Suchergebnisse

This article summarizes the findings from the special issue. The EU, the US, and to some extent Turkey are the only actors considered in this special issue who not only explicitly try to promote human rights and democracy, but also employ specific instruments and resources for this purpose. But all external actors prioritized stability and security over democracy as the events unfolded. Despite all the discussions about EU actorness, we did not find any difference between the EU, on the one hand, and the four states we looked at in this special issue (the US, Russia, Turkey, and Israel), on the other. In fact, the US arguably pursued the most incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy toward the MENA region in response to the Arabellions. Among the three explanations considered in the introduction to this special issue, realism scores worst. 'Objective' geostrategic interests cannot account for the variation in policy responses by the external actors. The authors in this special issue point to domestic politics in the various countries and inside the regional organization (the EU) considered here. Self-understandings and collective identities provide a complementary explanation for why external actors have acted against their economic and security goals. As to the effects of the external actors' policies in the target countries, the main drivers of events during the Arabellions have been domestic so that external actors could only assume subsidiary roles. Tunisia might be the only case in which external democracy promotion-in this case by the EU-played an auxiliary role. Adapted from the source document.

Our article seeks to contribute to the growing literature on noncompliance with law beyond the nation-state. We take issue with an argument advanced by Michael Zurn that "positive" (market-correcting) policies give rise to more compliance problems than "negative" (market-making) policies. Our statistical analysis of data on noncompliance with European Law shows that the positive or negative character of a policy has no significant influence on its level of compliance. Country-specific variables, such as state capacity, are causally more important. We conclude with a summary of our most important findings & some considerations on the relevance of other policy-specific factors that might explain noncompliance with law beyond the nation-state. 4 Tables, 1 Graph, 3 Appendixes, 98 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article seeks to explain cross-country variation in noncompliance with European law. Although noncompliance has not significantly increased over time, some European Union member states violate European law more frequently than others. To account for the observed variance, the authors draw on three prominent approaches widely used in the compliance literature- enforcement, management, and legitimacy. They develop hypotheses for each of these approaches before combining them in theoretically consistent ways. They empirically test their hypotheses using a comprehensive data set of more than 6,300 violations of European law. The findings highlight the importance of combining the enforcement and management approaches. Powerful member states are most likely to violate European law, whereas the best compliers are small countries with efficient bureaucracies. Yet administrative capacity also matters for powerful member states. The United Kingdom is much more compliant than Italy, which commands similar political power but whose bureaucracy is far less efficient. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]