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In "Goods, Games, and Institutions," we discussed the underlying conditions under which institutions might promote cooperation among states. Our unified theoretical framework specifies bargaining games based both on the costs and benefits of different types of goods and actors' capabilities. Klaus Wallner argues in his critique in this issue that our modeling approach is seriously flawed. We show that Wallner comes to his conclusion because of several simple analytical errors on his part. After pointing out the flaws in his reasoning, we show that our framework is robust and can be easily extended to explore key features of international relations.

In "Goods, Games, and Institutions" we discussed the underlying conditions under which institutions might promote cooperation among states. Our unified theoretical framework specifies bargaining games based both on the costs & benefits of different types of goods & actors' capabilities. Klaus Wallner argues in his critique in this issue that our modeling approach is seriously flawed. We show that Wallner comes to his conclusion because of several simple analytical errors on his part. After pointing out the flaws in his reasoning, we show that our framework is robust & can be easily extended to explore key features of international relations. 4 Tables, 4 Figures, 6 References. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]

International institutions can help to overcome the problem of supplying goods that are difficult to restrict in terms of consumption. Yet the links between the characteristics of goods, the nature of strategic interaction between actors, and the effectiveness or need for international institutions have not been systematically treated. This article tries to remedy this gap by providing a systematic analysis of the problem of the provision of two types of goods—public goods and common pool resources (CPRs). It starts by examining the characteristics of these goods, and then derives some simple game structures that correspond to different assumptions about the costs and benefits of these goods and variations in actors' capabilities. It then discusses the links between games and institutional solutions. In doing this, the authors are able to encompass previous analytical work and open up new avenues for empirical studies of collective action.

Examines impact, causes, and policy implications of the Dec. 1994 peso crisis, and reasons for the US-led bail-out package. Includes perspectives on the crisis from the point of view of the classical schools of economics: liberalism, mercantilism, and structuralism.

This article develops a political-economic model to examine debt rescheduling between private banks and debtors. The model provides a means of developing bargaining games by allowing the analyst to deduce game payoffs based on actors' "individual situation" as defined by their overall capabilities, their debt-specific resources, and their coalition stability. The model is operationalised based on written sources and interviews and then applied to four periods of rescheduling between banks and Peru from 1982 to 1990. (DSE/DÜI)

This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online.