This book investigates the major internal and external pressures and constraints facing China as it enters the new century. It is widely recognised that in its capacity as a nuclear power and as a member of the UN's Security Council, China plays a major role in world politics. China is also a growing economic power, which according to some economists is projected to overtake the US 20 years from now. China has clearly emerged as the major power in the East Asian region and the major issues of contention in the region such as the tension on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan issue and the conflic.
AbstractResearch on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the world's largest political party, has seen a revival in recent years. Today, studies of the CCP are a key part of any attempt to understand China's development trajectory in the post-1949 era. This review takes a new and closer look at how the study of the CCP has evolved in terms of themes, concepts, and areas of research. In the following we explore nine topics: Party organization, cadre management, cadre advancement and training, Party ideology, Party reform and adaptation, local Party work, the Party and business, the Party and corruption, and the Party and the law. Combining the pieces of the puzzle provides the picture of a political machine and organization of amazing durability.
At the Third Plenum held in November 2013, the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a comprehensive reform programme containing no less than 300 reform proposals. It is potentially the most important reform document to have been passed by the CPC since the landmark Third Plenum in December 1978. Entitled 'The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Important Questions Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform', the programme upgrades the role of the market in the general economic system from 'basic' to 'decisive'. It also stipulates a number of reform measures within finance, banking, tax, real estate, hukou, urbanisation, government administration, family planning, etc., and establishes two new important leading bodies. One is The Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform and the other is the National Security Council. Xi Jinping is named chairman of both of these new powerful institutions. This indicates his increasingly dominant role in Chinese politics. The reform programme aims to create a more open and market-regulated Chinese economy by 2020, although without dismantling the guiding role of the state-owned economy. The article argues that implementation of the new ambitious goals will be met by resistance from entrenched vested interests. In the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector powerful actors and interests will try to preserve the status quo. Some private investment will be allowed in publicly-owned entities in order to create enterprises characterised by mixed ownership. However, in key sectors of the economy SOEs will still enjoy a monopoly and will not be exposed to free market competition.
AbstractThis article analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a case study of a central-level SOE holding group. Relying on official documents, secondary literature and interviews with enterprise managers, government officials and academics, the article documents how the CCP has actively formalized its role in Chinese business by embedding itself in the corporate governance structure of SOEs. Through the application of Chinese indigenous administrative corporate governance concepts such as "bidirectional entry, cross appointment" and "three majors, one big," the CCP has consolidated its dominance of enterprise decision-making procedures and personnel appointment and created a hybrid, Party-led model of corporate governance. While this hybrid model can secure enterprise compliance, communication with higher state and Party organs, as well as long-term development planning, it is unlikely to help solve SOE efficiency problems and may even undermine other SOE reforms.
This article analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a case study of a central-level SOE holding group. Relying on official documents, secondary literature and interviews with enterprise managers, government officials and academics, the article documents how the CCP has actively formalized its role in Chinese business by embedding itself in the corporate governance structure of SOEs. Through the application of Chinese indigenous administrative corporate governance concepts such as "bidirectional entry, cross appointment" and "three majors, one big," the CCP has consolidated its dominance of enterprise decision-making procedures and personnel appointment and created a hybrid, Party-led model of corporate governance. While this hybrid model can secure enterprise compliance, communication with higher state and Party organs, as well as long-term development planning, it is unlikely to help solve SOE efficiency problems and may even undermine other SOE reforms. (China Q/GIGA)
Leading cadres in China are subject to rotation. An interesting form of rotation takes place between big business and the political world. That means one fifth of China's governors and vice governors have a business background as heads of one of China's large State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). How this takes place and which qualifications the involved business leaders possess are shrouded in mystery. Based on prosopographical studies of Chinese business leaders who have participated in the Chinese Executive Leadership Program (CELP), this article attempts to open the black box. The study examines the career pathways of CELP participants in Party, government and business positions. The study shows that 84 of the 261 CELP SOE participants (2005-2018) were subsequently promoted, and 20 of these promotions were from SOEs to leading Party and government positions. In some cases, former business leaders became Party secretaries in important provinces or ministers in key ministries. The article also argues that Chinese business leaders have managed to keep their administrative ranking in the Chinese nomenklatura system. In fact, Chinese business leaders are quasi officials (zhun guan) and form an important recruitment base for leadership renewal. As such, the article suggests that the rotation of cadres within the 'Iron Triangle' of Party–government–business constitutes the main unifying and stabilising factor in the Chinese political system.
In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging and gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Heft 20, S. 2-44
Contrary to the expectations of many people, China's recent economic growth has not led to the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the Party has recently carried out a peaceful and orderly transition to the so-called fourth generation of leadership, has revitalised itself, and created a new, younger and better trained cadre corps. Despite this successful transformation, there continue to be many problems that the Party will need to overcome if it is to remain in power, including pressures for democratization in both urban and rural areas, widespread corruption, the emergence of new social groups, and increasing dissatisfaction among workers who seem to be losing out in the present transition process. The Chinese Communist Party in Reform explores the current state of the Chinese Communist Party and the many challenges that it faces. It considers the dynamics of development in China, the Party organization, recruitment and management, and the Party's role in society more widely. It concludes by examining the prospects for the future of the Party, including whether it will continue to be able to accommodate socio-economic changes within China and pressures from abroad, and the likely nature of its evolution. Overall, this book provides a comprehensive assessment of the internal dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party and its role in Chinese society.
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We argue, due to the conspicuous failure of Washington Consensus-guided reforms in most part of the developing world in 1990s and the outbreak of the current global financial crisis, Washington Consensus, as a general term of the neoliberal free market economic thinking, has been withering. In the meantime, Chinese economic model has gain wide recognition and praise worldwide. Joshua C. Ramo coined the term of Beijing Consensus as an alternative approach to economic development for developing nations. There has been hot debate on the notion of Beijing Consensus. We argue even though there are some problems in Ramo's original definition of Beijing Consensus, we should not reject this notion altogether. Instead, we should try to come up with better conceptualizations of this term. In this paper, we sum up ten general principles of the Chinese development model as our new definition of the Beijing Consensus.