Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
Written on the basis of CARIM database and publications ; Ecrit à partir de la base de données du CARIM et de ses publications ; Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; CARIM is co-financed by the European University Institute and the European Union ; CARIM est co-financé par l'Institut Universitaire Européen et l'Union Européenne
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions' concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes; the latter is likely to backfire.
In a unionized economy with endogenous fiscal policy central bank transparency has two contrasting effects on wages, the relative strength of which determines the macroeconomic performance. This finding allows us to demonstrate that (i) if the central bank is populist the effect of transparency is negative, and (ii) if policy makers are sufficiently conservative and the government is active, transparency decreases inflation and unemployment, but opposite results apply if a populist government faces a tight fiscal constraint. Macroeconomic volatility disappears with full transparency and increases, in general, with opacity, but the relationship is hump‐shaped when the central bank is strongly populist.
This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we also discuss in an informal way possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.
The paper explores the consequences of economic integration on wage and monetary policy management. It studies the possibility that openness may discipline labor unions through potential losses created by the worsening in terms of trade (international competitiveness) associated with high wage claims. We find that, contrary to some recent literature, a monetary expansion fails to affect real outcomes and only results in higher inflation, since the claimed wage-moderation mechanism does not work when it is properly modeled. Hence, recent policy recommendations for an expansionary monetary policy in open economies result to be counterproductive, whereas low-inflation targeting remains a first best policy. [Copyright 2004 The Society for Policy Modeling; published by Elsevier Inc.]