Considers the nature of the Australian Labor Party and Labor governments in the course of a critique of two books on the Party. Stresses the continuity in the ALP's pursuit of the interests of Australian capital when it is in office and its 'structural constitution', that is its distinctive relationship with the working class, especially through the union movement, and with the capitalist class. Evidence to support the analysis is drawn from the experience of the Chifley government during the 1940s, the Whitlam government during the 1970s and the Hawke government during the 1980s.
Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.
This thesis focuses on the political and diplomatic history relating to Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question during the Whitlam and Fraser governments, from April 1974 to January 1978. With reference to a number of published and unpublished Australian diplomatic records, a study of newspaper coverage (in particular, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Canberra Times), and also contemporary periodicals and personal memoirs, this thesis analyses the Australian foreign policymaking process towards Indonesia's integration policy towards East Timor. Although the existing literature has tended to focus on Australian policymakers, notably Prime Minister Whitlam in collaboration with Ambassador to Indonesia Woolcott – who were mostly concerned with Australian relations with Indonesia and sought to avoid the outcome of a small independent East Timor in the neighbourhood – this research also pays attention to the contribution of other foreign policy actors, including Foreign Minister Willesee of the Whitlam government in consultation with Secretary Renouf, both of whom thought it necessary to take account of domestic opinion sympathetic to self-determination. Considering that the Department of Foreign Affairs was convinced of the need for a proper act of self-determination in Portuguese Timor from the beginning and accordingly advised Foreign Ministers Willesee and Peacock to issue official statements in support of the right of self-determination against the backdrop of mounting domestic opinion – in particular during the period from October 1975 to July 1976 – this thesis argues that the Department took a substantial role in foreign policymaking in an attempt to dissociate the Australian government from Indonesia's coercive integration policy. In conclusion, despite the commonly-accepted view of the strong personal leadership of Prime Minister Whitlam who favoured Indonesia's integration of East Timor, this thesis argues that his influence was not unlimited. It is essential to consider ...
Australia's engagement with Asia from 1944 until the late 1960s was based on a sense of responsibility to the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian colonies as they navigated a turbulent independence into the British Commonwealth. The circumstances of the early Cold War decades also provided for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non‑communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships. From 1967 into the early 1970s, however, Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity demonstrates that the framework for this deep Australian engagement with its region was progressively eroded by a series of compounding, external factors: the 1967 formation of ASEAN and its consolidation by the mid-1970s as the premier regional organisation surpassing the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; Washington's de‑escalation and gradual withdrawal from Vietnam after March 1968; the 1969 Nixon doctrine that America's Asia-Pacific allies must take up more of the burden of providing for their own security; and US rapprochement with China in 1972. The book shows that these profound changes marked the start of Australia's political distancing from the region during the 1970s despite the intentions, efforts and policies of governments from Whitlam onwards to foster deeper engagement. By 1974, Australia had been pushed to the margins of the region, with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.
This article focuses on the interaction between the Australian and British governments during the early 1970s over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It examines the considerations behind the Australian government's approach to Britain, and Britain's response to initiatives from Australia. Through the presentation of a case study demonstrating how Australia's Pacific interests and Britain's European concerns inevitably led to different perspectives, I argue that the policies of both countries were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than the lingering links of Empire.
AbstractIn 1974 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam established the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration ('the Commission'), appointing HC Coombs as chair. The Commission's brief was 'to inquire into and report on the administrative organization and services of the Australian Government' giving particular attention to, among other issues, public servants' 'participation in forming policy and making decisions'. From the outset the Commission aligned itself with the view that Aboriginal people were 'less than proportionately represented in the administration'. The Commission asked CD Rowley to prepare a report on Aboriginal issues. Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the newly established Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Charles Perkins, Assistant Secretary and Arrernte man from Central Australia, both gave evidence to the Commission. The competing ideas on Indigenous administrative participation expressed by Coombs, Rowley, Dexter and Perkins in the course of the Commission will be considered through the lens of representation theory. While all four doubted the capacity of the bureaucracy to provide a meaningful channel for Indigenous representation internally, each argued from a different view of representation. Understanding their positions on how Indigenous people should be represented in public administration, including their assumption that there would also be external Indigenous representation, could shed light on tensions that are still present today.