Suchergebnisse

We analyze the conduct of fiscal policy in a financially integrated union in the presence of financial frictions. Frictions create a wedge between the return to investment and the union interest rate. This leads to an over-spending externality. While the social cost of spending is the return to investment, governments care mostly about the (depressed) interest rate they face. In other words, the crowding-out effects of public spending are partly "exported" to the rest of the union. We argue that it may be hard for the union to deal with this externality through the design of fiscal rules, which are bound to be shaped by the preferences of the median country and not by efficiency considerations. We also analyze how this overspending externality—and the union's ability to deal with it effectively—changes when the union is financially integrated with the rest of the world. Finally, we extend our model by introducing a zero lower bound on interest rates and show that, if financial frictions are severe enough, the union is pushed into a liquidity trap and the direction of the spending externality is reversed. At such times, fiscal rules that are appropriate during normal times might backfire. ; Broner and Martin acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through the I+D Excelencia grant (ECO2016-79823-P). Broner, Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D grant (CEX2019-000915-S), from the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR grant 2017SGR01393), the CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya, and from the Barcelona GSE Research Network. In addition, both Martin and Ventura acknowledge support from the ERC Consolidator Grant FP7-615651-MacroColl and Horizon 2020 Programme, Advanced Grant 2020- 693512-GEPPS respectively.

Open access funding provided by Università degli Studi di Genova within the CRUI-CARE Agreement. ; International audience ; The aim of this article is to help explain the history of the public spending-to-GDP ratio in France by examining the production of laws and regulations. It empirically finds a positive and significant relationship between the number of pages in the Official Gazette of the French Republic and the development of the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. We rely on the number of pages in the Official Gazette as a proxy for the cost of implementing laws and regulations. If unchecked, a proliferation of laws and regulations expands public spending. Over the period 1905–2015, a 10% increase in pages caused a 1.14% increase in the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio.

Open access funding provided by Università degli Studi di Genova within the CRUI-CARE Agreement. ; International audience ; The aim of this article is to help explain the history of the public spending-to-GDP ratio in France by examining the production of laws and regulations. It empirically finds a positive and significant relationship between the number of pages in the Official Gazette of the French Republic and the development of the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. We rely on the number of pages in the Official Gazette as a proxy for the cost of implementing laws and regulations. If unchecked, a proliferation of laws and regulations expands public spending. Over the period 1905–2015, a 10% increase in pages caused a 1.14% increase in the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio.

The aim of the article is to describe the indicators determining the efficiency of public spending on education, to identify problems related to the evaluation of efficiency, to compare education funding in the European Union countries, to characterise public spending on education in Latvia as well as to provide suggestions for further improvement of efficiency. It is concluded that there are a number of indicators characterising the efficiency of education financing, but there is no unified approach to their evaluation, and it should be taken into account that efficiency indicators are continuously influenced by environmental factors. The author points out that financing amount per one learner in different types of education allows assessing the efficiency of public spending. It is proposed to pay special attention to the issue of special education financing in Latvia, by evaluating possibilities to improve the financing principles of special education and increasing its efficiency. ; Straipsnio tikslas yra aprašyti rodiklius, lemiančius viešųjų išlaidų švietimui efektyvumą, identifikuoti problemas, susijusias su efektyvumo įvertinimu, palyginti švietimo finansavimą Europos Sąjungos šalyse, charakterizuoti viešųjų išlaidų skyrimą švietimui Latvijoje, taip pat pateikti pasiūlymus dėl tolesnio efektyvumo gerinimo. Išvadoje teigiama, kad yra daug rodiklių, kurie charakterizuoja švietimo finansavimo efektyvumą, tačiau nėra vieno būdo tai įgyvendinti. Svarbu pažymėti, kad efektyvumo rodikliams dažnai įtakos turi išoriniai veiksniai. Autorė pažymi, kad finansavimas, skiriant lėšas vienam mokiniui pagal skirtingus švietimo tipus, leidžia pasiekti švietimo finansavimo efektyvumą. Siūloma ypatingą dėmesį skirti specialiajam ugdymui Latvijoje, įvertinant galimybes pagerinti finansavimo principus šiame ugdyme ir taip pagerinti jo efektyvumą.

Este trabalho estuda como os incumbentes respondem, em termos de gastos públicos, ao sairem do cargo quando concorrem à reeleição. Para isso, utilizamos dados de municípios brasileiros, com foco nos relatórios periódicos de execuções orçamentárias que nos permitem analisar as finanças públicas nos dois últimos meses de um ano eleitoral, quando o prefeito em exercício sabe se permanecerá no cargo por mais um mandato. Aplicamos um design de regressão em descontinuidade para eleições acirradas e mostramos que prefeitos em exercício que perdem a eleição tendem a ter um nível de despesas mais alto nos últimos dois meses no cargo em relação que aqueles que são reeleitos para outro mandato. O efeito estimado é particularmente forte para as despesas de investimento. ; This paper studies how incumbents respond after being voted out of office when running for reelection in terms of public spending. We use data from Brazilian municipalities, focusing on the periodical reports of budget executions that allow us to analyze the public finances in the last two months of an election year, when the incumbent mayor knows if he will remain in office for another term. We apply a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) for close elections and find that incumbent mayors who lose the election tend to have higher expenses during the last two months in office than those reelected for another term. The estimated effect is particularly strong for the investment expenses.

Malawi's economic growth has been low and volatile for the past two decades, leading to stagnating high poverty levels. The Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic will negatively affected economic growth leading to lower government revenue. Despite low per capita growth, Malawi has made strong progress in many areas of human capital development since 2000. Notwithstanding the above, Malawi still faces considerable gaps in human capital, which will impede its ability to reduce poverty in the medium term. Malawi lags behind in some health and nutrition outcomes, including HIV and malaria prevalence. Strengthening human capital in Malawi will be critical to reduce poverty, increase inclusion in society, and create jobs. The World Bank launched a new Human capital index (HCI) in October 2018 as part of its broader Human capital project. One factor that contributes to low human capital outcomes is Malawi's adolescent fertility rate, one of the highest rates of in the world, with 132 births per 1,000 women aged 15-19. The main underlying cause for the high adolescent fertility rate is the high rate of child marriage. The government is making efforts to strengthen human capital. To strengthen human capital in the face of limited fiscal space, Malawi needs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government and donor spending on human capital. To address this problem, there is need to integrate financial reporting systems at district and central government levels. This will enhance government's ability to monitor and evaluate expenditure and program implementation across sectors.

This study examines the relationship between types of government and level of public spending. There are two competing perspectives about the consequences of coalition governments for the size of public expenditures. The most common argument is that government spending increases under coalition governments, compared with one-party governments. Another line of thought contends that coalition governments are often stalled in the status quo due to the veto power of each member. Our analysis of public spending in 33 parliamentary democracies between 1972 and 2000 confirms the latter argument that coalition governments have a status quo bias. We find, particularly, that single-party governments are apt to modify the budget according to the current fiscal condition, which enables them to increase or decrease spending more flexibly. By contrast, coalition governments find it difficult not only to decrease spending under difficult fiscal conditions but also to increase it even under a more favorable context, because each member of the coalition has a veto power.

AbstractThe aim of this article is to help explain the history of the public spending-to-GDP ratio in France by examining the production of laws and regulations. It empirically finds a positive and significant relationship between the number of pages in the Official Gazette of the French Republic and the development of the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. We rely on the number of pages in the Official Gazette as a proxy for the cost of implementing laws and regulations. If unchecked, a proliferation of laws and regulations expands public spending. Over the period 1905–2015, a 10% increase in pages caused a 1.14% increase in the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illu strations -- List of Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1. Public-Spending Debates -- 2. The Cost of Festivals -- 3. The Cost of Democracy -- 4. The Cost of War -- 5. Conclusion: Public-Spending Priorities -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index of Sources -- General Index