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Abstract
This study provides evidence that strong kin networks are detrimental for democratic participatory institutions and that the medieval Catholic Church's marriage regulations dissolved Europe's clan-based kin networks, which contributed to the emergence of participatory institutions. I show that weak ancestral kin networks are positively associated with ethnicities' democratic traditions in the past and countries' democracy scores today. At the same time, medieval Church exposure predicts weak kin networks across countries, European regions and ethnicities. In a historical difference-in-difference analysis, I provide evidence that exposure to the Church contributed to the formation of medieval communes—self-governed cities with participatory institutions. Moreover, within Christian Europe, stricter regional and temporal marriage prohibitions are associated with commune formation. Lastly, I shed light on one mechanism, civicness, and show that weak kin networks are associated with more political participation.

The positive correlation between real investment rates and real income levels across countries is driven largely by differences in the price of investment relative to output. The high relative price of investment in poor countries is due to the low price of consumption goods in those countries. Investment prices are no higher in poor countries. Thus, the low real investment rates in poor countries are not driven by high tax or tariff rates on investment. Poor countries, instead, appear to be plagued by low efficiency in producing investment goods and in producing consumer goods to trade for them. (JEL E22, E23, O16, O47)

Scheffler and Needham give alternative interpretations of Karo Batak terminology, the former describing it as a kinship terminology, the latter as a terminology of social/symbolic classification. Both these points of view prove useful in understanding the way Karo use kinship terms and behave as kin. The organization of ritual, the etiquette of reference and address, and the way Karo forge kinlike ties illustrate how both genealogy and alliance categories operate in Karo kinship.

AbstractA series of studies has shown that civil wars are caused not only by factors inside countries, but also by effects operating across state borders. Whereas a first wave of quantitative studies demonstrated that such effects make the "closed-polity" assumption untenable, more recently researchers have identified particular causal mechanisms driving conflict. Despite these recent advances, a central puzzle remains unresolved, namely why ethnic groups that at least in theory could count on support from large transborder ethnic kin (TEK) groups often have remained surprisingly peaceful, such as the stranded Russian populations in the "near abroad." We propose a theoretical framework that extends the analysis from the primary dyad between the incumbent and the challenger group by adding a secondary dyad that pits the incumbent against the TEK group. We postulate a curvilinear effect of the TEK group's relative size on conflict onset. Using a new data set on transnational ethnic links, we find that that the risk of conflict increases within the middle range of the size spectrum, consistent with our main hypothesis. This means that large TEK groups have a conflict-dampening effect, provided that they control their own state. Excluded TEK groups, however, are not associated with lower conflict probabilities.

Scholarship on fictive kinship has relied on many different terminologies. I argue for a new precision. I review existing discussions and draw on those to suggest a new, experimental typology. I suggest that the typology illuminates a variety of issues, including the aspects of family that are accomplished through fictive kin. I also discuss issues surrounding fictive kinship for which no information exists but about which the typology might help make predictions.