Suchergebnisse

Monetary politics -- The blame game -- Creating the Federal Reserve -- Opening the act in the wake of the Depression -- Midcentury modern central banking -- The great inflation and the limits of independence -- The only game in town -- The myth of independence

Nearly unique amongst the world's monetary bodies, the Federal Reserve defies description as a central bank. A century after its creation, the Fed retains a hybrid structure of a president-appointed, Senate-confirmed Washington board and twelve largely privately directed regional reserve banks—each of which remains moored in the cities originally selected in 1914. In this article we investigate the origins of the Federal Reserve System, focusing on the selection of the twelve reserve bank cities. In contrast to accounts that suggest politics played no role in the selection of the cities, we suggest that a range of political interests shaped Democrats' choices in designing the reserve system. The result was a decentralized institution that initially proved unable to coordinate monetary policy—a key contributor to the onset of the Great Depression less than two decades later.

Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view, arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we show how institutional and political forces increase interested senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees.

Examines duration of the confirmation process for presidential appointees to US Courts of Appeal; includes role of ideological differences and institutional rules.

Das praxisorientierte Sachbuch gibt Einblick in die Marktstrategien von Krankenhäusern und zeigt anhand zahlreicher Fallbeispiele, wie Krankenhäuser unternehmerisch handeln und sich zu Gesundheits-Dienstleistern wandeln. Es beleuchtet Chancen und Risiken von Profit-Centern und schlägt den Bogen von der Optimierung des Managements zu einem zielgerichteten Marketing. Anhand einer Fülle von Projektbeispielen wird klar, dass Marktstrategien vor allem dann erfolgreich sind, wenn interdisziplinär zusammengearbeitet wird und Kommunikation die Change-Prozesse begleitet.

Is American democracy being derailed by the United States Senate filibuster? Is the filibuster an important right that improves the political process or an increasingly partisan tool that delays legislation and thwarts the will of the majority? Are century-old procedures in the Senate hampering the institution from fulfilling its role on the eve of the 21st century? The filibuster has achieved almost mythic proportions in the history of American politics, but it has escaped a careful, critical assessment for more than 50 years. In this book, Sarah Binder and Steven Smith provide such an assessment as they address the problems and conventional wisdom associated with the Senate's long-standing tradition of extended debate. The authors examine the evolution of the rules governing Senate debate, analyze the consequences of these rules, and evaluate reform proposals. They argue that in an era of unprecedented filibustering and related obstructionism, old habits are indeed undermining the Senate's ability to meet its responsibilities. Binder and Smith scrutinize conventional wisdom about the filibuster—and show that very little of it is true. They focus on five major myths: that unlimited debate is a fundamental right to differentiate the Senate from the House of Representatives; that the Senate's tradition as a deliberative body requires unlimited debate; that the filibuster is reserved for a few issues of the utmost national importance; that few measures are actually killed by the filibuster; and that senators resist changing the rules because of a principled commitment to deliberation. In revising conventional wisdom about the filibuster, Binder and Smith contribute to ongoing debates about the dynamics of institutional change in the American political system. The authors conclude by suggesting reforms intended to enhance the power of determined