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AbstractWe argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We also claim that our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and science.

Abstract
The claim that diversity and independence have a net positive epistemic effect on the judgments of groups has been recently defended formally by Scott Page, among others, and popularized in Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds. In Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds Thorn and Schurz take issue with the claim that more diversity and independence in groups leads to better collective judgments. I argue that Thorn and Schurz's arguments are helpful in clarifying a number of over-generalizations about diversity and independence that are often circulated in the social epistemology literature. I also argue that the relevant formal arguments are easily misunderstood when presented 'in a vacuum', that is, without a context of application in mind. I provide a different approach to understanding formal results in social epistemology: With the help of concrete scenarios and the formal literature, I focus on a trade-off between independence and dependence in groups. I show that the approach works well also for another principle in social epistemology; namely, the principle that 'more heads are better than few'.

I respond to William Lynch's critique of the sympathetic reading of my work provided by Remedios and Dusek in Knowing Humanity in the Social World: The Path of Steve Fuller's Social Epistemology. Lynch harks back to my early works, which he sees as a promoting a 'naturalism' lacking in the later works. In response, I observe that my commitment to naturalism has always been 'reflexive', which has led me to break with conventional forms of naturalism, though sticking closely to the spirit of science.

ntroduction and purpose. The paper is a reaction to the article previously published in this journal by A. M. Orekhov, which examines the state of affairs in Russian social epistemology. The author provides responses to critical comments and proposes clari- fication of the facts and theories discussed. Methods. The author of the article uses the meth- od of conceptual analysis and historical narrative. Scientific novelty of the study. It is shown in a new way how Russian social epistemology fits into the world philosophical context; its conceptual and methodological status is clarified, the details of its formation and development over the past thirty years are revealed. Its features are indicated, mak- ing it possible to rank it as a non-classical episte- mology. Results. The author proposes arguments against a critical assessment of the current state of Russian social epistemology in terms of its dependence on Western influences. It is argued that Russian phi- losophy cannot and should not completely get rid of dependencies, since it borders on isolationism. A critical assessment of the KHM style is given, which has been proposed by A. M. Orekhov as a perspective of social epistemology.

The paper problematizes the issue of contradictions of scientific multidimensionality and is devised as a contribution to the topic from the perspective of social epistemology. The paper points to the fact that scientific multidimensionality and interdisciplinarity are some of the unquestionable categories in the defining of contemporary notions of knowledge and science, and that, as such, they inherently possess negative aspects, which must be taken into consideration when reflected on within the current world history. The paper in particular foregrounds the problem of the status of humanities and social sciences which are marked as redundant and practically useless, due to the objective global and political circumstances and the rearguard capitalist logic. Moreover, the paper also discusses the conceptual history and a sort of knowledge stock of the fundamental roots of the modern notion of scientific knowledge, about which we can take more clear positions to contemporary discussions on the topic.

Contemporary societies face tensions related with the unequal distribution of knowledge and simultaneous demands for democratic equality that are central to Social Epistemology´s inquiry. This article describes how the defenders of deliberative democracy explain their characteristics and epistemological virtues; the objections placed by their critics related to public ignorance, and describes issues related to deliberative inequalities and epistemic injustices. It finally proposes that tackling democracy´s epistemic obstacles does not entail that all citizens should have equal influence in deliberations and decisions. ; Con el objetivo de reflexionar en torno a temáticas centrales para la Epistemología Social derivadas de la tensión que existe en las sociedades contemporáneas entre la desigual distribución del conocimiento y el reclamo democrático de equidad, el texto delinea cómo han descrito los autores que defienden la democracia deliberativa sus características y virtudes epistémicas. Después se exponen las objeciones que han elaborado sus críticos relacionadas con la ignorancia pública, así como los problemas derivados de las inequidades deliberativas y las injusticias epistémicas, para finalmente plantear que si bien reconocer y abordar los obstáculos que suponen estas últimas para la democracia, eliminarlas no implica afirmar que todos los ciudadanos debieran tener igual influencia en la deliberación y la toma de decisiones.