Suchergebnisse

This article examines the commemorative role played by museums of nuclear technology in the United States, particularly those supported by the government agency responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons and reactor programs, the Department of Energy. The management of public perceptions of America's nuclear history in these museums reflects national defence and security imperatives in the post 9/11 era. The legacy of American nuclearism is complex and contradictory, and presents a daunting challenge to curators in museums sanctioned by vested interests. The many beneficial civilian applications of nuclear technology have be balanced by the recognition of the dire destructiveness of nuclear weapons; the compulsion to celebrate American technological achievement has to be checked by the acknowledgement of the damage wrought by the military use of nuclear energy both at home and abroad. A comparison with the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum suggests that nuclear 'victory' is more problematic to exhibit than nuclear victimhood.

"Leveraging Latency explores how the weak coerce the strong with nuclear technology. Allies and adversaries alike can compel concessions from superpowers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. When does nuclear latency-the technical capacity to build the bomb-enable states to pursue this coercive strategy? The conventional wisdom is that compellence with nuclear latency works when states are close to the bomb. But this intuitive notion is wrong. Tristan Volpe finds that more latency seldom translates into greater bargaining advantages. He reveals how coercion creates a tradeoff between making threats and assurances credible. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult to promise nuclear restraint. The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon. Historical studies of Japan, West Germany, North Korea, and Iran demonstrate that mere capacity to build atomic weapons can yield diplomatic dividends. As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape, Leveraging Latency provides scholars and practitioners with a systematic assessment of its coercive utility. Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanism-the threat-assurance tradeoff-that explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work. This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons"--

Natasha Bajema & Mary Beth Nikitin describe how enduring weaknesses in compliance & enforcement mechanisms have been lost in the debate on nuclear proliferation & advance a new approach to proliferation threats. Adapted from the source document.