IT IS A COMMON ASSUMPTION THAT A NATURAL RIGHTS THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDERLIES CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINES. THE TERM HUMAN RIGHTS IS GENERALLY TAKEN TO MEAN WHAT LOCKE AND HIS SUCCESSORS MEANT BY NATURAL RIGHTS: NAMELY, RIGHTS HELD SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF BEING A PERSON. SUCH RIGHTS ARE NATURAL IN THE SENSE THAT THEIR SOURCE IS HUMAN NATURE.
In this article I explore the intersections of children's human rights, social policy, and qualitative inquiry from a social work perspective. First, I consider the relationship between human rights work and social work. Second, I argue that children add complexity to the human rights debate. In doing so, I briefly examine the conflict between children's rights as developed in the United States and that of the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child. Third, I turn to a specific qualitative research project in which a team of researchers conducted an in-depth study of the prosecution of child sexual abuse in one U.S. jurisdiction. I argue that the findings from this study illustrate how qualitative inquiry can reveal conflicting and often hidden value trade-offs that must be addressed when enacting and enforcing children's human rights. This study demonstrates what qualitative inquiry has to offer policy advocates who seek to promote children's human rights.
AbstractDrawing from community‐based research in the Downtown Eastside, the poorest part of Vancouver, Canada, a neighbourhood long demonized as an 'outlaw zone', we suggest that what may appear to be illegal property practices in the area's infamous Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels are, in fact, harder to detach from formal legality than supposed. We characterize the state's withdrawal of tenancy law from SRO in the 1970s as productive of property outlaws. A form of legal relegation, outlawry places SRO residents in a space of lesser protection, stripping them of rights. A space of decades of systematic legal relegation, the outlaw zone is a product of law, not its antithesis, predicated on organized forms of devaluation and discrimination.
Labor rights are the first to come up for criticism when accounts of human rights are offered in response to philosophical questions about them, and notoriously so Article 24, which talks about `rest and leisure' and `period holidays with pay.' This study first tries to make it plausible why labor rights would appear on the Universal Declaration, and next articulates some philosophical objections to their presence there. The interesting question then is not so much how one could respond to the objections, but to explore what commitments one needs to make to answer our question in a satisfactory manner. To make progress, we can contrast the idea of human rights with conceptions of them. Such conceptions offer answers to a set of philosophical questions about human rights. It would be rather unlikely for any such conception to emerge as the uniquely best philosophical account of human rights since disagreements among different conceptions (each of which requires commitments to a range of issues) are complex. What is sensible to ask then is what a conception of human rights would have to be like to count labor rights as human rights, and whether there is a conception of that sort. I offer one conception that I take to be plausible overall, and that does count labor rights as human rights. Or, that is: it does count a right to work as a human right, alas not in the strong interpretation according to which states must create jobs but in the weaker sense that states need to make sure people are not systematically excluded from employment, and are treated in certain ways at their place of work, and it does count a right to leisure as a human right, alas not a right to paid vacations.
