Suchergebnisse

Abstract. By tying subsidies to vote totals, Bill C-24
substantially changed the way Canadian national parties are financed. This
raises the possibility of increased voter turnout, as parties face greater
incentives to maximize vote totals, and voters face greater incentives to
turn out. We consider this possibility. We show that turnout was not
differently affected by closeness in 2004 than in 2000; that
candidates' efforts were not greater in 2004 in more marginal
ridings; that there were no differences in the likelihood of abstaining or
deserting a preferred third-place party in 2004 and 2000; and that at the
individual level, the decision to turn out was not affected by strategic
considerations in the expected direction. Accordingly, we find little
support for the possibility that C-24 increased turnout.Résumé. En liant les subventions au total des
votes obtenus, la loi C-24 modifie substantiellement le financement des
partis politiques nationaux au Canada. Ce changement pourrait induire une
augmentation de la participation électorale puisque les partis ont
intérêt à maximiser le nombre de votes et les
électeurs sont davantage incités à voter. Nous
examinons cette hypothèse. Nous démontrons que
l'influence de l'intensité de la lutte entre les
candidates sur la participation électorale n'a pas
été différente en 2004 qu'en 2000; que les
efforts des candidats n'ont pas été plus intenses en
2004 dans les circonscriptions perdues à l'avance; que la
probabilité de s'abstenir ou de renoncer à appuyer un
tiers parti n'a pas changé entre 2000 et 2004; et que la
décision individuelle de participer à l'élection
n'a pas été influencée par des
considérations stratégiques allant dans la direction
prévue. En conséquence, nous trouvons peu de preuves
confirmant l'hypothèse selon laquelle la loi C-24 a
favorisé la participation électorale.

This article assesses the claim that proportional representation (PR) fosters a closer correspondence between the views of citizens and the positions of the government. The study uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set and compares respondents' self-placements on a Left-Right scale with placements of cabinet parties' locations in 31 election studies. The authors argue that PR has two contradictory consequences. On one hand, PR leads to more parties and more choice for voters; but these parties are less centrist, and this increases the overall distance between voters and parties. On the other hand, PR increases the likelihood of coalition governments; this pulls the government toward the center of the policy spectrum and reduces the distance between the government and voters. These two contradictory effects of PR wash out, and the net overall impact of PR on congruence is nil. The data support the authors' interpretation.

Objective-This article examines the factors that form voters' perceptions of the parties' chances of winning at both the national and the local levels. Method-We make use of the 1988 Canadian Election Study and we employ a HLM model to estimate the effect of individual-level and contextual-level variables. Results-It is shown that voters' expectations are affected by a combination of "objective" contextual information and personal preferences (projection effects). Conclusion-The basic contextual information that is utilized to ascertain local chances is the outcome of the previous election in the local constituency, whereas polls are crucial in the case of perceived national chances. We also find that the most politically aware are more strongly influenced by "objective" indicators. Tables, 7, References. Adapted from the source document.

A methodology is proposed for assessing the impact of televised debates on electoral outcomes, and it is applied to a specific case, that of the 1988 Canadian election. We present four tests of the debates' impact: first, a cross-sectional group comparison, which contrasts the voting behaviour of those who did and those who did not see the debates; secondly, a panel analysis of the shift in party support, before and after the debates, among those who watched the debates and those who did not; thirdly, a panel study of the impact of reactions to the debates on voting behaviour; and, fourthly, a time-series analysis, which examines the evolution of vote intentions over the course of the campaign and, more precisely, before and after the debates. It is argued that because non-watchers are influenced by what their friends or the media tell them about the debates, the first two designs, based on a comparison of debate watchers and non-watchers, are not appropriate. The empirical analysis of the 1988 Canadian election substantiates this point. While these first two designs seem to indicate no debate impact, panel reaction and time-series analyses show that the debates had a substantial and enduring impact on the vote and that they were decisive in the contest for second place between the Liberals and the NDP. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Parties and Their Messages -- Chapter 2. The Media: Getting Out the Messages -- Chapter 3. Why Was Turnout So Low? -- Chapter 4. The Vote: Stability and Change -- Chapter 5. A Multi-Stage Model of Vote Choice -- Chapter 6. The Social Bases of Party Support -- Chapter 7. Values and Beliefs -- Chapter 8. Partisan Loyalties -- Chapter 9. The Economy -- Chapter 10. The Issues -- Chapter 11. Liberal Performance -- Chapter 12. The Leaders -- Chapter 13. Strategic Voting -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: Multinomial Estimations of Vote Choice Outside Quebec -- Appendix B: Multinomial Estimations of Vote Choice in Quebec -- Appendix C: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Parties Outside Quebec -- Appendix D: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Parties in Quebec -- Appendix E: Description of Variables -- References

We investigate strategic voting in proportional representation (PR) systems where parties are organized in pre-electoral coalitions and subject to a vote threshold. We show that such political systems are likely to generate coordination problems among the supporters of a coalition, and we examine voter behavior in this setting using a laboratory experiment with repeated rounds of elections. Our findings suggest that in absence of electoral history, voters cannot coordinate their efforts successfully and are more likely to vote sincerely. However, as history becomes available, the vote threshold induces strategic coordination on parties that performed best in previous elections.