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The article of record may be found as published, 2016-06-20 in "Presidential Power, with Matthew Dickinson", at http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/. Included courtesy of the author.

English language version is available here: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/49920 ; The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/00115258201682 ; Embora Portugal seja uma nação relativamente pequena da Europa Ocidental, o país serve como um excelente estudo de caso para a discussão sobre as relações civis-militares na medida em que criou, praticamente do zero, instituições de controle civil e democrático das Forças Armadas, capazes de responder a mudanças no ambiente nacional e internacional. Ademais, construiu estruturas conjuntas de comando e formação profissional para aprimorar simultaneamente o controle civil e a eficácia das Forças Armadas. Portugal foi a primeira das "novas democracias", tendo inaugurado a Terceira Onda de Democratização em 25 de abril de 1974. O regime autoritário português (1928-1974) não foi, em sentido estrito, uma ditadura militar, embora tivesse apoio dos militares; na luta contra três guerras de insurreição na África, entre 1961 e 1974, os contingentes das Forças Armadas elevaram- se a 200mil homens e chegarama absorver cerca demetade dos orçamentos governamentais.

The United States has gone further than any country in the "privatization of security". Other countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.

Portuguese language translation is available here: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/49921 ; Civil-military relations in Portugal are analyzed employing a framework with empirical indicators focusing on the three dimensions of democratic civilian control, effectiveness in roles and missions, and efficiency. Despite the economic crisis, and consequent lack of government resources, this analysis of Portugal is positive in comparative perspective. In addition to the influence and incentives of international organizations, specifically NATO, EU, and the UN, the author emphasizes how civilians and military use defense policy and the armed forces in pursuing strategic goals. The author is distinguished professor emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and has published scholarly books and articles on civil-military relations, reform of intelligence agencies, Central American street gangs, and the use of private security contractors by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1022469 ; In our edited book, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, Steven Boraz and I argued that intelligence should be analyzed as a subset of civil-military relations. In addition to the three reasons given there-that intelligence is a monopoly of the military in most non-democratic regimes; that even in older democracies including the United States the military plays a very large role in intelligence; and that both exist to ensure national security - another can be added, at least in the case of Brazil, that while democratic civilian control has been achieved, minimal attention and commitment are given to achieving effectiveness.

Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it. Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00216.x ; This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.