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The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progressivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity, except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and technological factors that have also affected the skill premium. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We find that optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demographic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of the observed skill premium.

The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progressivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity, except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and technological factors that have also affected the skill premium. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We find that optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demographic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of the observed skill premium

This thesis aims to assess the impact of downward wage rigidities on optimal tax- ation. We study a dynamic general equilibrium neoclassical growth model for a one sector, cashless stochastic closed economy with an in nitely lived representative house- hold, a representative rm with a constant returns to scale technology, a government deciding how to nance its exogenous expenditures without access to lump sum taxes, and competitive markets. We conclude that the optimal labor income tax exhibits both a reactive and a precautionary nature. Regarding the reactive nature, when the wage rigidity is binding, labor taxes increase since it is possible to raise revenue without ad- ditional distortions. On the precautionary side, the expectation of a future constraint lowers labor taxes, which, in turn, decreases the wage that clears the labor market, thus loosening future constraints. In the nominal small open economy with downwardly rigid nominal wages and exogenous nominal exchange rates, we show that the same conclu- sions apply. Additionally, it is possible to use consumption taxes in such a way that the optimal capital control tax is zero for a broad family of instantaneous utility functions. Finally, we introduce a consumption tax that discriminates between the good produced in the domestic economy and the good produced abroad to show that downward wage rigidities and exogenous exchange rates are irrelevant if the correct policy is used. ; Esta tese pretende avaliar o impacto de rigidezes salariais decrescentes sobre a política scal óptima. Para tal, usamos um modelo dinâmico de equilibrío geral, concordante com a corrente neoclásica, para uma economia estocástica fechada, sem moeda, de horizonte temporal in nito com uma família representativa, uma empresa representativa que usa uma tecnologia com rendimentos constantes à escala num único sector, um governo que precisa de nanciar a sequência exógena de gastos sem ter acesso a impostos lump sum, e mercados competitivos. É possível concluir que o imposto óptimo sobre o rendimento do trabalho apresenta características reactivas e precautórias. No que respeita à vertente reactiva, quando a restrição salarial é activa, o imposto deve aumentar visto ser possível recolher mais receita sem introduzir distorções adicionais. Na vertente precautória, a ex- pectativa de uma restrição futura diminui o imposto, o que, por sua vez, reduz o salário que equilibra o mercado do trabalho, relaxando, desta forma, as restrições futuras. Para a pequena economia aberta nominal, com rigidez decrescente no salário nominal junta- mente com taxas de câmbio nominais exógenas, o mesmo resultado é obtido. Além disso, mostramos que é possível implementar impostos sobre o consumo tais que o imposto óptimo de controlo de capitais seja zero para uma variedade de funções utilidade instan- tâneas. Finalmente, introduzimos um imposto sobre o consumo que discrimina o bem doméstico do bem produzido no exterior para demonstrar que rigidezes decrescentes no salário nominal, juntamente com taxas de câmbio nominais exógenas, se tornam irrele- vantes para uma correcta utilização desta política.

We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule when taxpayers earn multiple incomes and differ along many unobserved dimensions. We derive the necessary conditions for the government's optimum using both a tax perturbation and a mechanism design approach, and show that both methods produce the same results. Our main contribution is to propose a numerical method to find the optimal tax schedule. Applied to the optimal taxation of couples, we find that optimal isotax curves are very close to linear and parallel. The slope of isotax curves is strongly affected by the relative tax-elasticity of male and female income. We make several additional contributions, including a test for Pareto efficiency and a condition on primitives that ensures the government's necessary conditions are sufficient and the solution to the problem is unique.