Hauptbeschreibung: Die Gründung der WTO zum 1. Januar 1995 hat die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen des Welthandels nachhaltig verändert und auf eine neue Basis gestellt. Dies gilt neben materiell-rechtlichen Neuerungen vor allem auch für die Streitbeilegung. Das anläßlich der Gründung der WTO neu gefaßte Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) versucht, den materiell-rechtlichen Vorgaben ein echtes Durchsetzungsinstrument an die Hand zu geben. Wie kein anderes WTO-Abkommen steht damit das DSU symbolisch für das ehrgeizige Ziel, den Charakter zwischenstaatlicher Handelsbeziehungen von dem früher vo
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Zwei Themen standen im Jahre 2001 vor allem im Mittelpunkt des Interesses der politischen Führung Chinas, und zwar die Aufnahme als Mitglied in die WTO und die Konjunkturentwicklung. Beide Themen wurden von den Ereignissen am 11. September letzten Jahres in den USA beeinflusst. Um international politische Handlungsfähigkeit nach dem Terrorattentat zu beweisen, waren die USA und die EU zu einem Kompromiss bei den Verhandlungen bereit gewesen, sodass China noch im Jahr 2001 der WTO beitreten konnte.
Inhalt: - I. Einleitung - II. Begriff und Bedeutung von Globalisierung - 1. Einzelerscheinungen der Globalisierung - 2. Globalisierung als Denationalisierung und Entstaatlichung - III. Die Bedeutung des Welthandelsrechts im Prozeß der Globalisierung - 1. Allgemeine ökonomische und rechtliche Aspekte - 2. Die Akteure im Welthandelssystem - 3. Offene Märkte und Nichtdiskriminierung als zwei wesentliche Grundprinzipien der WTO-Rechtsordnung - 4. Die ordnungspolitischen Handlungsfreiheiten der WTO-Mitglieder - IV. Zusammenfassung - Literatur
ABSTRACT In this paper, we build a quantitative database of the questions raised in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Committee on Agriculture (CoA) matching questions with the corresponding value of trade. Using this newly built database, we are able to show that (i) members' concerns about trade policy measures applied by other members cover on average 16% of global trade in agriculture; (ii) the activity of the committee increases in the aftermath of a new agreement, during a food crisis and has shifted over time from questions about market access (MA) policies to questions on domestic support, thus pointing at the need to further cooperation on some of these issues; (iii) 20% of the questions relate to trade policy measures that have not been notified at the WTO, thus representing a significant source of information for researchers to fill the gaps in notifications; and (iv) there is a strong correlation between members participation in the CoA and their share of trade in agriculture, yet questions on seeds, oils and animal fats, cereals, and beverages are well above what one would expect on the basis of the trade importance of these sectors. These findings illustrate the importance of building quantitative databases from the information collected in WTO committees to analyse trends in trade policy concerns by members and factors affecting these trends and to assess the impact of discussions in committees on trade.
Since 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members violate their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU), i.e. as being 'composed of seven persons', with vacancies being 'filled as they arise'. This contribution argues that none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates - on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates - can legally justify its disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. Also the European Union (EU) has offered no convincing justification of its failure to protect 'strict observance of international law' in it external relations, as required by Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU) and by Article IX:1 WTO Agreement ('where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting'). The 2018 'Concept Paper' prepared by the EU Commission on 'WTO modernization' indicates no strategy for the obvious problem that the EU objective of 'preserving and deepening the rules-based multilateral system', including 'more effective and transparent dispute settlement including the Appellate Body', is inconsistent with the US strategies underlying US blocking of the AB jurisdiction by preventing the appointment of AB judges, a strategy which was previously applied by the US for blocking third-party adjudication under Chapter 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Trade diplomats have no democratic mandate for disrupting the AB jurisdiction by illegally reducing the number of AB members to one single judge by December 2019 and, thereby, undermining the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership for using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX:1 WTO – if necessary, based on 'a majority of the votes cast' - to initiate and complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Article IX.2 could be used for authoritative interpretations 'taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members' confirming the collective duties of WTO members to fill AB vacancies in case of illegal blocking of AB nominations. WTO law foresees similar majority decisions for the appointment of the WTO Director-General; such majority decisions are necessary for preventing illegal de facto amendments of the WTO legal system, and do not set a precedent for future WTO majority voting on discretionary, political issues, which most WTO diplomats reject as a 'nuclear option'. As suggested by European ordo-liberalism, citizens and democratic institutions must hold trade politicians democratically and legally more accountable for complying with their legislative mandates to implement and modernize, but not to destroy WTO law and dispute settlement.
Dorn, James A.: Economic development and freedom. The legacy of Peter Bauer. Debroy, Bibek: An intellectual property perspective for South Asia. Rahman, Mustafizur: Phase-out of MFA. Concerns and interests of South Asia. Mohamed, Sim I.: Maldives: what is to be done. Malik, Abdul Rashid: Impact of WTO on Pakistan's agricultural sector. Bhaumik, T. K.: WTO, South Asia and related issues. Wickramasinghe, Harsha: Challenges and opportunities. Shakya, Bijendra Man: Nepal's trade under the WTO regime. More gain or pain? Herzog, Siegfried: The World Trade Organisation (WTO). Is it a good thing?
Becoming member of theWorld Trade Organisation was the decisive follow-up of Vietnam's reform resolutions taken in 1986. Nevertheless the process of acceding the "club" was not a walkover but took the SRV not less than two decades, marked by seven steps: The doi-moi-resolution (1986), the normalization of her relationship with the international financial organisations (1993), the formal applying for membership to the WTO (1995), the membership of the ASEAN (1995), of the ASEM (1996) and of the APEC (1998), and the accession to the WTO (2006/07). Having achieved this final destination, Vietnam's expectations continue to be strangely mixed. On the one hand there are at least three great opportunities for the country: to join the global trade market, to absorb capital, know-how and management, and to improve its status in the international economy and politics. On the other hand Vietnam has to meet several challenges coming up in different realms: The SRV is partially afraid of becoming confronted with a disintegration of its economy: Whereas the strong secondary sector is supposed to continue to grow, the service industry and particularly the agriculture may decline at the same time. Functionally there is much concern about efficiency and competitiveness of the economy in general and about the qualification of workers and the flexibility of the state owned enterprises in particular. Last not least there remains a conceptional problem to be settled which could trouble the political leadership. The more the Vietnamese enterprises are sticking to WTO-rules, the more the authoritarian tutelage of the CPV-leadership is becoming undermin
With the establishment of the WTO, trade in services became part of the world trade order. This volume covers the core agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) with annexes.