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The study of party unity and its determinants is conceptually confusing, with terms such as "party discipline" and "party cohesion" used to denote both dependent and independent variables. Moreover, while the literature recognizes both anticipated sanctions and homogeneity of preferences as pathways to party unity, it ignores possibilities such as party loyalty and the division of labour within parliamentary parties. The article examines these different pathways to party unity on the basis of five waves of interviews with nearly all members of the Lower House of the Dutch parliament. The article finds least evidence for sanctions as a major determinant of party unity, with the possible exception of parties in the governing coalition. Homogeneity, loyalty and division of labour all seem to play an important role. Party unity might seem over determined, but the more likely explanation offered is that it is a case of "different horses for different courses". [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The study of party unity and its determinants is conceptually confusing, with terms such as 'party discipline' and 'party cohesion' used to denote both dependent and independent variables. Moreover, while the literature recognizes both anticipated sanctions and homogeneity of preferences as pathways to party unity, it ignores possibilities such as party loyalty and the division of labour within parliamentary parties. The article examines these different pathways to party unity on the basis of five waves of interviews with nearly all members of the Lower House of the Dutch parliament. The article finds least evidence for sanctions as a major determinant of party unity, with the possible exception of parties in the governing coalition. Homogeneity, loyalty and division of labour all seem to play an important role. Party unity might seem over determined, but the more likely explanation offered is that it is a case of 'different horses for different courses'.

Discusses delegation & accountability relationships in the Netherlands, which has been characterized both as a consociational democracy & a neo-corporatist system, each of which stresses the primacy of elites. Catholic, Protestant, & Socialist groups have established networks of subcultural organizations; this aspect of Dutch political culture is known as pillarization. Although the social pillars have largely declined in influence, their leaders still bear collective responsibility for governance in an environment of compromise & cooperation, working together in particular policy areas such as education & socioeconomic policy, often in tripartite advisory councils. The impact of Dutch consociationalism & neo-corporatism on political parties, legislation, voting, & the delegation process is described, followed by a discussion of external factors affecting delegation & accountability, including referendums, the judiciary, & the Netherlands' EU membership. The conclusion underscores key areas of deviation from the ideal-type chain of delegation & accountability. 1 Table, 34 References. K. Coddon