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Previous studies have stressed the role of a child's family environment for future political participation. This field of research has, however, overlooked that children within the same family have different experiences depending on their birth order. First-borns spend their first years of life without having to compete over their parents' attention and resources, while their younger siblings are born into potential rivalry. We examine differences in turnout depending on birth order, using unique population-wide individual level register data from Sweden and Norway that enables precise within-family estimates. We consistently find that higher birth order entails lower turnout, and that the turnout differential with respect to birth order is stronger when turnout is lower. The link between birth order and turnout holds when we use data from four other, non-Nordic countries. This birth order effect appears to be partly mediated by socio-economic position and attitudinal predispositions.

Previous studies have stressed the role of a child's family environment for future political participation. This field of research has, however, overlooked that children within the same family have different experiences depending on their birth order. First-borns spend their first years of life without having to compete over their parents' attention and resources, while their younger siblings are born into potential rivalry. We examine differences in turnout depending on birth order, using unique population-wide individual level register data from Sweden and Norway that enables precise within-family estimates. We consistently find that higher birth order entails lower turnout, and that the turnout differential with respect to birth order is stronger when turnout is lower. The link between birth order and turnout holds when we use data from four other, non-Nordic countries. This birth order effect appears to be partly mediated by socio-economic position and attitudinal predispositions.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Dedication -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Explanations of Turnout -- 3 Restricting Access to the Ballot Box: The Impact of Registration Laws on Turnout -- 4 Placing the United States in Context: A Comparative Look at Electoral Systems -- 5 Winner-Take-All Elections, Part I: The Electoral College: Strategy, Mobilization, and Turnout -- 6 Winner-Take-All Elections, Part II: Competition, Spending, and Turnout in U. S. House Elections -- 7 The Separation of Powers: Divided Government, Responsiveness, Accountability, and Turnout -- 8 Conclusion: The Future of Electoral Reform in the United States -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- Appendix C -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Index

AbstractSince Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what evolutionarily stable strategies are rationalizable under various conditions. Upon varying electorate size, the partisan split of the electorate, and the degree to which an electorate takes underdog considerations into account in its payoff structure, we find that different equilibria arise. Our model predicts comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior, specifically affirming a "size effect," in which turnout decreases as electorate size increases. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between the predictions of our model and empirical voter behavior. In particular, our work demonstrates that misperceptions about the partisan split of an electorate may account for high turnout behavior .

We exploit a natural experiment in Massachusetts in 2012 to estimate the causal effect of lowering voter registration costs on: voter registration, turnout and voting behavior in presidential elections. Both a within Massachusetts specification and a cross-state specification (utilizing Vermont, Maine and New Hampshire data) find a statistically significant effect on voter registration and turnout that is of a material magnitude. However, conditional on registration we find no material difference in turnout. Finally, we find a large treatment effect on Democrat voteshare. Our results highlight the importance of voter registration costs for electoral participation, especially for citizens from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.

Declining levels of participation in elections and especially presidential elections, have prompted greater interest among academics and policy makers in the sources and practical consequences of low turnout. This article shows that although nonvoters have many characteristics which mark them as Democratic voters, there is no reason to believe that high turnout elections, especially at the presidential level, would benefit Democratic candidates. The lower levels of involvement and commitment which characterize chronic nonvoters and peripheral voters would simply promote greater interelection oscillation if these voters began to turn out.

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. (JEL D72, Z13)

First published online on Oct 2020 ; We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

AbstractPresidential elections are conducted in two stages. The November general election is proceeded by a series of contests where delegates are selected to national party conventions, which is where the parties select their candidates for the fall election. These nominating contests' political environments vary: the rules regarding who can participate; the levels of electoral competition, which are related to when they are held; and that other offices present on the ballot, if any. We explore the effects of these conditions on voter participation in recent presidential contests and generally find turnout highest in competitive and inclusive contests where other offices are on the ballot. Examining the 2008 American National Election Panel Study, we find primary voters are more ideologically extreme than general election voters, but there is little difference between voters in closed and open primary states. We suggest primary type has little effect on the ideological composition of the electorate because modern nomination contests are low turnout elections that draw only the most politically interested.

After the 2009 referendum on a proposed change to the Danish Law of Succession, it was widely claimed that the early publication of exit poll results changed the rate of turnout and eventually the outcome. We investigate this claim and contribute to the wider debate on the implications of exit polls by setting up and analyzing a formal model. We find that the introduction of an exit poll influences the incentive to vote both before and after the poll is published, but the signs of the effects are generally ambiguous. The observation that exit polls influence the incentive to vote even before they are published is often overlooked. We show that this can lead to premature conclusions about the impact of exit polls on electoral outcomes. In particular, in cases such as the Danish referendum where it clearly appears that exit polls changed the outcome, it could well be that the outcome would have been the same had there been no exit polls.

Dissertation presented as the partial requirement for obtaining a Master's degree in Statistics and Information Management, specialization in Information Analysis and Management ; The decline of voter turnout in Portugal has been confirmed in the last legislative election of 2015. This fact, together with the unquestionable democratic value associated with the act of voting, leads to the discussion of the issue and emphasizes the need for additional investigation concerning the portuguese context. Particularly, it is crucial to identify the characteristics of citizens who vote, to better understand the phenomenon and think about solutions. This work aims to identify the most significant sociodemographic variables in explaining voter turnout in continental Portugal and describe the relationship between those variables and voter turnout, including the geographical variation existing across the municipalities. Data related to sociodemographic variables are provided from population census 2011, and turnout results concerns the legislative election of the same year. The chosen variables have been addressed in literature, both in meta-analyses studies and in country level empirical investigation. The analysis starts with the conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and continue with more spatially sensitive methods, namely Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) and its semiparametric extension (SGWR). The final method, SGWR, enables the investigation of local variations in turnout values, simultaneously considering that its relationship with some variables might not vary over space. Results show that turnout is a complex process, influenced by a set of sociodemographic variables. While some variables affect turnout differently over the country (percentage of family cores with children aged less than 15, and percentage of owner-occupied houses), others affect it uniformly (percentage of graduated residents, percentage of classic families, and distance to Lisbon or Oporto – the nearest). This highlights the use of a semiparametric approach to better understand turnout and for further research on voting issues.