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The relationship between law and politics is one of the most debated topics in legal theory. There is no consensus on the range and scope of the political and the legal element in law. Legislation or lawmaking is conceptually ambiguous because it indicates the law which has been promulgated, and therefore the primary object of many modern theories of law, but also the process of making it, that many theories of law usually locate outside the scope of jurisprudence and more specifically in the realm of politics. The first section sets the problem of legislation by distinguishing a number of different problems that often appear indistinctly under this label. Standpoints can be viewed according to a spectrum stretching from legal theories holding politics to essentially permeate the law to those claiming the opposite. The aim is to situate Hägerström's view on law-making along this spectrum. My claim is that Scandinavian realism holds middle ground in that ideological constructs structurally affect the law yet legal normativity cannot be reduced to the will of de facto holders of power: law cannot be reduced to any idea of will, including that of the majority or of the people. To substantiate this claim the article investigates Hägerström's view on the foundation of a new constitution pursuant to a political revolution, the ultimate touchstone for maintaining the (in)distinctiveness of law and politics. His bottom line is that the problem cannot be explained in terms of discovery of public interest, because of his non-cognitivist approach. But it cannot be explained in terms of decision-making either. Law-making here amounts to access and control of technical procedures grounded in a form of faith, or in his own terms "ideas governing men's minds". ; civis sum WAF 2015-2020

The core of Oppenheim's attack on what he calls the natural law thesis is the contention that it rests upon an incorrect epistemology:To subscribe to the natural law thesis is to adhere to the epistemological theory of value-cognitivism. Value-cognitivism claims that there exist intrinsic value-judgments which are cognitively true or false, regardless of the speaker's or listener's intrinsic value-commitments.In contrast to this view is the epistemological theory of value non-cognitivism, which tells us thatValue-words do not designate objects, and it is misleading to use nouns such as "Justice" and "Goodness." … A value-expression in an intrinsic value-judgment refers to a relation which holds between an evaluating subject and some object or event or state of affairs which he values intrinsically, whether positively or negatively.I take the foregoing to mean that, to predicate just or good of a law or of a man does not tell us anything about the law or man, but rather describes an attitude toward the law or man. Justice, as a noun, is misleading, because justice is not a "thing" or a "this"; it is not a substance but an attribute; not a real noun, but an hypostatized adjective, a quality of evaluating subjects, never of the objects of which the subjects themselves always predicate it.

Intro -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: Dummett'S Key Traits -- 1.1 Optimism -- 1.2 Adventurousness -- 1.3 A Thin Layer Of Rationality -- 1.4 Frege And Wittgenstein -- 1.5 And Kant -- 1.6 Objectivism, Relativism And The Intermediate Position -- 1.7 Two Connected Motivations For This Book -- 2 Metaphilosophy -- 2.1 Truth (1) -- 2.2 Truth (2) -- 2.3 Philosophy And Other Disciplines -- 3 Anti-Realism: The General Picture -- 3.1 Anti-Realism As Linguistic Kantianism -- 3.2 Analytical Philosophy -- 3.3 Objections To Linguistic Kantianism -- 4 Anti-Realism: The Semantical Details -- 4.1 Organic And Hierarchical Theory Of Meaning -- 4.2 Language, Idiolects And The Role Of Conventions -- 4.3 A 'Full-Blooded' Theory -- 4.4 Justificationism -- 4.5 Addendum: Davidson -- 5 Anti-Psychologism Revisited -- 5.1 The Cognitive Component -- 5.2 Rationality And Responsibility -- 5.3 Cognitive Sciences -- 6 Logic And Mathematics -- 6.1 Actual And Potential -- 6.2 Application And Innovation -- 7 Time -- 7.1 Wright'S Second Picture -- 7.2 Wright'S First Picture -- 7.3 Conclusion -- 8 Normative Applications -- 8.1 Cognitivism And Non-Cognitivism -- 8.2 Objectivity And The Rejection Of Bivalence -- 8.3 Systematization And Criticism -- 8.4 Dummett'S Positions -- 9 Epilogue -- 10 Bibliography -- 11 Name Index.

Those familiar with Ayn Rand's ethical writings may know that she discusses issues in metaethics, and that she defended the objectivity of morality during the heyday of early non-cognitivism. But neither her metaethics, in general, nor her views on moral objectivity, in particular, have received wide study. This article elucidates some aspects of her thought in these areas, focusing on Rand's conception of the way in which moral values serve a biologically based human need, and on her account of moral values as both essentially practical and epistemically objective in a sense fundamentally continuous with the objectivity of science. The bearing of her epistemological writings on her ethical thought is emphasized throughout, and her epistemology is defended against a line of criticism inspired by John McDowell's criticism of the so-called "myth of the given."

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Approach -- 1.2 Clarifications -- 1.2.1 Objectivity -- 1.2.2 Beliefs -- 1.3 Outline -- 1.3.1 Empirical Research -- 1.3.2 Philosophical Implications -- 1.3.3 Conclusion -- Notes -- Part I Empirical Research -- 2 The Methodology of Research On Moral Objectivity Beliefs -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Measures of Moral Objectivism -- 2.2.1 Disagreement Measures -- 2.2.2 Truth-Aptness Measures -- 2.2.3 Psychometric Scales -- 2.2.4 Alternative Measures -- 2.3 Worries About Incompleteness -- 2.3.1 Variants of Non-Objectivism -- 2.3.2 Variants of Subjectivism -- 2.4 Worries About Ambiguity -- 2.4.1 Objectivity -- 2.4.2 First-Order Moral Beliefs -- 2.4.3 Epistemic Beliefs -- 2.4.4 Universalism -- 2.4.5 Truth -- 2.4.6 Scenarios -- 2.5 Worries About Bias -- 2.5.1 Instructions and Explanations -- 2.5.2 Structure -- 2.5.3 Manipulations -- 2.6 Further Worries -- 2.6.1 Cognitivism/Non-Cognitivism -- 2.6.2 Moral Vs. Non-Moral -- 2.6.3 The Existence Assumption -- 2.7 Conclusion -- Notes -- 3 The Content of Moral Objectivity Beliefs -- 3.1 Somewhat Implicit/Rather Immediate Beliefs -- 3.1.1 Nichols and Goodwin and Darley's Measures -- 3.1.2 Sarkissian et al.'s Measure -- 3.1.3 Wright et al.'s Measure -- 3.1.4 Beebe et al.'s Measure -- 3.1.5 Recent Measures -- 3.2 Explicit/Somewhat Reflective Beliefs -- 3.2.1 Truth-Aptness Measures -- 3.2.2 Disagreement Measures -- 3.2.3 Psychometric Scales -- 3.2.4 Other Recent Measures -- 3.3 Very Implicit/Very Immediate Beliefs -- 3.3.1 Neuroimaging Data -- 3.3.2 Implicit Association Test -- 3.4 Conclusion -- Notes -- 4 The Correlates of Moral Objectivity Beliefs -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Cognitive Variables -- 4.2.1 Consensus Beliefs -- 4.2.2 Strength of Agreement.

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Intro -- Half Title -- Series Page -- References -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Part I: Studying Metaethical Objectivism-Why, What, and How? -- 1. Introduction -- Enter Metaethics -- Approach to Volume -- Notes -- 2. Setting the Stage -- What Should We Measure? -- Types of Content -- Metaethics: Is It Truth-Apt, Objective, and/or Universal? -- Domain Classification: Is It Moral? -- Types of Mental States: Beliefs, Attitudes, Values, etc. -- Types of Processes -- Correlates, Causes, and Consequences -- How Should We Measure Them? -- Direct vs. Indirect -- Explicit vs. Implicit -- Correlational vs. Causal -- General Methodological Concerns -- Operational Definitions -- Validity -- Reliability -- Power -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- Part II: Methodological Strategies and Challenges-A Review -- 3. Is It Moral? Measuring Domain Classification -- Social Domain Classification -- Direct Measurement -- No Definition -- Minimal Definitions -- More Substantive Definitions -- Indirect Measurement -- Other Classification Strategies -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- 4. Is It Truth-Apt? Measuring Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism -- Direct Measurement -- No Definition -- Minimal Definitions -- More Substantive Definitions -- Instructions and Training -- Instructions -- Training Exercise -- Other Examples -- Metaphor Example -- Comparison Example -- Indirect Measurement -- Other Considerations -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- 5. Is It Objectively True? Measuring Objectivism Vs. Subjectivism -- Direct Measurement -- Pölzler and Wright (2020a) -- Theory Example -- Metaphor Example -- Comparison Example -- Fisher et al. (2017) -- Davis (2021) -- Indirect Measurement -- Disagreement Tasks -- Nichols (2004) -- Goodwin and Darley (2008, 2012) -- Wright et al. (2013, 2014).

'Der Aufsatz stellt Umgangsweisen bei Migrationsfolgegenerationen in den Vordergrund, die deutlich machen, daß Menschen im faktischen und imaginären Spannungsfeld mehrerer 'nationaler Kulturen' produktiv und kreativ mit ihrer Lebenssituation umgehen. Doppelte national-kulturelle Heraussetzung und Mehrfachzugehörigkeit können zu einem kultivierenden Bezug auf sich selbst führen. Dies wird an einer Art Einzelfallanalyse exemplifiziert, welche abschließend mit Blick auf methodologische Argumente und Dilemmata einer 'subjektorientierten' Migrationsforschung kommentiert wird.' (Autorenreferat)