Suchergebnisse

Most research in global justice considers international distributive justice from a perspective of what duties, if any, affluent states have towards people in severe poverty. The debate usually focuses on whether positive or negative duties are most relevant and how they should be applied. This article challenges this orthodoxy by defending stakeholder theory as a promising new approach overcoming limitations in current debates through promotion of the virtue of stakeholders having a say where they have a stake.

This article explores the relationship between capabilities and political liberalism. There are two views about how they might be compatible: Sen claims capabilities should be seen as a revision of primary goods while Nussbaum argues capabilities should form part of an overlapping consensus. It is argued they are both right—and incorrect. Whereas Sen identifies where compatibility might best be found, it is Nussbaum's conception of capabilities that is able to overcome Rawls's objections to Sen's proposal. This provides a new third way of conceiving how capabilities and political liberalism might address these concerns that is more compelling for how Sen and Nussbaum claim. The two rivals can come together, but not in the way that either of its most well known champions have argued.

AbstractThomas Pogge has argued powerfully for the view that states which are responsible for severe poverty collectively share this responsibility. I claim that this rough equality of collective responsibility is not compelling. Relevant states may share collective responsibility for severe poverty, but some states possess much more responsibility than others. It may prove difficulty determining precisely how much more or less responsible some states are than others. Nonetheless, Pogge's account should be revised to recognize more clearly the inequality of contribution that relevant states have towards collective responsibility for severe poverty.

Abstract
Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax-cut promises is not wrongfulness but enforceability.