Suchergebnisse

This article draws on major theories of committee organization to explain committee chair selection in contexts with high informational and organizational constraints. We test our theoretical expectations through a series of fixed effects conditional logit models ran on an original data set which includes all legislators who have served in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from 1992 to 2012. The findings indicate that sector knowledge matters more for committee chair selection in the first post-communist terms, while chair seniority and party credentials acquire relevance later on. The effect of sector knowledge is stronger than that of chair seniority for the committees that the members of parliament perceive to be the most important, while party leaders have privileged access to the chair position irrespective of how salient the committee is.

This article draws on major theories of committee organization to explain committee chair selection in contexts with high informational and organizational constraints. We test our theoretical expectations through a series of fixed effects conditional logit models ran on an original data set which includes all legislators who have served in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from 1992 to 2012. The findings indicate that sector knowledge matters more for committee chair selection in the first post-communist terms, while chair seniority and party credentials acquire relevance later on. The effect of sector knowledge is stronger than that of chair seniority for the committees that the members of parliament perceive to be the most important, while party leaders have privileged access to the chair position irrespective of how salient the committee is.

Previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the change of parliamentary voting behaviour following electoral reforms. But scholars have not analysed whether the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited matter differently in such cases. Our article fills this gap by investigating the individual variation in voting loyalty across two legislative terms, using a sample of 26 high-stakes roll-call votes. Romania constitutes an ideal setting for such a study due to its recent shift from closed-list proportional representation to single-member districts. Multivariate ordinary least squares models (including all Members of Parliament and including only incumbents) test for the effect of parliamentary experience, party membership duration, parliamentary office, party hopping and district magnitude, while also accounting for demotion and a number of socio-demographic controls. Results indicate that socialisation is less important for Members of Parliament's voting behaviour after reform, whereas signalling through voting dissent prior to party switching becomes more relevant. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]

Previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the change of parliamentary voting behaviour following electoral reforms. But scholars have not analysed whether the mechanisms by which voting loyalty is elicited matter differently in such cases. Our article fills this gap by investigating the individual variation in voting loyalty across two legislative terms, using a sample of 26 high-stakes roll-call votes. Romania constitutes an ideal setting for such a study due to its recent shift from closed-list proportional representation to single-member districts. Multivariate ordinary least squares models (including all Members of Parliament and including only incumbents) test for the effect of parliamentary experience, party membership duration, parliamentary office, party hopping and district magnitude, while also accounting for demotion and a number of socio-demographic controls. Results indicate that socialisation is less important for Members of Parliament's voting behaviour after reform, whereas signalling through voting dissent prior to party switching becomes more relevant.

This article illustrates how the growing complexity of regulations regarding party funding in post-communist Romania is paralleled by practices employed by political parties in their attempt to gain increased access to state resources. Our document analysis indicate that political parties managed to exploit the weaknesses of the increasingly complex legislative framework. A cyclical process takes places: parties use the existing flaws in the legislation on party funding to indirectly obtain and exploit state resources for their (electoral) purposes, an improved law tackling those shortcomings is passed, but political parties are able to identify other flaws and use them to gain financial benefits. To make the case, we assess comparatively the evolution of legislative provisions and practices employed by political parties over two decades. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright the American Council of Learned Societies.]

This article illustrates how the growing complexity of regulations regarding party funding in post-communist Romania is paralleled by practices employed by political parties in their attempt to gain increased access to state resources. Our document analysis indicate that political parties managed to exploit the weaknesses of the increasingly complex legislative framework. A cyclical process takes places: parties use the existing flaws in the legislation on party funding to indirectly obtain and exploit state resources for their (electoral) purposes, an improved law tackling those shortcomings is passed, but political parties are able to identify other flaws and use them to gain financial benefits. To make the case, we assess comparatively the evolution of legislative provisions and practices employed by political parties over two decades.