Principal-Agent-Probleme in internationalen Organisationen
In: HWWA discussion paper 219
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In: HWWA discussion paper 219
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft = Revue suisse de science politique, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 131-135
ISSN: 1424-7755
The article describes policy analysis as regards complex policy making processes in multi-level governance systems & how the principal-agent model typifies governance problems between federal & canton levels. The limit on federal intrusion on the cantons is known as principal-agent problem, & it assumes that every agent tries to use information from the principal to their own advantage. However, the cantons do not only carry out policy recommendations from the federal level but also play a role in governance by initiating public policy. Even though the question of how the existence of different principals impacts the behavior of the executive branch on cantonal level is relevant, it is not an essential factor in the policy formulations of the cantons. In addition, empirical analysis has shown that federal policy initiatives occasionally have unintended results, as described concerning health policy. Thus, the lacking analysis of such unintended consequences, as well as the emphasis on problems of control in the principal-agent model, does not result in such an analytical advantage as to justify neglecting alternative theoretical approaches in multi-level governance, the author contends. 11 References. A. Kallioinen
In: British journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 605-630
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices. Adapted from the source document.
In: Frontiers of theoretical economics, Band 2, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
We propose an agency model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes (equilibria) of this market. In this regard we generalise the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). Unlike in the standard principal-agent theory, equilibrium payoffs of all the individuals are endogenous, equilibrium contracts are Pareto optimal, and the incremental surplus generated in a principal-agent relationship accrues to the tenant. We design a simple non-cooperative game which implements the set of stable outcomes in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also suggest policy measures in relation to efficiency and income distribution.
In: British journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 605-630
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article argues that human rights could be improved by motivating politicians and bureaucrats to put more effort into protecting human rights. It conceptualizes the production of human rights practices as the outcome of two principal-agent relationships that constrain politicians and bureaucrats. Reliance on taxes is a non-electoral, fiscal factor that makes politicians more willing to protect human rights. Increased government revenue, no matter the source, raises bureaucratic compensation and helps create a more accountable bureaucracy. Thus both a higher reliance on taxes and larger state revenues lead to the better protection of human rights. Each fiscal factor promotes a different type of accountability, both of which independently contribute to good human rights practices.
The present paper explicitly models the principal-agent relationship between a democratic population and its elected representative within a standard war bargaining setup. I find that the specific structure of this relationship and the problems resulting from it help overcome information asymmetries in crisis bargaining. This provides an alternative theoretic explanation of democracies' signaling advantage which may turn out to be more realistic than the concept of audience costs. ; Das Papier befasst sich modelltheoretisch mit dem empirischen Phänomen des 'Demokratischen Friedens', der Beobachtung also, dass Demokratien ihre Konflikte in der Regel nicht kriegerisch lösen. Die Grundlage meiner Analyse bildet das Modell von Fearon (1995), ein Verhandlungsspiel mit 2 Parteien und der Möglichkeit, die Verhandlung einseitig abzubrechen und eine Aufteilung durch Krieg herbeizuführen. Fearon zeigt, dass es immer dann zu Krieg kommen kann, wenn der erwartete Gewinn aus der Kriegsoption private Information der Parteien ist. Bei vollkommener Information dagegen wird der Gegner immer genau den erwarteten Gewinn seines Gegenübers anbieten und somit Krieg verhindern. Um herauszufinden, warum Demokratien trotz asymmetrischer Information eine friedliche Lösung finden, modelliere ich explizit die Prinzipal-Agenten Beziehung, die innerhalb einer Demokratie zwischen den Wählern und dem gewählten Regierungschef vorliegt. Es zeigt sich, dass es Demokratien aufgrund der Prinzipal-Agenten Struktur gelingt, ihren Gegnern glaubhaft das minimale Angebot zu signalisieren, welches gerade noch akzeptabel ist und so Krieg zu vermeiden.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"American Prosecutors as Principals and Agents" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: The review of international organizations, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 125-138
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: Swiss political science review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 131-136
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 30, Heft 5, S. 371-381
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Band 157, Heft 1, S. 83
In: Heidelberger Lehrtexte Wirtschaftswissenschaften; Risiko, Anreiz und Kontrolle, S. 234-276
In: Politická ekonomie: teorie, modelování, aplikace, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 491-507
ISSN: 2336-8225
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In: American economic review, Band 90, Heft 2, S. 203-208
ISSN: 1944-7981
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