Suchergebnisse

AbstractResearch on the determinants of government performance has identified numerous factors bearing on effective governance and government's role in it. However, understanding of how these factors are causally inter-related is limited. We take as our point of departure a multi-level analytic framework termed a logic of governance (LOG), previously used to reveal patterns of causality in governance based on hundreds of published research publications. Using a revised LOG, we reinterpret the earlier analysis in terms of organisational effectiveness indicators, and identify patterns of causal interaction in 300 more recent research articles. We formulate a multi-level model of governance that postulates how public policy and management interact to affect government outputs and outcomes. We hypothesise that the exercise of hierarchical authority is more fundamental to performance than has been acknowledged by governance scholars. We challenge the argument that advanced democracies are moving towards "governance without government".

The project on which this paper reports is aimed not only at increased understanding of the United States federal budget process, but also at predicting government expenditures in total and by bureau with a view to their determination within United States national econometric models. Estimates of likely expenditures using standard econometric techniques are poor, both in absolute terms and in comparison with our own work. Management of the economy should be improved by the use of predictors based on considering budgeting as a political process that is responsive to economic and social conditions. Use of mathematical models in the social sciences should be furthered, not by arguing their hypothetical utility, but by demonstrating that they work. The proof is in the prediction.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore various agreement phenomena in Xhosa within the government-binding (GB) framework of generative grammar. The principles of the null subject parameter postulated in (Chomsky 1981), which accounts for the absence of an overt subject in phonetic representation, are shown to extend to the analysis of agreement phenomena in J.nosa which are characteristic of Bantu languages in general. In the proposed analyses the empty pronominal nonanaphor (pro) plays a crucial role. In particular it is argued that, apart from occurring as subject and object., pro can appear as the head of an NP, and as the complement of prepositions, the possessive morpheme ~, and the copulative.

Early Arab grammarians used scientific tools to analyze the sentence structure. Their scholarship is best manifested in the establishment of the Governor theory. It assumed that governors change the parsing signs of the word. Two major types of governors were identified: the expressed and the abstract governors. Governor theory dominated the linguistic thinking not only at that time but it is still at the core of Arabic linguistic discussions nowadays. The purpose of this study is twofold: (a) to give a brief introduction about the theory of governor in Arabic, and (b) to compare the governor theory in Arabic with the theory of government presented in Chomsky's (1988) Government and Binding theory. The study revealed that Sibawayh (793) laid the foundations of the Governor theory and it matured in the works of the Basrans and the Kufans. The study also showed some agreement between Chomsky's theory of government and Arabic Governor Theory. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the nature and the types of governors between the two theories.

The rent-seeking model suggests that government provision of unemployment insurance may benefit politically powerful groups. A dominant industry, eg, may attempt to manipulate the tax rate structure, & thus generate greater subsidies if it is characterized by high unemployment, or decrease its share of unemployment subsidization if it is characterized by low unemployment. An examination of state unemployment insurance rates supports the hypothesis that the unemployment insurance system is politically biased. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 15 References. F. Rasmussen