Suchergebnisse

A response to Anthony Burke's criticisms in "Against the New Internationalism" (2005) accuses him of using "rhetorical onslaught" as a substitute for compelling argument & failing to offer any empirical evidence to support his claims. Consideration is given to his misleading account of the just war tradition; his failure to offer any real alternative to current norms; & his obvious ignorance of Spider-Man in his misrepresentation of references to the "Spider-Man ethic." The fantasy of Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace & the improbable nature of Burke's prescriptive argument for a world beyond states that relies on collective decision making are pointed out. It is contended that citizens & statepersons are responsible for distinguishing between good & bad reasons for engaging in armed conflict. Burke rightly states that over-ambitious uses of force must be harnessed; however, this is only possible if citizens act politically to correct their own governments &, in order to do this, they need a practical set of principles that sets limits on the use of force. J. Lindroth

I will be arguing against a school of thought and an epistemology.
The school of thought is 'scientific neorealism', as it is
called in the study of international relations. This perspective is
shaped by the insistence that ethics and international politics have
nothing to do with one another, save insofar as morality is brought in
as window dressing in order to disguise what is really going on: the
clash of narrowly self-interested powers. The world of international
relations is construed as a zone of self-help in a Hobbesian clash of a
war of all against all. For more than twenty-five years now, I have
argued that, to the contrary, ethics does not stop at the water's
edge and morality is not silent during war.

The question discussed in this article is whether Christian theology should influence contemporary political debates. The topic is discussed through two practical case studies: (1) technological advances in genetic engineering & (2) the just war tradition & the use of force. In the first discussion, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's unfinished Ethics is employed to demonstrate the importance of substantial theological categories to resist a reductionist technological utilitarian discourse about the body. Intrinsic human dignity is essentially God-given. In the second, Aquinas & Augustine add theological complexity & substance to secular discussions of war & peace. Human caring is more than the protection of the sovereign state. A peace that is only the absence of war can disguise many harmful situations. In conclusion, theological discussion brings nuance, richness, & depth to secular political debates so long as theologians go beyond simplistic contributions such as 'God demands' or 'The Bible forbids'. 4 References. Adapted from the source document.

Elshtain presents a case for the primacy of politics if one would argue persuasively about international justice. Without political stability, all attempts to assist developing states, or to sustain persons caught in the chaos of "failed states," must fail. A concept of justice lies at the heart of this discussion and revolves around the fundamental questions of to whom justice is owed and in what justice consists.Have we any obligations beyond our own borders? If so, what form do these take? These questions are addressed by developing a concept of comparative justice indebted to the just war tradition and tying it to the equal moral regard of persons. This leads, in turn, to two further difficulties. First, what does it mean to make a claim under the equal regard norm? Just war criteria posit certain universal claims in a political universe in which particular bodies politic either respond, or do not, to such claims in light of their own principles and interests. The article develops a citizenship model for cases of humanitarian intervention, rejecting any and all approaches that involve an asymmetrical valuing of human life.Second, who can be called upon to use coercive force in behalf of justice? Elshtain argues that all states have a stake in creating and sustaining an international system of equal regard. But, at present, there is no universal body that can be turned to with any confidence in situations of catastrophic violence, like ethnic cleansing. UN Peacekeepers are effective only after a measure of order is restored. As a result the state, or states, with the greatest capability to project power bears the lion's sharer of responsibility for enforcing an equal regard norm. Elshtain acknowledges the difficulties of articulating a strong universal justice claim while assigning a particular state, or states, and their people a disproportionate enforcement burden. But that best describes the present moment and it is better by far that those with power deploy that power within a framework of principles and constraints rather than solely along the lines of classic realpolitik.

Examines international justice interpreted as an equal claim to the use of coercive force deployed on behalf of victims of radical political instability. It is argued that cries of imperialism do not hold for the kind of intervention described here, as it does not involve colonialism or similar imposition of power & need be observed with the idea that such intervention will succeed to aid those in need. Ancient Greek philosophy & Christian theological considerations underpin much of the discussion. The obligation to intervene & the idea of universal justice embedded in the just war tradition are explored before making a call for the use of force as a remedy under a justice claim centered on equal regard & inviolable human dignity. The notion of humanitarian intervention is compared to the idea of equal regard, the latter requiring that those states of greater power, ie, the US, have greater responsibility to enforce an international system of equal moral regard. J. Zendejas

Justice and Punishment begins promisingly. Matt Matravers notes that the question—"Why and by what right, do some people punish others?"—is "not a new question. The problem of punishment is one of the most enduring in political theory" (p. 1). But over the years, punishment theory has been separated from moral and political philosophy more generally. The upshot is that both punishment theory and moral and political philosophy have suffered. To put things right, Matravers avers, any adequate theory of punishment "must be rooted in a broader moral theory, and that broader moral theory will be … constructivist" (p. 1). It is the task of his book to explore why and how this is so.