Suchergebnisse

An article based on the contribution or three authors. Former political secretary of the Flemish ecological party Green! Geysels remembers the main strategies at the start of the sanitary cordon in Belgium in 1989. After summing up the effects and impact of these statements, he defends the cordon as an instrument which helps to protect the bases of democracy. De Lange, in the second contribution, Right-populist political parties and sketches the academic outlines of the discussion. She warns against unilateral, unfounded and unwise propositions in the debate, certainly when it concerns translating the Belgian experience to the current Dutch situation. Professor Fennema, the third author, studied the forming of extreme Right parties in Europe and is president of the Center of Radicalism and Extremism Studies CRES. He writes of the Dutch experience with the sanitary cordon and its consequences on contemporary political debate in the Netherlands, which has changed into a debate in terms of fear and hate. All three authors emphasize that a comparison between the Flemish and Dutch experience falls: in Flanders, where the cordon functions since 20 years, no party was ever forbidden. In the Netherlands, where discussion on the sanitary cordon has been bled, that happened. O. van Zijl

AbstractWhat impact did the recent financial crisis have on the corporate elite's international network? Has corporate governance taken on an essentially national structure or have transnational networks remained robust? We investigate this issue by comparing the networks of interlocking directorates among the 176 largest corporations in the world economy in 1976, 1996, 2006 and 2013. We find that corporate elites have not retrenched into their national business communities: the transnational network increased in relative importance and remained largely intact during the crisis lasting from 2006 to 2013. However, this network does not depend – as it used to do – on a small number of big linkers but on a growing number of single linkers. The network has become less hierarchical. As a group, the corporate elite has become more transnational in character. We see this as indicative of a recomposition of the corporate elite from a national to a transnational orientation.

This article contributes to an understanding of how business–state relations have evolved over past decades by analyzing elite interlocks between the corporate sector and the state over the period 1969–2006 in the Netherlands. These interlocks create links between the top decision centers of the largest corporations and public administration. A comparative analysis over time of the network of corporate–state interlocks for the years 1969, 1996 and 2006 reveals that ties that were very frequent in 1969 are in decline, reflecting and confirming a rapid disentanglement of the corporate sector from what was until the 1980s an example of neo-corporatist socio-economic arrangement. The disappearance of industrial policy, privatization of state-owned corporations, the emergence of autonomous administrative units, and the 'hollowing out' of the state, all contribute to the fading of the state. The network structure that remains in place – albeit thin – is not dominated by either the state or business but rather a partnership between separate forces. At the same time many of the previous state–business relations are now established outside the span of control of the state. The state is left out. Our study suggests that by the time the financial crisis hit in 2007, the social fabric making for fruitful state–business cooperation was gone.

Over the past 2 decades, some anti-immigrant parties have managed to gain substantial electoral support in various European countries, most notably, Austria ( Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) and Flanders ( Vlaams Blok). However, in other countries, the success of such parties either has been insignificant or did not last. The most popular models of support for anti-immigrant parties focus primarily on the demand side of the electoral process. The authors develop a model to explain differences in aggregate-level support for these parties, which also takes into account the supply side. This model builds upon an explanation provided by Kitschelt. The model is tested empirically for 13 European anti-immigrant parties in the period from 1989 to 1999, altogether yielding 25 party-year combinations. The authors test the sociostructural model and their alternative model at the level of political parties. The sociostructural model explains 3% of the variance in success, whereas the authors' model explains 83%.

In this article we address the question whether or not the votes for anti-immigrant parties can be considered as protest votes. We define protest votes by the motives underlying electoral choices, building on earlier research done by Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). That research showed that ideological proximity and party size are the best predictors of party preference. On this basis we designed a typology of motives for party choice and how these motives would manifest themselves empirically. Analyzing the 1994 elections for the European Parliament for seven political systems we show that anti-immigrant parties attract no more protest votes than other parties do, with only one exception: the Dutch Centrumdemocraten. Voting for anti-immigrant parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties. In addition, (negative) attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties. Social cleavages and attitudes towards European unification are of minor importance as determinants of preferences for anti-immigrant parties. The overall conclusion is that a rational choice model of electoral behaviour has strong explanatory power for party preferences in general, but also for the support for anti-immigrant parties in particular. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Abstract. In this article we address the question whether or not the votes for anti–immigrant parties can be considered as protest votes. We define protest votes by the motives underlying electoral choices, building on earlier research done by Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). That research showed that ideological proximity and party size are the best predictors of party preference. On this basis we designed a typology of motives for party choice and how these motives would manifest themselves empirically. Analyzing the 1994 elections for the European Parliament for seven political systems we show that anti–immigrant parties attract no more protest votes than other parties do, with only one exception: the Dutch Centrumdemocraten. Voting for anti–immigrant parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties. In addition, (negative) attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti–immigrant parties than on preference for other parties. Social cleavages and attitudes towards European unification are of minor importance as determinants of preferences for anti–immigrant parties. The overall conclusion is that a rational choice model of electoral behavior has strong explanatory power for party preferences in general, but also for the support for anti–immigrant parties in particular.

Migrant Politicans in Amsterdam : Self Image and Image of Others.
Brieuc-Yves Cadat et Meindert Fennema.
How to understand the formation of ethnic and anti-racist identities and the relationship between these identities and political strategies? Based on interviews with twenty-nine migrant politicians, candidates or elected politicians, in 1990 and 1994, the article answers the questions. The Turkish politicians argue predominantly from an « ethnic perspective ». Surinamese and Antillean politicians, on the other hand, tend to argue from an « anti-racist » perspective. Moroccans take an intermediate position. The self-images of these three groups were reflected in the image they had of each other. These rival images suggest potential conflict in the existing advocacy coalition of migrant politicians.