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Buchanan's last book declares an antipathy to one aspect of ''conservatism'' as he identified it—namely, conservatism's defense of hierarchy in social relations. Buchanan's anti-hierarchy stance owes something to the rural populist background of his early years. That stance also explains something about his professional and individual personality: his contentment to remain at non-elitist institutions; his preparedness to challenge establishment thinking on the nature and role of government; his antagonism to inherited wealth and the privileges of dynasty; and his life-long affection for elements of the simple rural life. The aim of this short piece is to highlight these various connections between Buchanan's political commitments and the content and conduct of his work.

AbstractThis paper in honor of Hans Albert '@100' seeks to show how adhering to critical rationalist 'economic philosophy' avoids contradictions in James Buchanan's contractarianism: restricting constitutional economic advice to what serves the ends of all potential addressees simultaneously Buchanan not only blurs the borderline between value-neutral economic philosophy and substantive moral philosophy but also contradicts his thesis of the "necessary relativism and individualism of values". Translating 'means-ends'-relations into technological 'cause-effect'-relations, Albert can treat technological blueprints as nomological hypotheses subject to scientific test and corroboration while leaving their practical implementation to citizens whose contingent particular ends may or may not be universalistic.

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People learned many things from Jim Buchanan. Among the more important is that titles should be felicitous. The authors here are ambitious, perhaps presumptuous, even slightly mischievous. Their point of departure is Buchanan's paper published in this journal thirteen years ago. In that sense, the leap from 'The Soul of Classical Liberalism' (Buchanan 2000b) to the soul of one of classical liberalism's chief expositors and defenders strikes them as natural -- and may even meet the felicity test. First, to the mischief. The truth is that, for Buchanan, a reference to 'souls' is decidedly out of character. The term connotes religion, and he was antagonistic toward religion of all kinds. His opposition was not just to 'organized' religion: he was (if possible) even less sympathetic to unorganized populist mystics and new age spiritualists. Their aim is to say something about what they see as the central features of that 'animating spirit' and 'vital principle.'. Adapted from the source document.

In the literature on paternalism that has grown out of the behavioural economics "revolution", a distinction is drawn between "hard" and "soft" policies. Although this hard/soft distinction seems to be motivated by the thought that the two policy types might have different implications for individual liberty, there is a claim that "hard" policies are normatively superior to "soft" for "efficiency" reasons. We show, by appeal to an esteem-based model of "soft" policy that this claim is not valid in general. We also expose a number of conceptual mistakes in what many seem to have identified as the normative implications of behavioural economics. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]