Suchergebnisse

Civil society organizations in Northern Ireland played an important role in the peace process during the 1990s under the Peace I program sponsored by the European Union. Their impact on government decision making declined after 1999 under the iinfluence of Peace II, even though civil society organizations remained dynamic and active. This challenges a central claim in theories that assert strong social capital, related to a dynamic civil society sector, is necessary for effective democratic governance. Whether a strong civil society sector is implicated in processes of government decision making is an empirical question. Theory must treat the relationship as problematic. (Ethnopolitics)

Can nonstate militants professionalize? That is the core question of this piece. Discussions of professionalism have spread to the state military from civilian professions such as education, medicine, and law. This piece examines whether nonstate actors exhibit the same fundamental processes found within these state-based organizations. These fundamentals are the creation of a recognized internal ethos, which acts as a collective standard for those involved. A commitment to expertise and the punishment of those who do not reach these collective expectations reinforce this ethos. To answer this question, this piece examines the development of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Troubles. It highlights consistencies and inconsistencies with traditional forces and argues that groups like the PIRA can professionalize and increase their effectiveness in doing so. This widens the field of professionalism studies and provides an additional lens through which to examine nonstate groups.

Armed groups are prone to instability and fragmentation, but what explains variation among the new groups that emerge? I argue that the internal politics preceding organizational splits is critical. When it comes to the survival of breakaway groups, those forming around single issue areas gain an advantage by attracting more homogeneous, preference-aligned recruits. On the other hand, those forming over a variety of grievances attract a more heterogeneous population whose divergent views undermine cohesion and cooperation, necessitate hierarchy, and diminish the odds of organizational survival. I test this argument with a case study of two Republican groups from Northern Ireland—the Real Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army. The findings confirm my argument and underscore the limited utility of studying organizational fractures from the sole perspective of contemporaneous external events like conciliation and repression. Rather, I show how internal political dynamics influence the composition, identity, and overall trajectory of breakaway groups. This has implications for designing effective counterinsurgent policies, for understanding the formation of armed groups, and for anticipating whether breakaway groups are likely to escalate, moderate, or adopt spoiling behavior.

In conflicts between a state and a non-state actor, such as a paramilitary or terrorist organization, when no official diplomatic relations and recognition exists, there is a need for actors who can serve as a "diplomatic avant-garde." This article identifies a diplomatic pattern in which breakthroughs occur through cooperative work between two types of actors: unofficial citizen diplomats and key figures in intelligence bodies. Each actor brings specific resources: unofficial actors have contacts with the non-state actor, while intelligence officers can offer backing from within the official system of the state. The article analyzes the topic using three case studies: Brendan Duddy and the MI6 officer Michael Oatley (UK and the Provisional IRA, 1975–1993); Willie Esterhuyse and the head of the South African National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard (South African government and the ANC, 1987– 1990); and Gershon Baskin and the Mossad official David Meidan (Israel and Hamas, 2011). This study examines the unique relations between these two types of actors and how their collaboration promoted negotiations with non-state armed actors. It analyzes three stages: establishment of contact between these actors, persuasion of the relevant parties, and the breakthrough moment when talks shifted to an official back channel.

We elaborate a little noticed strategy generally used by weaker actors both in domestic and international politics: the ethical trap. Actors who fall into such traps lose ethical standing and influence at home as well as abroad. We explore the concept of the trap and distinguish it from policy interventions and escalation in which there is no deliberate enticement. We document historical instances of successful ethical trapping both within states and between them. We also discuss traps that were not sprung. We contend that ethical traps have become an increasingly salient feature of contemporary asymmetrical warfare both within states and internationally. We conclude with some propositions about the global practice in which ethical traps are set and the conditions in which they are likely to succeed and some observations about the relative vulnerability of liberal and non-liberal regimes to these traps. This in turn says something important about the practical consequences of ethical violations in international affairs.

This paper analyses the use of violence by Loyalist paramilitaries over the course of the peace process and after the Belfast Agreement. The focus is on a largely understudied area in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. It is argued that Loyalist paramilitaries have continually used violence to serve several objectives. These objectives of violence have shifted in dominance as the peace process unfolded. A typology of the objectives of Loyalist violence is presented which identifies violence as either between or within groups and in search of political, sectarian, economic, social and territorial aims. In conclusion, the article considers some implications of continuing Loyalist paramilitary violence for state and society. (Ethnopolitics)