Suchergebnisse

SUMMARYCritics often argue that government poverty programs perversely make the poor worse off by encouraging unemployment, out‐of‐wedlock births, and other 'social pathologies.' However, basic microeconomic theory tells us that you cannot make an agent worse off by expanding his choice set. The current paper argues that familiar findings in behavioral economics can be used to resolve this paradox. Insofar as the standard rational actor model is wrong, additional choices can make agents worse off. More importantly, existing empirical evidence suggests that the poor deviate from the rational actor model to an unusually large degree. The paper then considers the policy implications of our alternative perspective.

Previous research suggests that positive and normative beliefs about economics are largely unrelated. Using questions from two national surveys, this study finds that: (a) the underlying determinants of positive and normative beliefs are strikingly similar; (b) education is by far the strongest overall determinant of both positive and normative beliefs; and (c) the variables known to push positive beliefs in the same direction as formal economic training-education, male gender, income growth, and job security-also push normative beliefs in the same direction. These results strongly suggest that the positive-normative connection has been underestimated. Adapted from the source document.

The magic of education -- The puzzle is real : the ubiquity of useless education -- The puzzle is real : the handsome rewards of useless education -- The signs of signaling : in case you're still not convinced -- Who cares if it's signaling? : the selfish return to education -- We care if it's signaling : the social return to education -- The white elephant in the room : we need lots less education -- We need more vocational education -- Nourishing mother : is education good for the soul? -- Five chats on education and enlightenment -- Conclusion -- Technical appendix: Completion probability and student quality

AbstractMany scholars argue that retrospective voting is a powerful information shortcut that offsets widespread voter ignorance. Even deeply ignorant voters, it is claimed, can effectively punish incumbents for bad performance and reward them if things go well. But if voters' understanding of which officials are responsible for which outcomes is systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure rather than a cure for it. We design and administer a new survey of the general public and political experts to test for such biases. Our analysis reveals frequent, large, robust biases in voter attributions of responsibility for a variety of political actors and outcomes with a tendency for the public to overestimate influence, although important examples of underestimation also exist.