Suchergebnisse

This paper sets out to examine, at the national level, changes in the socioeconomic status of Indigenous Australians during the decade 1991–2001, a period that closely matches 'the reconciliation decade'. The information used is from three five-yearly censuses undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1991, 1996 and 2001. Comparisons are made both of change in absolute wellbeing for the total Indigenous population, and of relative wellbeing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Five broad categories of socioeconomic status are used in the analysis—employment, education, income, housing and health. The decade is divided into two five-year periods, 1991–1996 and 1996–2001. In 1996, there was a change in Federal government so that for the first time since Indigenous Australians were included in the census in 1971, there is a close match between political and census cycles. This facilitates a comparative assessment of the broad Indigenous affairs policy performance of the Hawke and Keating governments from 1991 to 1996, and that of the Howard governments between 1996 and 2001. This comparative analysis is important because there has been an attempt to change the broad approach in Indigenous policy since 1996. According to recent policy discourse, the period 1991 to 1996 saw a focus on both 'symbolic' (Indigenous rights and 'practical' (socioeconomic improvements) reconciliation, while the period since 1996 has focused increasingly on 'practical' reconciliation only, in an attempt to reduce the material disadvantage of Indigenous Australians. The paper develops a 'scorecard' and shows that, in absolute terms, it is difficult to differentiate the performance of governments pre- and post-1996. However, in relative terms—that is when comparing the relative wellbeing of Indigenous people as a whole with all other Australians—there is some disparity between the two periods, with the early period 1991–1996 clearly outperforming the more recent period. In conclusion we note that while practical reconciliation forms the rhetorical basis for Indigenous policy development since 1996, there is no evidence that the Howard governments have delivered better outcomes for Indigenous Australians than their predecessors. Indigenous socioeconomic problems are deeply entrenched and do not seem to be abating even during a period of rapid economic growth at the national level. It is of particular concern that some of the relative gains made between 1991 and 1996 appear to have been offset by the relatively poor performance of Indigenous outcomes between 1996 and 2001.

Convinced that what is needed in America is a serious, open, civil dialogue on racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice, William S. Cohen and Janet Langhart Cohen brought together an august and varied group of individuals in July 2008. Meeting in Washington, D.C., the participants, including Douglas Blackmon, Deepak Chopra, Sam Donaldson, Louis Gossett, Jr., and the Honorable John Lewis, came together to further a national conversation about the need for truth, tolerance, and reconciliation and what we can do to help all of our citizens to achieve their dreams in this land of great promise

Preliminary Material -- INTRODUCTION -- REMEMBERING THE PRESENT /Duane L. Cady -- VULNERABILITY AND BENEFICENCE: REMEMBERING THE PAST FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE /Eddy Souffrant -- HOMELAND SECURITY, FIDUCIARY CARE, AND DUTIES TO FOREIGN NATIONALS /Joseph Betz -- FORGETTING AND NOT RECONCILING HIROSHIMA /Joseph C. Kunkel -- INTRODUCTION /Dennis Rothermel -- COMPASSION AND RECONCILIATION /Robert Paul Churchill -- WHAT'S WRONG WITH VICTIMS' RIGHTS? /David Boersema -- PEDAGOGY AND PUNISHMENT: A UNITARIAN ARGUMENT FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE /Rob Gildert -- PERPETUAL VIOLENCE? MIMESIS AND ANAMNESIS /Andrew Fitz-Gibbon -- LANGUAGE AND RECONCILIATION /William C. Gay -- WORKS CITED -- ABOUT THE AUTHORS -- INDEX -- VIBS.

This paper sets out to examine, at the national level, changes in the socioeconomic status of Indigenous Australians during the decade 1991–2001, a period that closely matches 'the reconciliation decade'. The information used is from three five-yearly censuses undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1991, 1996 and 2001. Comparisons are made both of change in absolute wellbeing for the total Indigenous population, and of relative wellbeing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Five broad categories of socioeconomic status are used in the analysis—employment, education, income, housing and health. The decade is divided into two five-year periods, 1991–1996 and 1996–2001. In 1996, there was a change in Federal government so that for the first time since Indigenous Australians were included in the census in 1971, there is a close match between political and census cycles. This facilitates a comparative assessment of the broad Indigenous affairs policy performance of the Hawke and Keating governments from 1991 to 1996, and that of the Howard governments between 1996 and 2001. This comparative analysis is important because there has been an attempt to change the broad approach in Indigenous policy since 1996. According to recent policy discourse, the period 1991 to 1996 saw a focus on both 'symbolic' (Indigenous rights) and 'practical' (socioeconomic improvements) reconciliation, while the period since 1996 has focused increasingly on 'practical' reconciliation only, in an attempt to reduce the material disadvantage of Indigenous Australians. The paper develops a 'scorecard' and shows that, in absolute terms, it is difficult to differentiate the performance of governments pre- and post-1996. However, in relative terms—that is when comparing the relative wellbeing of Indigenous people as a whole with all other Australians—there is some disparity between the two periods, with the early period 1991–1996 clearly outperforming the more recent period. In conclusion we note that while practical reconciliation forms the rhetorical basis for Indigenous policy development since 1996, there is no evidence that the Howard governments have delivered better outcomes for Indigenous Australians than their predecessors. Indigenous socioeconomic problems are deeply entrenched and do not seem to be abating even during a period of rapid economic growth at the national level. It is of particular concern that some of the relative gains made between 1991 and 1996 appear to have been offset by the relatively poor performance of Indigenous outcomes between 1996 and 2001.

Reconciliation is being urged upon people who have been bitter and murderous enemies, upon victims and perpetrators of terrible human rights abuses, and upon groups of individuals whose very self-conceptions have been structured in terms of historical and often state-sanctioned relations of dominance and submission. The rhetoric of reconciliation is particularly common in situations where traditional judicial responses to past wrongdoing are unavailable because of corruption in the legal system, staggeringly large numbers of offenders, or anxiety about the political consequences of trials and punishment.But what is reconciliation? How is reconciliation to be achieved? And under what conditions should it be sought? The notable lack of answers to these questions prompts the worry that talk of reconciliation is merely a ruse to disguise the fact that a "purer" type of justice cannot be realized–that, in being asked to focus on reconciliation rather than on punishment, victims of past wrongdoing are having to settle for the morally second best. By mining our pretheoretical understandings of reconciliation, the essay arrives at a core concept of reconciliation as narrative incorporation that at the same time suggests a way in which reconciliation might be pursued and grounds a response to moral qualms provoked by the use of an unanalyzed conception of reconciliation.

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to question some basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that reconciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the interactions between reconciliation and negotiation. Beyond a theoretical interest, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases (Afghanistan, Rwanda, South-Africa, and the Franco-German case). Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to determine to what extent reconciliation can be considered as negotiable.

The purpose of this article is to question some basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that reconciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the interactions between reconciliation and negotiation. Beyond a theoretical interest, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases (Afghanistan, Rwanda, South-Africa, and the Franco-German case). Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to determine to what extent reconciliation can be considered as negotiable. Adapted from the source document.

THE PRESENT CULTURAL FOCUS ON HEALING THE WOUNDS OF WAR THROUGH A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN VIETNAM VETERANS AND NON-VETS, WHILE LONG OVERDUE, RISKS SUSTAINING CONVENTIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES-FOR EXAMPLE COLD WAR ANTI-COMMUNISM--IN ITS ATTEMPT TO TRANSCEND THE POLITICS OF VIETNAM. INDEED, IT TENDS TOWARD RECONSTRUCTING THE 1960S AS A PERIOD OF SELF-INDULGENCE, MORAL COWARDICE, AND FADDISM. AS SUCH, THE PRESENT RECONCILIATION, IN ADDITION TO RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORY OF THE 1960S ALONG NEOCONSERVATIVE LINES, PERPETUATES THE INVISIBILITY OF "THE OTHER," THE VIETNAMESE. A RECONCILIATION WHICH IGNORES THE VIETNAMESE AND SMEARS THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT YIELDS AMBIVALENCE RATHER THAN HARMONY IN LEAVING UNRESOLVED THE ESSENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. TO PUT VIETNAM BEHIND US WE MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH WHAT MUST BE CALLED OUR IMPERIAL PAST. TO BUILD A GLOBAL AND HUMANE FUTURE, INCLUDING A GENEROUS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE, WILL REQUIRE A STRENUOUS REJECTION OF THE PAROCHIAL AND ETHNOCENTRIC MYTHS OF INTERVENTIONISM. IT WILL REQUIRE A RECONSTRUCTED PATRIOTISM COMPATIBLE WITH SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL NATIONS. IT WILL MOST OF ALL, REQUIRE A REJECTION OF A DANGEROUS BIPARTISANSHIP NOSTALGIC FOR THE PRE-VIETNAM COLD WAR CONSENSUS. FINALLY, RECONCILIATION CANNOT TRANSCEND POLITICS; ESSENTIALLY, IT IS POLITICS.