The Way Forward
In: New political economy, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 395-400
ISSN: 1469-9923
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In: New political economy, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 395-400
ISSN: 1469-9923
In: Review of international political economy, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 136-143
ISSN: 1466-4526
One of the most striking financial developments in recent years was the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) – large publicly owned investment portfolios, which until recently were growing rapidly in both number and size. In a global environment already roiled by a prolonged credit crisis, SWFs raise tricky and potentially controversial new questions for international financial regulation. One issue of concern to many in host countries is the possibility that some SWFs might be used for overt or tacit political purposes, posing a challenge for global monetary governance: a Great Tradeoff between, on the one hand, the world community's collective interest in sustaining the openness of capital markets; and on the other hand, the legitimate national security concerns of individual host countries. Can some balance between the two be found that will be both stable and acceptable to all concerned? Individually as well as collectively, recipient countries have begun to address the regulatory challenge directly. To date, however, accomplishments have been slight and have failed to stem a noticeable drift toward financial protectionism. A review of some recent proposals suggests that there is no foolproof solution to the Great Tradeoff. But the potential for controversy could be significantly reduced by a negotiated agreement among host governments addressing three key issues: (1) definitions; (2) risk assessment; and (3) dispute resolution. The most logical venue for such an exercise would be the OECD, building on its already extensive experience with international investment issues.
BASE
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 436-444
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 741-766
ISSN: 1468-5965
AbstractAfter nearly a century of dominance of the international monetary system, has the US dollar finally met its match in the euro? When Europe's economic and monetary union (EMU) came into existence in 1999, many observers predicted that the euro would soon join America's greenback at the peak of global finance. Achievements, however, have fallen short of aspiration. After an initial spurt of enthusiasm, international use of the euro actually appears now to be levelling off, even stalling, and so far seems confined largely to a limited range of market sectors and regions. The euro has successfully attained a place second only to the greenback – but it remains, and is likely to remain, a quite distant second without a determined effort by EMU authorities to promote their money's global role. The temptation will surely be great. In practical terms, it is difficult to imagine that EMU authorities will refrain entirely from trying to promote a greater role for the euro. But that, in turn, could turn out to be a recipe for discord with the United States, which has never made any secret of its commitment to preserving the greenback's worldwide dominance. A struggle for monetary leadership could become a source of sustained tensions in US–European relations. Fortunately, however, there seems relatively little risk of a destabilizing escalation into outright geopolitical conflict.
In: International affairs, Band 85, Heft 4, S. 713-731
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 436-444
ISSN: 0305-0629
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 741-766
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
In: International affairs, Band 85, Heft 4, S. 713-731
ISSN: 0020-5850
World Affairs Online
After nearly a century of dominance of the international monetary system, has the US dollar finally met its match in the euro? When Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) came into existence in 1999, many observers predicted that the euro would soon join America's greenback at the peak of global finance. Achievements, however, have fallen short of aspirations. After an initial spurt of enthusiasm, international use of the euro now actually appears to be levelling off, even stalling, and so far seems confined largely to a limited range of market sectors and regions. The euro has successfully attained a place second only to the greenback, but it remains, and is likely to remain, a quite distant second without a determined effort by EMU authorities to promote their money's global role. The temptation will surely be great. In practical terms, it is difficult to imagine that EMU authorities will refrain entirely from trying to promote a greater role for the euro. But that, in turn, could be a recipe for discord with the US, which has never made any secret of its commitment to preserving the greenback's world-wide dominance. A struggle for monetary leadership could become a source of sustained tensions in US-European relations. Fortunately, however, there seems relatively little risk of a destabilising escalation into outright geopolitical conflict.
BASE
In: International affairs, Band 84, Heft 3, S. 455-470
ISSN: 1468-2346
This essay looks at the dynamics of power and rule setting in the international monetary system. I begin with a brief discussion of the meaning of power in international monetary relations, distinguishing between two critical dimensions of monetary power, autonomy and influence. Major developments have led to a greater diffusion of power in monetary affairs, both among states and between states and societal actors. But the diffusion of power has been mainly in the dimension of autonomy, rather than influence, meaning that leadership in the system has been dispersed rather than relocated – a pattern of change in the geopolitics of finance that might be called leaderless diffusion. The pattern of leaderless diffusion, in turn, is generating greater ambiguity in prevailing governance structures. Rule setting in monetary relations increasingly relies not on negotiations among a few powerful states but, rather, on the evolution of custom and usage among growing numbers of autonomous agents. Impacts on governance structures can be seen at two levels: the individual state and the global system. At the state level, the dispersion of power compels governments to rethink their commitment to national monetary sovereignty. At the systemic level, it compounds the difficulties of bargaining on monetary issues. More and more, formal rules are being superceded by informal norms that emerge, like common law, not from legislation or statutes but from everyday conduct and social convention.
BASE
In: The world today, Band 64, Heft 12, S. 8-9
ISSN: 0043-9134
World Affairs Online
In: Review of international political economy, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 30-34
ISSN: 1466-4526
John Ravenhill and Richard Higgott and Matthew Watson, in commenting on my earlier article, accuse me of distortion, favoritism, and making the quality of debate of RIPE worse rather than better. Their criticisms, I suggest, reflect misunderstanding and are not supported by textual evidence. Adapted from the source document.
In: International affairs, Band 84, Heft 3, S. 455-470
ISSN: 0020-5850
World Affairs Online