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AbstractWhat difference does it make if the state makes people vote? The question is central to normative debates about the rights and duties of citizens in a democracy, and to contemporary policy debates in a number of Latin American countries over what actions states should take to encourage electoral participation. Focusing on a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela, this article shows that not forcing people to vote yielded a more unequal distribution of income. The evidence supports Arend Lijphart's claim, advanced in his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, that compulsory voting can offset class bias in turnout and, in turn, contribute to the equality of influence.

Drawing on new data that combine recorded votes from the Swiss National Assembly with canton-level referendum results on identical legislative proposals, Portmann et al. (Public Choice 151:585-610, 2012) develop an innovative strategy to identify the effect of district magnitude on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. We replicate PSE's central result and also estimate a related model that allows for the possibility of non-monotonicity in the relationship between district magnitude and representatives' deviance from referendum median voters. Our results indicate that representatives elected in low-magnitude multi-member districts deviate from canton-level majorities less than either MPs from single-member districts or those from high-magnitude multi-member districts. Adapted from the source document.

In their response to Timothy Meisburger's essay, Andrew Reynolds and John M. Carey argue that the weight of the evidence -- from nations actually going through democratic change, as well as from the scholarly literature that tries to understand such change -- points to the conclusion that proportional systems, while not solving the all the problems by any means, are a better option than majoritarian systems in most contexts. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract:
In their response to Timothy Meisburger's essay, Andrew Reynolds and John M. Carey argue that the weight of the evidence—from nations actually going through democratic change, as well as from the scholarly literature that tries to understand such change—points to the conclusion that proportional systems, while not solving the all the problems by any means, are a better option than majoritarian systems in most contexts.

Abstract:
Among their other effects, the seismic political events of late 2010 and early 2011 have set off a wave of actual and proposed electoral reforms throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This wave has touched both countries where long-ruling authoritarian regimes have collapsed and those where existing regimes have (so far) managed to retain power. Throughout the region, even in places not at the center of the recent upheavals—Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority, for instance—the rules for deciding who will sit in parliament are the topic of intense debate. In all these cases we find the same core challenge for reformers and democratizers: How to open space for new parties and movements to challenge the old ones and gain a voice in the making of laws?