Racial Differences in Hospital Evaluation After the Use of Force by Police: a Tale of Two Cities
In: Journal of racial and ethnic health disparities: an official journal of the Cobb-NMA Health Institute, Band 7, Heft 6, S. 1178-1187
ISSN: 2196-8837
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In: Journal of racial and ethnic health disparities: an official journal of the Cobb-NMA Health Institute, Band 7, Heft 6, S. 1178-1187
ISSN: 2196-8837
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 156-182
ISSN: 1460-3667
To compete in political contests, politicians need their supporters to contribute resources. We investigate how politicians can best allocate group-based prizes on a contingent basis to incentivize individual members of a group to exert effort on their behalf. We contrast contingent contracts with tournament style contests (Lazear and Rosen (Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J Political Econ 1981; 89(5): 841–864)) and characterize when tournaments that create intergroup contests for prizes elicit more contributions than contingent contracts. By tying the allocation of prizes to the observed level of effort made by each group, politicians ameliorate the collective action problem that is created by the fact that each individual's effort has only a minimal impact on the overall political contest. We examine the relative performance and stability of intergroup tournaments as a function of the number of groups and asymmetric group size.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 4, S. 707-743
ISSN: 1552-8766
In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country's economy, or their government's revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 413-426
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 371-392
ISSN: 1469-2112
Parties can elicit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which party wins, a voter's choice also influences the distribution of prizes. This latter factor, referred to in this article as prize pivotalness, tends to be the dominant influence in vote choice. The desire to win prizes can induce voters to coalesce into a highly supportive group, even if they dislike the party's policies. Characterizing voting equilibria in this framework explains the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups in both established and new democracies. Adapted from the source document.
In: Annual Review of Political Science, Band 15, S. 161-181
SSRN
In: Annual review of political science, Band 15, S. 161-182
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 371-392
ISSN: 1469-2112
Parties can elitcit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which party wins, a voter's choice also influences the distribution of prizes. This latter factor, referred to in this article as prize pivotalness, tends to be the dominant influence in vote choice. The desire to win prizes can induce voters to coalesce into a highly supportive group, even if they dislike the party's policies. Characterizing voting equilibria in this framework explains the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups in both established and new democracies.
In: British journal of political science, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 371-393
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 54, Heft 5, S. 667-687
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 54, Heft 5, S. 667-686
ISSN: 1552-8766
Nations elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as temporary members have lower levels of economic growth, become less democratic, and experience more restrictions on press freedoms than comparable nations not elected to the UNSC. Using regression and matching techniques the authors show, for instance, that over the two-year period of UNSC membership and the following two years during which a nation is ineligible for reelection, UNSC nations experience a 3.5 percent contraction in their economy relative to nations not elected to the UNSC. The detrimental effects of UNSC membership are strongest in nondemocratic nations. The authors contrast these results with the growing evidence that nations elected to the UNSC receive greater development assistance.
In: International organization, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 309-340
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 271-287
ISSN: 1467-9221
This paper represents an attempt to bridge the gap between rational and psychological models of choice, as represented by expected utility theory and prospect theory, and to show how researchers from different traditions can start to work together on problems of interest to both. A central issue for both models concerns the origin of preferences and how they might be predicted. Two questions of interest to all social scientists are related to the formation of preferences: What determines what people want, and what determines what people do once they know what they want? The incorporation of emotion into models of decision‐making may help users of divergent models find common ground for exploration and investigation.
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 271-288
ISSN: 0162-895X
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 449-451
ISSN: 0032-3470