The Effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk Neutrality with Endogenous Information
In: Journal of political economy, Band 88, Heft 3, S. 462-475
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 88, Heft 3, S. 462-475
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 147-170
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 213-229
In: Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets, S. 299-326
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15039
SSRN
Working paper
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12489
SSRN
Working paper
OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATION: This paper considers the impact of interactions between competitiveness, fiscal policy and monetary institutions in the presence of unionized labor markets on economic outcomes and welfare in the long run. Two main classes of questions are investigated. First, what is the impact of exogenously given labor taxes and unemployment benefits on the choice of monetary policy by the central bank, on the choice of nominal wages by unions, on the choice of prices by monopolistically competitive firms and through them on unemployment, inflation and welfare? A related question is, how does the level of competitiveness on goods? market affect the economy and welfare? Second, how are labor taxes and redistribution chosen by a (Stackelberg leader) fiscal authority whose objectives are a weighted average of social welfare and of catering to the interests of political supporters, and how does the general equilibrium induced by this choice affect welfare? The framework of the paper is motivated by the European scene in which the fraction of the labor force covered by collective agreements dominates wage setting in the labor market. 'PLAYERS' AND PAYOFFS: The model economy features labor unions that maximize the expected real income of union members over states of employment and of unemployment, a central bank that strives to minimize the combined costs of inflation and of unemployment, and a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each of which maximizes its profits. The last part of the paper also features a fiscal authority that sets taxes and redistribution so as to maximize a combination of social welfare and of benefits to particular constituencies. Utility from consumption is characterized by means of a CES, Dixit-Stiglitz, utility function and (as in Sidrauski type models) money appears in the utility function. METHODOLOGY AND 'PLAYERS' STRATEGIES: The first question is investigated within a three stage game in which labor unions move first and commit to nominal wages and the central bank moves second and chooses the money supply. In the third and last stage each of a large number of monopolistically competitive firms picks its price. To deal with the second class of questions the game is expanded to feature a preliminary stage in which government chooses labor taxes and redistribution anticipating the subsequent responses of the other players. General equilibrium is characterized and used to find the impact of various economic and institutional parameters.
BASE
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 29, Heft 11, S. 1951-1983
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Economics & politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 247-284
ISSN: 1468-0343
The median voter paradigm (MVP) has been widely used to study the interactions between economic and political behavior. While this approach is easy to work with, it abstracts from institutional detail. This paper explores whether the MVP leads on average to the same policies that would be chosen in a two‐party representative democracy (RD). When it does not, the paper fully characterizes the size and magnitude of the average divergence (or bias) between policy choices in MVP and in RD in terms of the degree of polarization between the parties, their relative electoral prospects, and the distribution of electoral uncertainty. The results are then applied to the influential Meltzer and Richard (1981) theory of the size of government.
In: The Manchester School, Band 71, Heft 5, S. 541-565
ISSN: 1467-9957
The Kydland–Prescott, Barro–Gordon inflation bias result hinges on policymakers aiming at employment above potential. This has been questioned by academics and policymakers on the ground of realism. We show that even if policymakers target the normal level of employment, a bias arises if they are uncertain about economic conditions and are more sensitive to employment below than above normal. This view implies a positive association between inflation and the variance of output shocks. Cross‐sectional empirical evidence from OECD economies supports this implication. We also discuss the consequences for the transparency of monetary policy and for central bank reform.
In: Economics & politics, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 247-284
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 111, Heft 473, S. 541-565
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 99-127
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 423
In: Journal of political economy, Band 90, Heft 1, S. 146-157
ISSN: 1537-534X