Suchergebnisse

This article explores the norm of state responsibility by asking two research questions — (1) How do states become the responsible agents rather than people in International Relations? (2) What are the consequences of holding states responsible? States become responsible because of the structure of the international system and the power of the dominant states in that system. This hypothesis is explained by demonstrating how international law and foreign policy require state agents that can be held responsible for their actions, but do not depend on specification of free will within the state for holding it responsible. This hypothesis is counterintuitive to the assumption that responsibility derives from free will. The consequence of a state being held responsible is that individual agency is undermined, leading to violations of civil and political rights. This hypothesis is explained by the effects of war, reparations and lack of support for political dissent in a responsible state agent. The argument is supported by a case study of US foreign policy toward Iraq. The conclusion is that state responsibility is not a viable moral construct in the late 20th century. While blame and responsibility will continue to play a role in International Relations, we must realize that the decision to blame is a political one, reflecting political relationships and levels of power.

AbstractWhy does the United States seek to export its own political and economic system as part of an intervention? We argue that the United States has an ideologically inflected strategic culture which has yielded two "ways" of intervention over time. The limited model is cost-conscious and cedes control over the future of the state to local actors provided that they guarantee open markets and good government. The vindicationist model involves the United States paying costs to remake another society in its own image. We argue that the vindicationist way of intervention is activated by specific types of strategic surprises, which cause policymakers to react by gambling on interventions to remake another society. To empirically investigate this claim, we examine the record of America's major interventions from 1946 to 2005 and present two contrasting case studies of Cold War interventions in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic.