Treaties and in practice. We will study the rules governing the ordinary legislative procedure and the special consent and consultation procedures. Advantages and shortcomings of each of the procedures will also be addressed, including the main actors and the level of transparency and accountability. Within the ordinary legislative procedure, we will assess whether the informal trilogues should be reformed to be more accessible to the European citizen. Lastly, our paper will also address the use of passerelle clauses and citizen's and how they can affect the lawmaking procedure in the EU

"The manual is the third revision of one first compiled in 1928 by the Indiana Legislative Bureau, and revised in 1968 by George W. Meyers, House Parliamentarian, and Dr. Robert C. Jeffrey, Senate Parliamentarian." ; Mode of access: Internet.

Super-majorities have occurred frequently in Congress but have escaped scholarly attention. This paper employs new measures of positive agenda control and a unique data set of 3,407 nontrivial bills from 1981 to 2008 to answer two questions: how did legislative leaders construct veto-proof coalitions, and what did presidents do with them? Legislative leaders, we argue, deployed procedures to expand and sustain veto-proof coalitions, despite increasing polarization. The resulting history, which signaled members' commitment to a bill, provided information to the president that reduced uncertainty about possibilities for interbranch bargaining and the likely success of a veto. We find that positive agenda control increased the probability of vote tallies of two-thirds or more, especially after the 1994 election. In addition, we demonstrate that presidents concentrated veto activity on bills with outcomes of less than two-thirds, rejected some veto-proof bills for reputational gains, and deployed signing statements strategically. The analysis suggests that congressional leaders paradoxically gained capacity for nurturing large, bipartisan alliances as the institution became more polarized. Moreover, it demonstrates that strategic activity by legislative leaders is critical to explaining variation in presidential options for veto bargaining and signing statements.

"December 1960." ; Includes index. ; At head of title: State of Maine. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the article tries to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective ; highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans&rsquo ; needs.

In the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the article tries to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective; highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans' needs.