Suchergebnisse

The structure and quality of EU democracy is greatly determined by the status that the European Union accords both to the European Parliament and to national parliaments. The potential that national parliaments carry for providing political accountability and democratic legitimacy to the EU decision-making processes in various fields of action has long been neglected. This study explores the role of national parliaments not only as actors of their own Member States but of the European Union as a larger constitutional compound. The study focuses on the parliaments of France, the United Kingdom and Portugal, which provide a representative sample as regards the system of government, the structure of parliament, the date of accession and so on. The analysis is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the conditions under which national parliaments consent to the transfer of sovereignty to the Union. As the powers that they formerly enjoyed are to some extent taken over by the European Parliament, it was important to inquire whether national parliaments perceive the European Parliament as a partner or rival in effecting the accountability of EU executive institutions. The examples of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty, Maastricht Treaty and Lisbon Treaty show that a sense of partnership tends to prevail. Part II delves into the Europeanisation of national parliaments and the correspondent reform of their competences of scrutiny over draft EU initiatives. While the constitutional contexts within which the selected parliaments operate differ, they have successfully adapted their scrutiny systems to the requirements of the post-Lisbon era. In formal terms, this enables them to participate in the scrutiny of EU policies satisfactorily. Part III adds a qualitative empirical element to the analysis and tests whether and, if so, how national parliaments use their scrutiny powers in practice. We ask what claims they make as a result of their scrutiny. In the in-depth case studies of the Services Directive, the EU-US ...

It is clear that the formal inclusion of the national parliament as a political actor within the EU decision-making process has been one of the most important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.Their role, however, remains controversial. It is on the one hand disputed whether national parliaments enjoy sufficient powers to tame'competence creep'. On the other hand, it is contested to what extent it is desirable that they should become involved as a legislative actor in the EU'sdecision-making procedure. This essay contributes to these debates by critically examining to what extent national parliaments can contribute to the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. The article contends that national parliaments by having taken a too expansive view of their remitunder Protocol No 2 appears to have'misunderstood' their role within the EU- decision making procedure. Notwithstanding this, it is sustained that national parliaments could, in the absence of other trustworthy safeguards of federalism, be seen as a promising avenue for legitimate political control of the exercise of EU competences

In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, much of the academic debate on national parliaments in the EU has focused on the new powers of national parliaments and the potential for the politicisation and parliamentarisation of the EU. In the process, the role of administrators in the parliamentary control of EU affairs has been neglected. This article addresses that gap by comparing parliamentary administrations to a set of ideal types on the basis of in-depth interviews and a comparative survey of parliamentary staff. This leads to the observation that the roles of parliamentary administrators have been further expanded after Lisbon to a range of tasks that go beyond technical support and include elements of agenda-setting.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced the 'early-warning mechanism', with national legislatures assigned the right to monitor whether initiatives for EU laws comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Does the mechanism really empower national parliaments by giving them a collective veto in EU politics or will it remain largely unused by domestic MPs? This paper leans towards the latter interpretation, arguing that the whole mechanism was mainly introduced in response to legitimacy concerns. It is a rather harmless procedure, with only a marginal impact on the EU's legislative process. The incentive structure simply works against individual MPs, political parties or parliaments making active use of this instrument. When placed in the larger context of the role performed by national parliaments in EU politics, the early-warning mechanism can be seen to reinforce the perception of domestic MPs acting as the 'gatekeepers' of European integration.

AbstractThe role of national parliaments in EU matters has become an important subject in the debate over the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Yet despite a remarkable increase in parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, the added value in terms of democratic legitimacy will remain limited if citizens are not aware of their activities. Given that citizens mainly experience politics through the media, the aim of the paper is therefore to explore whether and under what conditions parliamentary involvement in EU matters is visible in national newspapers. The paper draws on two quantitative datasets covering parliamentary EU activities and relevant newspaper articles in seven Member States between 2010 and 2013. Results suggest that the efforts of active parliaments pay off. In addition, conflict within government coalitions over EU issues and greater salience of EU politics in public opinion increase coverage while, surprisingly, both public and parliamentary euroscepticism do not.

This paper provides an insight into how interparliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and the EP is evolving, what forms it is taking and what its main advantages and flaws are. The Lisbon Treaty contains important provisions for a greater presence of national parliaments at the EU level and increasing possibilities for cooperation between them and the European Parliament (EP). If national parliaments want to make full use of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and to play an increasing role at the EU level they will need to develop effective sifting and scrutiny systems. In this context, parliamentary cooperation could be a cost-effective exercise reducing information gaps and providing an entry gate for national parliaments at the EU level. At the same time, due to its full-time focus on European politics and its position in the EU's political system, the EP has the capacity to act as a leader of this cooperation and to shape it according to its preferences. Based on recent developments this paper provides an insight into how interparliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and the EP is evolving, what forms it is taking and what its main advantages and flaws are.

In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, much of the academic debate on national parliaments in the EU has focused on the new powers of national parliaments and the potential for the politicisation and parliamentarisation of the EU. In the process, the role of administrators in the parliamentary control of EU affairs has been neglected. This article addresses that gap by comparing parliamentary administrations to a set of ideal types on the basis of in-depth interviews and a comparative survey of parliamentary staff. This leads to the observation that the roles of parliamentary administrators have been further expanded after Lisbon to a range of tasks that go beyond technical support and include elements of agenda-setting. Adapted from the source document.

This article builds on the assumption that both the concept of subsidiarity and the concept of respect for national identities were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty to carry out the constitutional accommodation of national values and interests in the European legal order, permeating the parliamentary debates related to the ratification processes. Against this backdrop, this article analyses the use of Article 4(2) TEU – requiring the EU to respect Member States' national identities – in some national parliaments' reasoned opinions scrutinizing the compliance of EU legislative proposals with the principle of subsidiarity. The aim is to assess if – and to what extent – national parliaments, as national actors exercising their monitoring functions, could reframe the subsidiarity inquiry from a 'comparative efficiency test' to a sort of 'non-encroachment (upon Member States) test' referring to the concept of respect for national identities.

The objective of this dissertation is to identify the determinants of parliamentary involvement in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Specifically, this project investigates the formal participation rights of 18 Eurozone parliaments within the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and develops a typology of parliamentary ESM involvement. A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has been conducted for the period 2010-2012, complemented by 29 expert interviews from four countries. Why have some parliaments adopted firm participation rights within the ESM while others have not? And what effect does this have on accountability relations within the Economic and Monetary Union? The analysis has revealed a favourable macro-economic situation to be decisive for the adoption of strong parliamentary participation rights. Eurosceptical sentiments, on the other side, hardly play a role. In particular, the simultaneous presence of a favourable macro-economic situation and previously strong powers in EU affairs is a strong indicator for firm parliamentary ESM prerogatives. Two donor countries (Austria and Germany) and two debtor countries (Ireland and Portugal) are analysed in order to investigate the parliamentary day-to-day handling of ESM affairs. Theoretically speaking, strong parliamentary ESM involvement can potentially legitimise decision-making in the Economic and Monetary Union. The current asymmetric parliamentary involvement, however, only marginally increases the overall input-legitimacy of the European Stability Mechanism. One effect of parliamentary involvement is the politicization of EMU decision-making with potential spill-over effects to other policy areas.