Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes the French and the Vietnamese versions of the TV game show "The Price is Right", using data from 130 episodes. We focus on the bidding game, covering 434 rounds and 1,736 bids. We document that players deviate signifi cantly from what is predicted by the model of rational expectations, especially in the French population. Moreover, Vietnamese fourth bidders are found to win more frequently than their French counterparts in spite of using strategic bids less often. We attribute these results to cultural reasons. Contestants from the collectivistic, uncertainty-tolerant culture (i.e., Vietnam) are more reluctant to engage in strategic bidding than individuals from the individualistic, uncertainty-avoidant culture (i.e., France). However, Vietnamese contestants pay more attention to the estimates of the previous players and thus make a better use of the informational advantage inherent to the sequential nature of the game. Overall, our evidence suggests that culture is an important omitted variable in studies that examine cross-country differences in decision-making.

Relying on culture as an important explanatory variable is regarded with skepticism by many contemporary political scientists. Yet, doubts about culture's usefulness rest in large part on false perceptions of various sorts. These misunderstandings relegate an important explanatory variable to the social science scrap heap. Accordingly, the author engages in three tasks. First, selected prominent arguments for culture's lack of explanatory usefulness are discussed. Second, it is demonstrated how at least one conceptualization of culture, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group theory, overcomes aspects of these difficulties and contributes to explaining institutional form and political change. Third, it is argued that grid-group theory contributes significantly to both institutional analysis and rational choice theory. Grid-group theory augments each of these latter two approaches and, more important, reveals complementary aspects, linking these modes of analysis together as mutually supportive elements of a more inclusive explanatory scheme.

Using the model, this study makes eight policy recommendations for creating a new postwar deterrent world order when the warring parties are authoritarian dictatorships with veto power and nuclear powers. First, as long as the ceasefire condition is the abandonment of an independent state by a dictatorship and the retention of an independent state by an invaded state, ceasefire negotiations tend to be parallel unless a mediator is obtained; Second, since democratic states require public consent before the decision to start the war, the obstacles to the start of the war are this is greater than in dictatorships. Third, the distance between a dictatorship and a country determines the decisions of its leaders. The greater the distance, the more likely it is to provide only economic assistance. The closer a country is to the point where it feels threatened if the occupation is tolerated, the more military assistance it will provide. Fourth, when a dictatorship initiates a war of aggression, neighboring countries tend to use economic sanctions to weaken the dictatorship's ability to wage war to avoid a major-power war. Fifth, it is essential to introduce a system in which the veto power of a permanent member of the UN Security Council is suspended if it violates the UN Charter or is a war party. The sixth is the establishment of a permanent UN force that can intervene in areas of conflict by a certain level of resolution of the UN General Assembly. Register with the UN volunteer soldiers who can act in the exercise of war, so that they can be deployed early in the event of a war of aggression by a major power against a minor power. Eighth, make wartime statements by dictators and leaders of invaded countries in the media and elsewhere binding under international law.Keywords. Veto power; Dictator; Authoritarian states.JEL. F51; F52; P16; P26; P48.

The association of self-regulation and personality factors with rational decision making was investigated using an experimental model of political voting. The results revealed diff erent sets of personality characteristics for rational and emotional voters. A self-regulation/personality typology of decision making was then constructed, and traits representing self-regulation, cognition, and personality were examined as predispositions toward rational decision making. As a result, specifi c connections among these variables were uncovered, through which the primary role of the conscious self-regulation system in the management of rational decision making in a political voting context was established.