Estimating Border Tax Evasion in Mozambique
In: The journal of development studies, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 1010-1025
ISSN: 1743-9140
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In: The journal of development studies, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 1010-1025
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: Business and Society Review, Band 116, Heft 3, S. 375-401
ISSN: 1467-8594
ABSTRACTA wide and growing consensus views taxation as fundamentally coercive in nature. Regardless of the magnitude of the tax or the agents perpetrating it, this fundamental coercive element remains. Tax evasion must consequently be treated as an effort to convert this coercive behavior into voluntary transactions. By altering the conditions of payment and receipt of goods and services, taxation veils both consumers' and producers' preferences. Critics of tax evasion have left unanswered the question as to how society will efficiently allocate its scarce resources under coercively falsified preference signals. Accepting that preferences are best signaled voluntarily and via market participants directly, we argue that tax evasion must result in increased economic efficiency, as well as allow for a reinstatement of an individual's right to contract freely.
Beiträge der ersten 'Asian-Pacific Tax Conference', die im Juli 1983 in Singapur stattfand; behandelt wurden Themen wie Steuerhinterziehung, Steuerpolitik, Besteuerung in asiatischen Staaten und - im Vergleich - in europäischen Ländern. (DÜI-Xyl)
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American weekly report, Heft 45, S. 531
ISSN: 0143-5280
In: Brevik , F 2008 , ' Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments? ' , Public Choice , vol. 136 , no. 1-2 , pp. 103-122 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9284-z
This paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady-state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
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In: Social policy & administration: an international journal of policy and research, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 209-220
ISSN: 0037-7643, 0144-5596
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Working paper
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 74, Heft 4, S. 273-276
ISSN: 1090-9451
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 82, S. 97-104
In: Journal of Development Studies (Impact Factor: 0.79). 01/2009; 45(6):1010-1025. DOI: 10.1080/00220380902952324
SSRN
In: Journal of economics and business, Band 60, Heft 6, S. 517-535
ISSN: 0148-6195
In: Dissent: a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy, S. 48-54
ISSN: 0012-3846
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 799-815