Suchergebnisse

This article presents a stress-coping-choice model of state behavior in international crisis. Competing definitions of crisis are first examined, with special reference to the differences between the Hermann and ICB definitions. Thereafter the model is specified-notably the independent variable, stress induced by perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and the probability of war-and the dependent variable, choice. The central research question is the effects of changing crisis-induced stress on coping and on choice. A multifaceted methodology is delineated. I he model is then applied to the behavior of one state in two international crises, Israel in 1967 and 1973. A set of 23 hypotheses drawn from empirical studies of the 1914, Korean War, and Cuban Missile crises is assessed with the findings from these Middle East cases. More than two-thirds are supported, suggesting the possible existence of common attributes in international crisis behavior, relating to information processing, consultation patterns, decisional forums, and the consideration of alternatives. Finally, new propositions about coping by decision makers of states under conditions of escalating and deescalating stress are generated from the findings indicated in this inquiry.

Among India's foreign policy crises since independence the most intense were in the military-security issue-area. Some, like the concentration of Indian and Pakistani forces on the Kashmir and Punjab borders in July 1951, de-escalated without war. Others, like the disputed claims over the Rann of Kutch in the early months of 1965, led to limited military hostilities followed by stalemate. Still others culminated in war with India's principal neighbours - with Pakistan in 1947–9, 1965 and 1971, and with China in 1962. All of these conform to the definition of a crisis along the peace-war continuum: