Vom souveränen Nationalstaat zur souveränen Europäischen Union? – Souveränitätsverlagerung durch supranationale Rechtsprechung
In: JuristenZeitung, Band 77, Heft 12, S. 584
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In: JuristenZeitung, Band 77, Heft 12, S. 584
In: Das historisch-politische Buch: HPB, Band 69, Heft 3–4, S. 417-418
ISSN: 2567-3181
In: Leviathan: Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 524-538
ISSN: 1861-8588
In: Leviathan: Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 524-538
ISSN: 0340-0425
World Affairs Online
In: Common market law review, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 1671-1717
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: Europe in change
In: Globalization & transition: case studies in economical and socio-political perspectives, S. 91-106
In: In Ian Hurd, Ian Johnstone, and Jacob Katz Cogan, eds., Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (OUP, 2016)
SSRN
In: Common market law review, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 1671-1718
ISSN: 0165-0750
In the modern European Union, disability policy (which was paid extremely little attention in the framework of traditional social policy in the late twentieth century) became one of the priorities of legal regulation. Today, this area of social policy includes not only social protection and integration in the labor market, but also takes care of the problem of ensuring equal rights and non-discrimination. In the context of this evolution, the article examines these questions: what is the legal nature of the European Union? What impact does the emergence of a supranational level of legal regulation have on disability policy? How does the international law and European legal regulation in the field of disability relate? How has the terminology changed in the regulations of the international, regional and national levels? How has EU disability policy evolved and what factors influenced on it? The article presents the results of a systematic analysis of EU regulations on disability policy, covering the period from 1951 to 2020.
BASE
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
BASE
SSRN
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
BASE
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 141-169
ISSN: 0304-4130
Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for instituional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 141-169
ISSN: 1475-6765
Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.