Suchergebnisse

The impact of regulatory competition on policy outcomes and particularly on policy innova-tion is widely debated among scientists from different fields as well as among policymakers. In this paper, Swiss cantonal regulation is studied in order to gain further insights into the policy impact of regulatory competition and harmonization. Starting from a theoretical per-spective that particularly emphasizes the beneficial impact of inter-jurisdictional competition on policy innovations, and a discussion of the existing empirical evidence on regulatory com-petition, the development of the common market, regulatory competition and harmonization in Switzerland across time is analyzed. In an econometric analysis of the extent of regulation at the Swiss cantonal level, some indicative empirical evidence on the main determinants of Swiss cantonal regulation is derived.

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives' potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the Euro¬pean Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU le¬vel. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competen¬cies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European fede¬ration should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.

This article assesses the EU's financial perspective 2007-2013 & Agenda 2007 from an economic point of view. It starts by considering the economic theory of federalism as a yardstick for evaluation. As the actual financial activities of the EU cannot be explained solely in terms of interregional externalities or arguments from economies of scale, politico-economic factors -- such as the impact of decision-making power in the Council & the Parliament -- must also be taken into account when explaining EU spending. The article argues that the budgetary activities of the EU result from a political game between member states in which they demand compensation payments in exchange for economic integration in the ED. Furthermore, the Parliament can be seen to be expanding its influence by increasing the weight of non-compulsory spending over time. In conclusion, it emerges that the Commission's proposal sets out to both allocate additional EU finances in the area of EU public goods & provide a potential means for meeting the political needs of the Council's negotiations. It is therefore an ambitious proposal with a high risk of failure. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Starting from the economic theory of federalism, this chapter surveys the development of EU revenue, spending and off-budget activities, discusses the redistributive impact of EU finances on member states, and budgetary decision-making procedures. The analysis is guided by a political economics perspective on the interaction between the different players in EU decision-making and the institutional restrictions they face. This involves the interests of the Commission, the Parliament as well as those of the single countries in the Council. They are restricted by the system of member states' contributions to the EU and the balanced budget requirement, but also by the budgetary procedures that determine individual decision-making powers.

In this paper, German federalism is analysed with respect to its implications for public spending and revenue. Since the Second World War, taxing and spending competencies in Germany have become more and more centralised. This is demonstrated with respect to (1) changes of the power to tax, (2) the important territorial reforms, and (3) the increase of the federal influence on spending of sub-federal jurisdictions. In addition, the fiscal equalization system between jurisdictions is too egalitarian and the effects of German fiscal federalism on regional development are disastrous. Compared to unitary states with a powerful central government, this kind of cooperative federalism has the disadvantage of a federal state which cannot often decide anything without the consent of the states. Consequently, many reforms are blocked in the struggle between Bundestag and Bundesrat. It appears that only the introduction of fiscal competition between the states is able to improve economic policy in Germany.

Tax competition is much discussed in the political arena these days. Although it is not a new phenomenon, the political pressure has increased to restrict tax competition by intensifying tax coordination and accomplishing tax harmonization. This particularly holds for the EU which has established a Code of Conduct for business taxation in 1997 and is about to establish a system of information exchange with respect to capital income taxation (allowing Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg a minimum source tax on capital income as an alternative). In 2001, the Commission has additionally released the so called 'Ruding II'-report in which a uniform corporate tax base with formulary apportionment is proposed for the EU. In addition, the OECD (1998) aims at stronger tax coordination among its members also favoring a system of information exchange. Such a system would necessarily involve the abolishment of (or the reduction of the strictness of) bank secrecy laws around the world (Feld 2002).