The article focuses on effectiveness of Investment climate in Georgia after transition period. Investment climate is the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in whichfirms operate - factors that influence the link from sowing to reaping and I can say that investment climate itself is the process from sowing to reaping because you will reap what you sew. Investment climate is the opportunity and incentive for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand. One of the major determinations of country s economic developments and wellbeing are the indicators of investment structure and volume These indicators show attractiveness of economy for foreign investors and give clues for analyzing countries development process. Investment climate matters for the total factor productivity, average wage rates, the rate of return on fixed assets, growth rate of output, employment, corruption plus government regulations, taxes, political and economical stability, migration. A good investment climate is an essential pillar of a country s strategy to stimulate economic growth, which in turn generates opportunities for poor people to have more productive jobs term effect of foreign investment will increased in increased employment and household income, poverty will be decreased and Georgian economy will be developed. The paper also includes the results of a survey conducted to find out the changes of investment climate after Rose Revolution.
The formation of independent media is one of the main achievements of the many years of reform of the Georgian political system. Georgia's mass media is developing faster than other civil institutions. Despite the low level of election democracy, local self-government, and political parties, state-independent mass media organizations came into being after Georgia gained its independence. But-unfortunately there has to be a "but"-the mass media in Georgia have not only become the main lever in public opinion formation, but they are also a hefty weapon in the political struggle. Confirmation of this was the so-called Rose Revolution in November 2003, which not only raised the significance of the mass media, particularly television, but also revealed several shortcomings in their work. State-independent television played a very important, if not decisive, role both in forming public moods and in raising the wave of revolutionary protest. Until the parliamentary elections of 2003 (which escalated into the revolution), television companies could still deny their politicized nature and claim that they were trying to be objective; however, the revolution revealed and polarized their political views. The Rustavi-2 TV channel openly supported the revolution. Later, one of the popular anchorwomen on this television station admitted that the channel covered all the events of those days extremely tendentiously. So, Rustavi-2 turned out to be closely associated with the victorious political forces. It soon became obvious that the special role of the mass media in Georgia's political system not only stemmed from the fact that the state and other political entities can use them to inform the population about their policy and their aims and values, but also from the fact that the mass media themselves have become a very powerful tool in the purposeful elaboration of political procedures in Georgia. The mass media are still playing an extremely significant role in Georgia's present-day, post-revolutionary political system, but the quality and nature of their influence on the political processes currently depend on how strongly they themselves feel pressure from the government, particular political groups, or other interested entities. According to various international assessments, Georgia is still viewed as a country with a partially free press, which is primarily due to the government's increased pressure on the independent mass media.
The wave of Colour Revolutions, which started in Serbia in the year 2000, and spread to Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, has changed the existing concepts on how transformation would take form in countries exiting from "really existing socialism." In the early years following the collapse of the Soviet state, the dominant concepts were that of "transition" or slow, top-down reforms that would transform the existing political systems from ruling-party dictatorships to parliamentary democracies, and planned economies to market-based ones. Yet in the late 1990s there was a growing fatigue and pessimism towards the basic thesis of transition: the transition paradigm was formulated as a reaction to the perceived causes of the Soviet failure: a totalitarian state which monopolized the political space proved itself unable to provide either economic well-being or political legitimacy. The task in the early 1990s was to shrink the state apparatus, to make space for a multi-party political pluralism. Even though some argued that the main objective of transition was to achieve democracy,1 for transition theories and even more so for its translation into actual political choices the economic aspect of transition was perceived to be more immediate than the political one. Democracy needed a certain material context, and here too decreasing the role of the state was thought to liberate the market and provide material stability to the new democracies. It was necessary to create a new middle class by way of mass privatization of the former state properties to create a social demand for democracy. Those ideas reflected not only an ideological victory of the one side of the Cold War over the Eastern camp, but also very practical needs: the huge Soviet state sector was neither sustainable nor necessary after the fall of one-party rule, and it had to be radically transformed. At the time, this transition was thought to be an easy task: to take off the oppressing lid of the party-state and let democracy and market economies emerge naturally. Yet in the conception of transition there was a certain tension between the economic and political sides of the imagined reforms, between mass privatization with its dire social consequences of unemployment and fall in the standard of living, and the political goals of democratization where people who were being "restructured" were simultaneously promised to receive the right to change their rulers by casting their ballots. Would people who are threatened with job loss and lower living standards vote for the reformers? And in the event of a negative answer, how would the reforms proceed? Should economic reforms come before political ones; that is, first privatization and in a second stage freedom of political choice through parliamentary elections? These are some of the dilemma that the new republics of the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe were facing in the early 1990s. At the time, the answer was clear: the economy came first; it was more important to reform the economic sector, to privatize massively, and stabilize the economy as soon as possible. The economy came before politics, in the sense that restructuring of the property structure through mass privatization was supposed to create the material means for the creation of democracy. It was believed that once the middle class was created as a result of mass privatization, the democratic institutions, such as free elections, multi-party system, independent media, an active civil society, in a word, all the attributes of democracy, would evolve naturally.
"This article examines the role of civic groups in Georgia's Rose Revolution using Larry Diamond's framework of the democratic functions of civil society. The author argues that the contribution of civil society to the peaceful transfer of power in 2003 is best understood by expanding the analytical focus out from the Kmara youth movement to include a larger set of organisations. Rather than focusing on the Kmara youth movement as the primary civil society actor in 2003, the author contends that Kmara was, in fact, a product of the coordinated involvement of a cohort of NGOs. The article stresses the highly interconnected nature of Georgian civic leaders and organisations, particularly regarding networks with other NGOs, opposition politicians, and journalists from the Rustavi 2 television station." (author's abstract)
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe ; What is at stake in Georgia? -- U.S. interests in the South Caucasus -- Russian policies -- Independence and the Russian "reconquista" -- The slipping of the Caucasus, 1996-99 -- Implications for the West -- Implications ; Svante E. Cornell ; "February 2007." ; Parallel als Buch-Ausg. erschienen
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe. ; "February 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41). ; What is at stake in Georgia? -- U.S. interests in the South Caucasus -- Russian policies -- Independence and the Russian "reconquista" -- The slipping of the Caucasus, 1996-99 -- Implications for the West -- Implications. ; The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to American security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and NATO forces. But this region has multiple conflicts and fault-lines. As multiple recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected with South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt into open violence at any time. The author outlines the possibilities for conflict in this region and the qualities that make it strategically important, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also increasingly for Europe. ; Mode of access: Internet.
AbstractAfter Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, it experienced civil war and strife for more than a decade. In late 2003, the peaceful Rose Revolution installed a new government that began a series of radical market‐liberal reforms. However, the effectiveness of these reforms was controversial. We offer a rigorous evaluation of these reforms via the synthetic control method which creates a credible counterfactual. Compared to the synthetic controls, we find that the reforms enacted after the Rose Revolution led to significant improvements in Georgia's social and economic development, albeit with temporary side effects and argue that this case provides some support for the effectiveness of rapid, multidimensional reform.
